OCCUPATION

OF

CRACOW.

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OCCUPATION OF CRACOW.

Notes addressed by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to the President and the Senate of the Free Town of Cracow. Dated the 9th and 16th of February, 1836.

Proclamations of General Kaufman, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Troops on the Territory of Cracow. Dated the 17th of February, 1836.

Nouvelle Constitution de la Ville libre de Cracovie. Dated the 30th of May, 1833.

Debate in the House of Commons on the Questions addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by Sir STRATFORD CANNING, on the 18th of March, 1836.

IN our number for last October, we laid before our readers the motives which then appeared to us sufficiently powerful for inducing the British Government to send, without delay, a diplomatic agent to the free town of Cracow. We urged this measure as much with a view to future changes, as to the performance of the obligations imposed upon us by the treaty of Vienna. Since the publication of that article, events with which the public are familiarly acquainted, and which the official documents at the head of these pages abundantly attest, have shown that our prognostications were not exaggerated or prema-

ture. The occupation of Cracow and the abrogation of its nominal privileges have set the seal of truth upon the representations we then made. We shall not indulge in any comments on the conduct of those who, by a month's delay, have sacrificed an advantageous position which might have been preserved for an indefinite period. But the great and merited interest which this event has produced in Europe, warrants us in recurring to arrangements now so foully broken; in reviving recollections now so barbarously effaced; and in renewing remonstrances which have more than once been preferred in vain, but which can never be slighted with impunity. The occupation of Cracow by the northern allies, has done more to excite the indignation and the apprehensions of civil society in the west of Europe than the capture of Warsaw itself. The fall of the capital of Poland was the termination of an unequal conflict, which had filled Europe with the noise of arms; the occupation of Cracow is an act of aggression in the midst of profound peace, and a result of that diplomatic strategy which rarely betrays its purposes until they are consummated. The former was the triumph of an overwhelming vengeance; the latter is the successful display of an insinuating ambition: and Europe is roused to fresh sympathy with Poland when fresh attacks bear witness to her enduring energy and to her protracted misfortunes. We may then claim the attention of our readers while we lay before them some account of the negociations, which accompanied the original creation of the independent republic of Cracow, and of the events which have attended its recent Occupation.

It is well known that the question of Poland long occupied the Congress of Vienna, and kept all the powers, assembled upon that memorable occasion, in suspense. Russia had successively repudiated the project of creating an independent Polish kingdom, as well as of a new partition of the Duchy of Warsaw—a state which remained at the close of the war in the exclusive occupation of her armies. She had at last succeeded in obtaining possession of the Duchy under the title of the kingdom of Poland, when a fresh difficulty, scarcely less serious, arose with regard to the City of Cracow.

At that time Cracow belonged to the Duchy of Warsaw; but it had been subject to Austria during the whole period, which elapsed between the third partition of Poland in 1795 and the peace of 1809, when it was added to the Duchy. The Emperor Alexander conceded to Prussia that considerable portion of the Polish territory, which has since been called the Grand Duchy of Posen. Austria at first laid claim to an equivalent concession; but she soon desisted from her own pretensions, in order to insist with greater force on an arrangement destined to prevent Russia from advancing in a direction which threatened the only line of communication* between Vienna and Gallicia. The road between the capital of the Austrian empire and that province passes within a league and a half of Cracow. The position of the town commands a passage of the Vistula: the town itself is protected by the river. It is evident that the possession of Cracow would give Russia an immense advantage over Austria, since it must enable a Russian army to issue from the gates of the city, and to cut off Gallicia from the rest of the empire by a single march. Austria was so deeply interested in obviating this exposure to attack, that the contracting powers were induced to sanction the existence of an independent intermediate state, on that point of territory. With a view to increase its importance, a proposal was made to extend its frontiers, and to confer it upon the Prince Gustavus Vasa, the legitimate heir to the throne of Sweden, by way of compensation for the kingdom he had lost. The Emperor Alexander perhaps recollected that the Vasas had more than once worn the crown of Poland during the seventeenth century, and he dreaded the influence associated with their name; perhaps other motives operated to restrict the boundaries of the projected state. Bu it was finally determined by the Congress that Cracow should be constituted a FREE TOWN, with a territory of 496 square miles on the left bank of the Vistula, and a population of

* This road was the only line of communication before the construction of the two military roads, which now cross the Carpathian Mountains from Hungary to Gallicia; these routes are usually rendered impracticable in winter by the snow.

110,000 inhabitants. Austria obtained a confidential assurance by which Russia pledged herself never to post a body of troops in that part of the kingdom of Poland which lies beyond the Nida, a river flowing within about fifty miles of Cracow. Austria on her side, "granted* to the *riveraine* town of Podgorze (opposite to Cracow and belonging to Austria) the "privileges of a free trading town in perpetuity;" and promised "never to establish, within that town or within a distance of "500 toises, any military posts which may threaten the "neutrality of Cracow†."

When the general basis of this arrangement was determined, the political condition and the privileges of the new State of Cracow, were regulated and recognised in the following official acts:—

First.—In the treaty relating to the whole of Poland, concluded between Russia and Austria, on the 3rd of May, 1815.

Secondly.—In a similar treaty concluded between Russia and Prussia, and bearing the same date.

Thirdly.—In the additional treaty relating to Cracow, concluded between Russia, Austria, and Prussia: same date.

Fourthly.—In the constitution of the free town of Cracow, annexed to the last-mentioned treaty.

Fifthly, and lastly.—In the general act of the Treaty of Vienna, which repeats the principal stipulations of these partial treaties in its first fourteen articles, and declares afterwards, Art. 118, "That they are considered as integral parts of the "arrangements of the Congress, and shall have everywhere "the same force and effect as if they were inserted, word for "word, in the general Treaty‡."

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* Art. 8, Acte Général du Traité de Vienne.

† In conformity with this reciprocal engagement, no Russian or Polish troops were posted beyond the Nida, from the conclusion of the treaty of Vienna to the ear 1831. The Polish insurrection furnished the Russian troops with a pretext for invading Cracow; and after they evacuated the territory of the Republic, a large body remained upon the frontier. The Austrians construed this position of their neighbours in their own way; and in direct contradiction to Art. 8 of the treaty, they maintain a strong garrison in the town of Podgorze.

‡ See for further details an able article "On the necessity of appointing "a British diplomatic agent at Cracow," in the *Polonia*, No. II., Nov. 1832, p. 262.

The future condition of the free town of Cracow was thus regulated and solemnly guaranteed, not only by the powers most interested in the maintenance of its neutrality, but by all the contracting powers of the Congress. In the foundation of this new state, each party was actuated principally by the desire of obtaining the securities which it conceived to be most essential, either to the preservation of its actual possessions, or to the cherished purpose of future aggrandizement.

But in the midst of these discussions, dictated by egotism and ambition, the unexpected creation of the independent republic of Cracow was hailed, with very different feelings, by those who had never ceased to evoke, before the assembled powers of Europe, the great and undying shade of Poland:—of that Poland which lived, as she still lives, in the hearts of all generous and provident men—and which seemed to meet with a zealous defender even in the Emperor Alexander (who was become the principal arbiter of her future destinies), or at least in some of his counsellors, amongst whom the Prince Adam Czartoryski then held a distinguished place. Thus the effaced, but still unbroken, image of the Polish empire occurred once more in that great act which comprised the labours of the European Congress.

Already, under the impression produced by principles which were proclaimed at the Congress of Vienna, however imperfectly they may have since been observed in practice, certain rights were guaranteed to *all the inhabitants of the ancient kingdom alike*, that is to say, to all the natives of what was the Polish territory before the first partition in 1772*. These rights and privileges, which were recognised in the first fourteen articles of the Treaty, promised to exercise upon their welfare an influence partly direct and positive, partly moral and indirect—partly of an immediate, partly of an ulterior effect. The first consisted:—

In the assurance of national and representative institutions, given to all the Polish subjects of the high contracting parties:

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* Art. 14, Acte Général du Traité de Vienne.

In " the most unlimited liberty of transit throughout " all parts of ancient Poland . . . with the view of facili- " tating the import and export trade between the said " parts; . . . and the free navigation of the rivers and canals " in all ancient Poland; as also the frequenting of such " seaports as they can reach by the navigation of the said " rivers;" and

Lastly.—In " the most unlimited circulation of all the " inhabitants of the Polish provinces, and of the produce of " agriculture and industry between all parts of ancient Poland, " as it existed before the year 1772."

Besides these material privileges, which were of immense importance in themselves, not for Poland alone, but for Europe and European commerce, if they had been ever put into execution, the Treaty gave rise to numerous moral advantages, which were not less valuable to all the Poles indiscriminately. These advantages were derived from the preservation of the nucleus of their country in the new kingdom of Poland; and from the existence of a national government and a national army, though both were to remain in dependence upon the Russian sceptre. While their language, their literature, and their ancient academic institutions were maintained over the whole face of the country.

The creation of the independent state of Cracow, which closed these favourable stipulations, was the fitting completion of the principle they laid down, and, as it were, an appropriate symbol of their integral spirit and object.

No point on the Polish territory could have been better selected for this purpose: no spot in the country comprises within a narrow space so many of the touching recollections and the kindling hopes of Poland. The city of Cracow is said to have been founded by Cracus, whose warlike exploits in the earlier part of the eighth century, are narrated by Gregory of Tours. It was the royal residence of a long line of Polish kings, and the seat of that dynasty of the Jagellons, who, at once philosophers, warriors, and the fathers of their people, were the first sovereigns in modern Europe to give a noble example of liberty flourishing by the side of monarchy, and of toleration by the side of Catholicism,

during the worst years of religious persecution. While science and the arts were diligently cultivated, from the first revival of letters, in the midst of wars and triumphs occasioned by the perpetual incursions of the Tartars, Muscovites, and Ottomans*.

In the seventeenth century the royal residence was transferred to Warsaw, but Cracow still continued to be the sacred city in which the kings of Poland were crowned and interred. This custom, united to the numerous vestiges of its great antiquity and ancient splendour, confers upon the town a solemn and mysterious character, in the hearts of the Poles, which more recent occurrences have still further heightened. By a fortuitous concourse of events, its territory has proved a classic soil, where fresh heroes appeared to start from the ashes of the dead. There, on the 24th of March, 1794, Kosciusko raised the standard of his immortal insurrection; and near those walls he won his first victory, at the head

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* Cellarius the historian relates, that in 1652 the plague destroyed 173,000 Christians, and 20,000 Jews in the city of Cracow. This statement may be somewhat exaggerated, but it serves to give an idea of the size of the town at that period.

In 1364 a brilliant assemblage of sovereign princes took place at Cracow, to witness the marriage of Charles IV., Emperor of Germany, with a niece of Casimir the Great, King of Poland. The chronicles of the time are filled with details of the magnificence displayed on that occasion. The company consisted of Peter, King of Cyprus, Louis, King of Hungary and afterwards King of Poland, Sigismund, King of Denmark, the Dukes of Bavaria, Mazovia, Schweidnitz, and Pomerania, the Pope's Nuncio, &c.

Cracow, notwithstanding the constant attachment of its university to the Catholic faith, was the scene of numerous controversies, and the asylum of a great number of victims of religious persecution. In 1431 a great disputation took place, in which the Academy of Cracow defended the edicts of the Council of Basle against the delegates of the Hussites, who came from Bohemia. Among these delegates the name of one Peter Payne, an Englishman, occurs. At the close of the same century the celebrated Italian, Callimachus Experiens, who was menaced by Pope Paul II., found a refuge at the court of Casimir Jagellon, who entrusted him with the education of his sons, and honoured his memory by a mausoleum in the cathedral of Cracow, which contains the remains of most of the kings and great men of Poland.

A novel recently translated into English under the title of " The Court of " Sigismund Augustus," gives an accurate and interesting picture of Cracow and its court in the sixteenth century.

of his followers, who fought with scythe blades against the disciplined troops of Russia. There, in 1813, Poniatowski made a last halt with his small army, which was doubled in crossing the town, whence it followed its adored leader till he fell on the plains of Leipsic. The mortal remains of those two captains were brought home by their soldiers; and repose in the royal vault, beside the tomb of Sobieski. Between the years 1818 and 1824 an immense tumulus of earth was raised by the whole Polish nation to the memory of Kosciuscko. This monument rises several hundred feet above the Vistula, in the immediate vicinity of the city. It is formed of soil brought from every part of Poland; from every field which has been consecrated by a religious patriotism, or hallowed by the reminiscences of glory; by all ranks and all classes of Poles, who eagerly united to add their wheel-barrow load of Polish earth to the indestructible monument of Kosciusko's fame. We remember no more striking trait than this, in the history of any nation. Here is a pyramid, not erected by the toil of a myriad fellahs, the ponderous and fantastic boast of some barbarous Cheops, but built up by the exertions of a nation, free in labour and in heart, to the memory of an approved patriot.

This mountain-monument, is moreover a striking testimony of the unanimity of feeling, hope, and regret, which prevailed throughout the ancient provinces of Poland. The toleration which the three governments of Petersburgh, Berlin, and Vienna, displayed on that occasion, was a last token of their homage and assent to the great principle of the Treaty of Vienna, designed to maintain the existence of the Polish nation, notwithstanding the dismemberment of the country, and promising a more fortunate condition to that people amidst the uncertain events of the future.

None of the stipulations of the Congress of Vienna furnished a more vital guarantee to this fundamental principle, than the creation of the free and sovereign state of Cracow. The city became the last asylum of the Polish nationality which remained independent upon that spot alone. It became, more than ever, the Westminster Abbey of Poland; and thenceforward her children knew no higher ambition than

that of obtaining the honour of a grave at the foot of the great tumulus of Kosciusko, and upon a soil still free from the pollution of a foreign foot.

But Cracow obtained at Vienna another advantage, which promised to give her a still more direct influence upon the future destinies of Poland. Its university, called the Jagellonian University, founded in the fourteenth century, was placed under special protection of the treaty. The ancient statutes were solemnly confirmed*; its possession guaranteed; and it was expressly stipulated that the Polish subjects of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, should be allowed to carry on their studies in that academy. This fact alone would be sufficient to establish beyond a doubt that nothing was further from the spirit of the treaty of Vienna, or even from the avowed intentions of the three Courts, than to transform the Poles into Russians, Prussians, or Austrians.

It may seem strange that a European treaty should regulate such minute details, and that the guaranty of all the powers should interpose its authority between governments and their subjects, instead of confining itself to international relations. This observation is not a new one; it has already been objected to those who have claimed, in favour of Poland, that guaranty, and the protection which it implies. But at the Congress of Vienna the instability inherent in the arrangements then made with regard to Poland, and the consequent necessity of intervening protection, was obvious to the assembled diplomatists, and during a great part of the Congress, it gave rise to the most serious objections. These objections were not only urged by the agents of England, Austria, and Prussia, but they were admitted by the confidential advisers of

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* Art. 15,—Additional treaty relating to Cracow. The ancient statutes of the university were annulled and superseded by the new Organic Statute, of the 15th of August, 1833, imposed upon the university by the three protectors. To judge of its spirit, it is sufficient to know that it deprives the government of the Republic of the right of appointing the professors. This right is reserved to the three Protecting Courts, who have, for that purpose, distributed among themselves the different faculties. Austria has taken that of medicine; Prussia that of law; and the faculty of divinity in this Catholic university, has been confided, not to Austria, who alone maintains Catholicism as the religion of the state, but to Russia, who pursues that religion with unrelenting persecution throughout her dominions!

Alexander himself. We quote the following sentence from a note presented by one of them to that prince in October 1814:—"Une constitution qui réunirait la Pologne Russe à "l'Empire sous le nom de Royaume, entretiendrait dans les "Polonais Russes une disposition à rétablir leur indépen- "dance, et dans ceux qui resteraient aux autres puissances, "une tendance à s'en détacher. La Russie serait toujours "disposée à substituer à l'union l'incorporation; la Pologne "serait inquiète sur la conservation de ses droits, et son "inquiétude prendrait facilement un caractère séditieux. De "là résulterait un systême d'envahissement progressif dans un "sens ou dans l'autre, qui se terminerait après de nouvelles "secousses, par l'assujettissement ou la séparation."

These views were the reason for the precautions taken by the other contracting powers of the Congress, to ensure the duration of such frail arrangements. At the same time, the assurances given by Russia made the acquisition of the kingdom of Poland wear the appearance of a merely defensive advantage, calculated rather to diminish than to increase her aggressive powers. Nevertheless, whilst he yielded to necessity, Lord Castlereagh pointed out, in the most powerful manner, "the "dangers which might justly be apprehended from the reunion "of a powerful Polish monarchy with the still more powerful "empire of Russia; if the military force of the two countries "should be united under the command of an ambitious and "warlike monarch."

The main security against those dangers was sought for in the preservation of the nationality of the whole Polish nation, which was henceforward entrusted to the *interested* protection of all the European powers. But the arrangements made by the Congress were subjected to an inevitable alternative: either of acquiring solidity by the gradual development of their natural and legitimate consequences; or, of degenerating into a state of things directly opposed to the avowed object of the treaty. The precaution which was indispensable to ensure the former alternative, and to the complete adjustment of the Polish question, was the *vigilance* of the contracting parties. They were bound at least to inform themselves how the conditions were executed, upon which Europe had ratified the possession of the different portions of Poland by three sovereigns,

who had, till then, been nothing more than successful usurpers. And it became their especial duty—*a duty which may still be performed*—never to lose sight of their right of diplomatic surveillance over the internal situation of Poland; and never to allow that duty and that right to fall into disuse. But none of these obligations have been fulfilled—none of these precautions have been taken; the consequence is, that on this, as well as on every other point where Russia has been the rival of other powers, since the peace, she alone has derived benefit from the incidents which have arisen or could arise, and from the very stipulations which were framed to resist her aggrandizement.

If we revert to the treaties of 1815, and investigate their bearing and purpose in 1836, after such numerous and flagrant violations, it is assuredly with no view of obtaining simple redress, and of restoring an apparent harmony between the actual state of things and the letter of our conventions. There are positions which no art can restore, when they have once been lost. Henceforward we only recur to their present violation, as to an event which liberates us from all reciprocal engagements*. Those engagements have long and naturally been regarded as binding upon all the powers which subscribed them; but our government might perhaps have shaken them off much sooner, if it had appreciated with more accuracy and foresight the conduct and the intentions of certain continental cabinets. We apprehend, that by pointing out the cause and the object of a stipulation which is now cancelled, we not only demonstrate its inefficacy for the future even more than for the past, but we necessarily show what new precautions must be taken, and what modifications must be made in the treaty to ensure the accomplishment of its purpose. It is evident,

* We cannot forbear quoting the language in which Lord Palmerston characterised the violation of the territory of Cracow, in reply to the questions addressed to him by Sir Stratford Canning on the 18th of March:—"I am bound to say that I do not see any sufficient justification of the violent measures which have been adopted towards Cracow—a step which, to say the least, was one of unnecessary violence....a proceeding which bears upon one of the most important diplomatic transactions of the day." "It is of as much importance to us to see that the independence of a state like Cracow be not causelessly and wantonly disturbed, as if the case were that of Prussia, or any other powerful nation."—(See the *Mirror of Parliament*, 18th of March, 1836.)

that the object of the first fourteen articles of the treaty of Vienna was to preserve Europe from the dangers, with which the unconditional incorporation of the military forces of Poland with those of Russia, would have menaced it.

The violation of those solemn conditions therefore implies not only an outrage, but a danger to Europe. These expressions, indeed, are synonimous in politics. But we designedly signalize the *danger*, besides the outrage, although the actual event which has provoked these observations has not, in itself, a direct influence on the balance of power. It is not indeed credible that Russia should have dared this new outrage in the face of Europe, if she had not had in view more important designs than the mere restoration of tranquillity in a neighbouring city—a tranquillity which, in point of fact, had remained undisturbed. It is not credible that Russia should have ventured upon this step, without some pressing object: — Russia, engaged at this moment in purposes of a far wider and a deeper character, and alarmed (we trust not without reason) at the awakening of Europe to the plans and the progress of her unbounded ambition. She had a thousand means at her disposal for bending to her will the government, and even the inhabitants of Cracow, without transgressing the conditions of the treaty. The experience she has had of the placid temper of France and England— to use no harsher term — might have convinced her that it would be easy to restrain their resentment, if not to satisfy their remonstrances, by a few courteous phrases. Those governments have invariably displayed the utmost readiness, not only to receive, but even to invent the most absurd pretexts in excuse of her most outrageous acts. But in this particular instance, their assent would have marred the mischief she had in view. Our subservience might have gratified her self-complacency, but it would not have advanced her end. The object of Russia was precisely to insult the governments of France and England in the eyes of all Europe. The English government was more peculiarly the object of her contemptuous silence. The fact is, that a confidential communication was made by the Austrian government to the French cabinet, within a very short time after the occupation, accompanied by a proposal that France

should receive the unfortunate refugees, who were threatened with transportation to America. To England, however, no communication whatsoever was made:—a circumstance which Lord Palmerston, on the 18th of March, chose to consider "as an involuntary homage to the justice and plain-dealing of "this country;" and as a proof "that they were aware we "should never have given our assent to such a proceeding."

If we be asked whence this lust of insult could proceed on the part of Russia, we reply, that the object was not only to crush Cracow, but Poland, in her cradle, and sanctuary. In order to complete her annihilation, it is necessary to destroy the lingering hopes of the Polish populations, by attempting to degrade those governments and national assemblies which have ventured to declare their unalterable adherence to rights which they deem sacred. Russia is not free to turn her attention and employ her resources elsewhere, until the Polish question is finally settled conformably to her views; and until the last spark of those hopes is gone out, which are always ready to break out afresh with the first blast of war in Europe. The most essential step for this purpose is to discourage the stirring spirits of those provinces, by casting obloquy upon the nations, they do not cease to regard as their natural allies.

After having placed the question in this light, our readers will not expect us to give a circumstantial account of the events which preceded and accompanied the occupation of Cracow. For Europe, and for England, it is not upon the *manner* in which this violation took place, that we require to dwell; but upon the *fact of the violation of treaties*, and on the motives which dictated it. The facts moreover are sufficiently well known; and after having compared accounts received from the most authentic quarters, with the statements which have been made by the journals of this country, and in the House of Commons, we can safely assert that the public has been very exactly informed of the circumstances of the case. The speech of Sir Stratford Canning, on the 18th of March, may be considered as the most complete account of the facts; and it contains a full discussion of the case, treated in a manner worthy of a statesman.

Some false assertions which have been circulated, for the

customary purpose of palliating violence by calumny, may, however, deserve our notice, although they can hardly have earned belief.

Several months before the occupation, the German papers began to spread reports that Cracow was become a focus of sedition, and a haunt of political assassins. These inventions were carefully contradicted by the official Gazette of Cracow of the 23rd of January*; for the object with which they had been put forward was but too obvious to the government of the republic, and justly awakened its alarm. An assassination† had in reality been committed with every mark of personal revenge, but nothing has ever justified the assertion that this crime was instigated by a secret revolutionary tribunal, of which no traces have ever been discovered. All accounts from Cracow state that the city and its territory had been in the enjoyment of the most perfect tranquillity for several years; and that the only secret society known to exist was one whose ramifications extend into the Austrian possessions, under the title of the Society of Young Sclavonians. The object of that society is sufficiently disclosed by the names of persons, honoured by the special favour of the Russian government, who are to be found amongst its members‡. The tenor of the official documents at the head of this article proves, that the residents of the three powers endeavoured to gain over the Senate of Cracow to share the reponsibility of the measure, and even to demand the occupation of the town. Their attempt was fruitless; and as if to remove every pretext from the three powers, five hundred refugees—the greater part of the whole body—had surrendered themselves within six days on the simple invitation of the Senate. Nevertheless this fact did not prevent the entrance of the troops, nor the accusations of ill-will which were directed against the Senate by the Residents. The estimable president of the Republic, Wieloglowski, sent in his resignation; and his successor was appointed, in direct contradiction to all laws, by the power which has usurped all

* See the *Times* of the 6th of February, 1836.

† Upon the person of a Jew, engaged in the service of the Russian secret police, known at different times and places under various feigned names.

‡ See the *Portfolio*, Vol. I, p. 499; and Vol. II., p. 79.

authority in Cracow, under the assumed title of a Conference of the Residents of the three protecting Courts.

The troops which entered the territory of the Republic were in number 3000 men, of whom 560 were mounted. The Conference informed the Senate, in its note of the 16th of February, that these troops were to be maintained "*comme il est de règle*"* at the expense of the Republic as long as the occupation lasted. This however is not all; and we can scarcely contain our indignation when we have to state the increase of evil, that the stupid silence of the western Powers when they received the intelligence of the occupation, encouraged Russia to commit. Notwithstanding the positive declaration of the residents that the refugees should be transported to America, if no European Power offered them an asylum, Russia incurred the odium of taking forcible possession of several of their persons; and Austria was not ashamed to deliver up to her ally some of those individuals who had already surrendered themselves to her at Podgorze, in conformity to the summons issued by the Government, and whom she was bound in honor to protect.

It is not, however, we repeat, these details which claim our attention. The essential point at the present moment is not so much to heal the individual sufferings which have been caused by great political faults, as to put an end to those faults and to repair them†. Our great error since 1815, and that in which all the other mistakes of our foreign policy have originated, has been the total want of surveillance over the maintenance of European affairs which was in fact effected by ourselves. Harassed by the immense efforts we had then made, and satisfied with the result of our victory, our statesmen imagined that thenceforward we might adopt a new system,

* This *règle* doubtless alludes to the *precedent* which had been established by the Russian corps which entered the town in 1831, and remained for two months on the territory. The General had declared upon that occasion that he should pay for all that was supplied to his army, but he marched off without performing his promise, and declared that the free town deserved that punishment for its disaffection.

† We cannot however pass over in silence the unfortunate persons who have been ejected from Cracow. The French Government has set a generous example in receiving part of them, and in granting them a subsidy; and we are persuaded that the House of Commons will not refuse to vote such a supplementary sum of money as the Government shall propose upon this occasion.

and remain perfect strangers to the destinies of Europe, of which we had just before been the arbiters. They supposed that we might cease to dread the influence of a preponderating power in the affairs of Europe, although such an influence always threatens our most important interests, by whomsoever it may be possessed.

In treating the question of Cracow, we have uniformly alluded to Russia alone; for our readers will already have understood that Austria and Prussia were only the subordinate accomplices of the deed. It would be easy to draw an instructive parallel between the league of 1772, by which the first partition of Poland was accomplished, and the league of 1836, by which the same powers have consummated an analogous injustice on a somewhat narrower stage. Now, as then, Austria has been first drawn into an unwilling assent, and afterwards compelled to take a prominent part in the tragedy; whilst Prussia appears as the more intimate and interested supporter of the designs of Russia. Now, as then, France* and England have held aloof, from a base dread of demanding redress for an outrage, to which not one but three Powers had given their sanction. In the present, as well as in the former case, the outrage will soon prove a danger irresistibly to call forth our alarm. This danger proceeds from Russia, and from Russia alone. And there are no powers better acquainted with it than Prussia and Austria, whom it has already led to degradation.

To repel that danger the first point is to face it, and to

* As for the position of France, we beg to illustrate the conduct of her present cabinet by a quotation from Gentz on the state of Europe, which derives double importance from the position of that author as the Secretary of Prince Metternich.

"It was owing to accidental circumstances, and to the weakness and mistakes of those who managed the affairs of France, that the revolutions which Russia projected in Turkey, and actually accomplished in Poland, could be attempted, and to a certain degree executed. It is now well known and generally acknowledged, that the partition of Poland might have been prevented by the timely interference of France; and that Austria herself would have opposed that partition, if the French ministry had not declared that they beheld it with indifference. It is no less certain that France might have prevented the breaking out of the last war with Turkey, or otherwise have powerfully supported the Ottoman Porte, had not the beginning of her internal dissensions at that time weakened her efforts and diminished her influence."—(*Gentz, State of Europe*, p. 21; published 1803.)

obtain ocular and certain information relative to the true state of all these positions. But have we followed the course of events? Have we had timely advice in Cracow or Poland, in Turkey or Persia, in Sweden or Germany, of the unceasing and daily progress of Russian influence and domination? If we have remained in ignorance, how was it possible to offer an effective resistance; or to combine in opposition to her those States by which she is detested, and which have more than once made a vain appeal to us for co-operation*? Far from engaging them on our side by an effective protection, or an imposing attitude, we have allowed Russia to reduce them one by one, first to impotence, and afterwards to servitude. Whenever we come forward to remonstrate, the evil has been already achieved; so that our trivial choler only serves to encourage our antagonist by a display of our inactivity, and to hasten the accomplishment of his enterprise.

At the present moment Austria plays the chief part at Cracow. The Austrian troops were the first to enter the territory, and an Austrian general was selected to put the merciless orders of the three Powers in execution. But does this apparent zeal of Austria prove that she has a direct personal interest in the step which has been taken? We no more believe such to be the case, than we give credit to the confidence of the Sultan in the good faith of Russia, because we learn that he has just placed all the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, who have hitherto acknowledged no spiritual control but that of a patriarch residing at Constantinople, in a state of dependence on another patriarch residing in Russia, and appointed by the Emperor. If any maintain a contrary opinion, we shall remind them that the influence of Austria alone retarded until 1836 this blow, which Russia had long since resolved upon; that the serious remonstrances of Austria were the sole cause which put an end to the previous occupation of the territory of Cracow, when in 1831 a Russian body of troops had been stationed upon it for two months; and that Austria had last year the option of refusing offers made, to her by Russia, for incorporating the free town and its territory with her own dominions†.

* These facts are strikingly elicited from those parts of the despatches of Count Pozzo di Borgo which relate to Austria. See *The Portfolio.*

† This proposal was actually made at Töplitz, and rejected by Austria. In returning from that conference, Count Nesselrode passed through Cracow, and

But when Austria had lost all hopes of checking the design of Russia, she doubtless, and perhaps with sufficient reason, thought it best to anticipate its execution on this point. Discouraged as she may well be by the policy of the west of Europe, perhaps she even stooped to receive under this form the wages of her compliance. Whatever may be the true state of the case, we are not of those who are astonished by her conduct. We believe that Austria does what her position obliges her to do; and that as she distinctly perceives the necessity which presses her, she will take no half measures, which would redouble her peril, without ensuring to her real advantages. We, nevertheless, persist in our firm and unalterable conviction that it is still in the power of England to sever Austria from Russia: her interest and her discernment afford grounds for this belief. But nothing can decide her to take such a step except acts, and decisive acts, on the part of our government. Before she will brave the animosity of Russia, she must be well assured that allies will not be wanting to back her. Till then, she acts consistently in submitting to the will of that power. Till then, although we may desire to restrain the policy of Russia, we must cease to rely upon Austria, and upon what has long been proclaimed to be her interest. FOR THE INTEREST OF AUSTRIA IS TO FOLLOW AND SUPPORT US WHEN WE ACT, BUT TO TURN A DEAF EAR TO OUR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS.

It must then at length be acknowledged, that no more barriers exist between ourselves and Russia: all those intermediate positions are gone; and henceforward our interests immediately conflict with her's. The occupation of Cracow and the part performed by Austria, are the signals which announce to us that Russia has once more appropriated to herself one of the most powerful engines which we might have directed against her. We are aware how much this reflection tends to discourage some of those who feel that it is absolutely necessary for us to resist Russia. And we ourselves are persuaded that when we are called upon to combat that power, no adequate and satisfactory success can be obtained without the concurrence of Austria. But the error has hitherto consisted in a

caused a petition to be secretly presented to him, signed by about ten traders of the place, who prayed the Emperor Nicolas to unite the city to his empire.

notion that those powers whose concurrence will ensure our victory, could WITHOUT US prevent the struggle and spare us the conflict. This misapprehension has caused the progress of the evil; and we may eventually have to atone for it by immense sacrifices, which a little foresight and activity would have prevented. Nevertheless, even if we admit the extreme case of a war, the line of conduct to be pursued remains unchanged. Austria is still the pivot on which the chances of the conflict turn. For that very reason our determination will lead Austria to take those steps to-morrow which she would have taken yesterday of her own accord, and which she entreated us, at no distant period, to take in concert with her. But the more we delay that determination, the more difficult it becomes to signify it to her, and to liberate her from the ties with which she is entangled.

As we have used the dreaded word—war, we hasten to avoid any misapprehension of our meaning which might arise on so momentous a subject. It is a serious mistake to suppose that war is the only means of repression, which it is possible for us to exert against Russia. No other power lies so open to the consequences of a sustained system of diplomatic exertion. In other countries every appearance of foreign hostility unites contending parties, and strengthens the government within as well as without. In Russia, on the contrary, it instantly begets internal revolt and external resistance: it emboldens and brings into concert the nations which she keeps in obedience or in dependence by the address with which she deprives them of all hopes of foreign succour, and of all means of resolving upon a common organised resistance.

These considerations might have sufficed long ago to determine our government to send out intelligent agents, under whatever title and in whatever capacity was thought most appropriate, to various points in the interior and on the different frontiers of Russia. Amongst these missions, Cracow deserved peculiar attention. That city has hitherto offered—and, should the occupation cease, it will still offer—to the governments of Europe, the singular advantage of finding upon that sole point a Polish government which remains independent. At Cracow the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, notwithstanding the title of protectors conferred upon their governments by the treaty of Vienna, are quite as alien to the state as the

Turks or the English. The treaty gives to the three protectors no sort of prerogative, as far as the internal administration of the affairs of the city is concerned. It was our peculiar duty to take care that no such prerogative should be usurped. The constitution of Cracow, which was drawn up in 1815, and textually inserted in the treaty, does not even contain the names of the protectors, and makes no mention whatever of their protectorate*. The position of a French or English diplomatic agent in relation to the government of Cracow, would be, by right, very nearly equivalent to that of the residents of the protecting courts. His importance will entirely depend on the tenor of his current instructions, and on his official character, which must evidently not be inferior to that of the agents of any other powers. It is clear that without this last condition, he will not represent the vigilance, the policy, and the power of his nation; and that the weakness of his government would be proclaimed by the mission of a subaltern agent destined to be the object of the haughty slights of his colleagues.

In the midst of the countless restrictions which shackle the commerce of Europe, Cracow, possessing by treaty (as we have shown in an earlier page of this article), a right of free communication with all parts of ancient Poland, might have become a point of the utmost importance, if the affairs of the west of Europe had been conducted by men of tolerable foresight. For we may apply to the commerce of Cracow, as well as to all the stipulations of the treaty with regard to Poland, the motto of a knight of old—

"Regardez-moi et je fleurirai."

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* We quote the constitution of 1815; for that which was thrust upon the town in 1833 is, and must remain for us, a mere dead letter *de jure*, whatever it may be *de facto*. We have only inscribed it at the head of the present article as one of the official documents which prove the numerous insults and violations of which Cracow has been the object. We quote, however, the 27th article of the Constitution of 1833, because it embodies the spirit of the whole act, by establishing a *new power*, which is henceforward the sovereign arbiter of the destinies of the state:—

"En cas de différens soit entre le Sénat et la Chambre des Représentans, "soit entre les membres de ces deux corps, sur l'étendue de leurs pouvoirs, ou "sur l'interprétation de la présente Constitution, les résidens des trois Cours "protectrices, réunis en Conférence, auront à décider de la question," &c.

The armed occupation of the territory is the inevitable sanction of that authority which this article confers upon the Conference.

Let it not be imagined, however, if we here speak of the great commercial advantages to be derived from Cracow as a post of almost unequalled importance, that a mere commercial agent on the spot will be competent to ensure them to us, or to revive rights which have been superseded. Such an appointment would be a fresh mockery, worthy of our foreign policy for the last twenty years. It would be a fresh display to our rivals, and to those nations whose hopes and prayers are turned towards us, of that lethargic pusillanimity, which, even when it perceives its peril—possessing means to avert the danger, and to ensure incalculable benefits—chooses to prolong for another hour that slumber from which it will be so fearfully roused.

FINIS.

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