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
A finely reasoned justification of the cultural and political independence of small nations in the New Europe. Attacking Professor E. H. Carr, G. D. H. Cole and others, the author maintains that the small nations were and will remain a danger to the peace of Europe only as long as power politics continues to be the underlying principle of European diplomacy.

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THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS

by
CZESLAW POZNANSKI

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Polish Department
THE UNIVERSITY
GLASGOW, W.2

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RIGHTS OF NATIONS

"The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded, if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak."

(Woodrow Wilson, address to Congress on January 22, 1917).



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INTRODUCTION

IN Professor E. H. Carr's latest book, *Conditions of Peace*, there is a particularly illuminating passage. Professor Carr writes: "The industries of Upper Silesia on one side, and of the Ruhr and Lorraine on the other, are natural economic units. It would be futile to break up these units on grounds of self-determination, and equally futile to attempt to exclude Germans from an effective share in their management and exploitation."

Professor Carr was one of the artificers of the Munich agreement and one of the enthusiasts for it. To this day he considers Munich a major and a beneficent diplomatic achievement. The only fault he finds with the policy of Neville Chamberlain is that Chamberlain condemned the annexation of Austria. Professor Carr does not believe that there can be any moral principles in foreign policy. "There are no simple and infallible rules of 'principle' and 'right' to determine foreign policy in a given situation." Not even the criterion of aggression "was either equitably applicable or morally valid." He does not believe in human rights: "Thus for the realist the equality of man is the ideology of the under-privileged seeking to raise themselves to the level of the privileged; the indivisibility of peace the ideology of States which, being particularly exposed to attacks, are eager to establish the principle that an attack on them is a matter of concern to other States more fortunately situated. . . ." For Professor Carr the self-determination of nations is simply a corollary of the *laissez-faire* economic policy, without any intrinsic validity. The only "realist" approach for him is that of power politics.

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It is not to people who concur in these opinions that this book is addressed. Nothing I say will convince them. For the underlying assumption of this book is that the rights of man are more important than the rights of iron and coal. I for one believe that the supreme values we are fighting for are human values. I believe that we are fighting for a world in which the rights of man proclaimed by the American and the French Revolutions, and suppressed by the totalitarian régimes, will not only be established as paramount, but enlarged to embrace the economic rights of man as well as his political and human rights. And I know that national rights are a necessary part of the rights of man.

Professor Carr and his friends consider these opinions reactionary. I, for one, shall always prefer to be a reactionary professing the ideals of Mazzini and Mickiewicz, rather than a progressive with the men of Munich and the admirers of Franco.

The acceptance, however, of the fallacies of "economic necessities," and the lack of comprehension of the interdependence between national rights and national statehood, and of the difference between a world based on the necessary voluntary collaboration of all nations, great and small alike, and a world based on the principle of the "hegemony" of the Great Powers, are widespread even among those people who recognize the principles of the rights of man and of international morality. It is to these people that I appeal.

This book does not pretend to make an exhaustive study of the problems concerned. It is, as Mr. Cole wrote of one of his books, "an uncompleted process of thinking aloud". It has been written in some haste, for I considered it necessary that at this moment a voice from the Continent should intervene in the discussions about the future of the Continent. One more word :

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this book is sometimes harsh in expression. I hope, however, that my readers will forgive this shortcoming in a foreigner who has not yet mastered the gentle English art of understatement.

CZESLAW POZNANSKI.

I

THE pattern of the first World War was very similar to the pattern of other wars ; the difference lay only in its scale. The clash of 1914 was mainly a clash between contending Great Powers—Germany, which wanted to establish its hegemony over the continent of Europe and the Middle East, and the Allied Powers, which opposed this bid for supremacy. It might have been a purely continental war, a contest between Germany and Austria on the one side and Russia allied with France on the other. Great Britain was dragged into the war only by the violation of the neutrality of Belgium ; the United States by the unrestricted submarine warfare. Even so, British Ministers resigned in opposition to the war, a section of the Labour Party opposed it to the end, and in the United States there was likewise a strong anti-war minority. As for the European neutrals, they were mere onlookers whose sympathies were divided and dictated by scores of different reasons, but who were all persuaded of one thing—that it did not greatly matter to them which of the belligerents emerged as victor.

Toward the end of the war, however, ideological factors made their appearance. The appalling destruction of the war, and above all the destruction of millions of young lives, produced a revulsion of feeling in the civilized countries. People realized the madness of this wholesale slaughter ; and they realized that something must be done to prevent its repetition. From the water-logged trenches, where the French *poilu* suffered unspeakable hardships, came the slogan “*la der des der*” —the very last war. And in Great Britain the same feeling found expression in the slogan “the war to end war”.

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It was out of this desire never to see another such dreadful holocaust of youth that the realization of the necessity of an international organization arose in nearly all the belligerent countries. In Great Britain Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, and others, worked at the plans of this future world organization; in France the veteran of French radicalism, the man who had several times refused to become President of the French Republic, Léon Bourgeois; in the United States the leader of the nation, Woodrow Wilson. It was Wilson who proclaimed in an official document, his "Fourteen Points", the necessity of an organization to ensure a lasting peace. And it was thanks to Wilson's insistence that the Covenant of the League of Nations was embodied in the Peace Treaties. The League of Nations was to guarantee that "freedom from fear" which is one of the essential freedoms of the nations.

This first attempt to eliminate war by means of world organization was based on three main principles. The first of these was the self-determination of nations. A real League of Nations could only be a League of free nations. The domination of one nation over another was inconsistent with a new and just world order. It was obviously impossible to draw frontier lines in ethnographically mixed areas without including certain national minorities in the framework of certain States, but the principle was laid down that every nation had the right to independence, the right to live in its own nation-State.

It was not only a consideration of abstract justice that linked the idea of the self-determination of nations with the idea of security from war; more realistic factors were involved. A subjugated nation was a permanent menace to peace, for it was primarily the irrepressible national struggles for independence that had made it

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impossible for nineteenth-century Europe to live at peace. The wars for the unity of Italy and the Balkan wars were wars of independence. From the first days of its partition Poland was an open wound in the body of Europe; as Ireland was in the body of Great Britain. A Hungary unconcerned with the suppression of the Croats could have lived on good-neighbourly terms with Serbia instead of being bent on the crushing of the Serbs. And just as within a nation the juridical and political equality of all citizens, without regard to differences of birth, wealth, or even education, is the basis of a democratic order, so the equality of all nations, irrespective of the number of warships, tanks, or guns they could muster, irrespective of their power and wealth, was the only sound basis for an international order. Great and small nations alike were to be equal in partnership, equally protected by the new international law against aggression from more powerful neighbours. The rule of unanimity in the deliberations of the League Council and the League Assembly, whatever its merits and demerits in practice, was the symbolic expression of this equality of all nations.

Collective security and the independence and equality of nations were thus closely correlated. The second principle associated with collective security, with the freedom from fear, was democracy. When in 1917 Woodrow Wilson spoke of the war "to make the world safe for democracy", the full implications of this statement were well understood by the masses. The responsibility of the autocratic rulers of Germany and Austria, afterwards obscured by a deluge of propaganda, was not yet forgotten. There was no doubt at that moment that a dictatorial, irresponsible ruler was much more easily tempted to wage war than the government of a democratic country.

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Finally, the new organization was to be based on "freedom from want". The rights of labour were linked up with the principles of self-determination of nations and of democracy. The organization of the I.L.O. was embodied in Part XIII of the Versailles Treaty. Each Member State of the League of Nations was automatically a member of the I.L.O., and automatically committed to the grant of a certain minimum of social security to its own subjects. Article 23 of the Covenant states that the Members of the League

"will endeavour to secure fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations."

Thus the ideas of national independence, of democracy, and of social security appeared as the only basis on which a lasting peace could be founded. In the minds of the people of 1919 they were intimately correlated, just as they were intimately correlated in the minds of Karl Marx and the founders of the First International, who put on the same plane the fight for the liberation of the proletariat and the fight for the liberation of the oppressed nationalities. The full text of the slogan of the First International was, in fact, "Workers of the world and oppressed nationalities, unite".

These fundamental issues and their intimate inter-connexion were, however, first obscured in the haggings of the Peace Conference and then gladly and completely forgotten. The recognition of the necessary connexion between collective security and democracy was the first to be obliterated. It disappeared almost entirely from the text of the Covenant. Only in Article I, in the first words of the sentence "Any fully self-governing State,

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Dominion, or Colony not named in the annex may become a Member of the League" can a faint echo be caught of President Wilson's promise to "make the world safe for democracy". As it was, this sentence was invoked once only, when Great Britain questioned the advisability of admitting Ethiopia to the League. But no body appealed to the League when Mussolini seized power in Italy, or when Hitler established his rule in Germany. The nineteenth-century doctrine of "non-interference in internal affairs", the doctrine of the mischievousness of "ideological blocs", reigned supreme and unchallenged, culminating in the tragic farce of "non-intervention" in Spain.

The equality of nations remained inscribed in the texts of the Covenant, but was never acknowledged in fact. The very constitution of the Council of the League, with its distinction between permanent and elected members, bore the imprint of the discrimination between Great Powers and Powers of "limited interests", as the smaller nations were politely called. And the Great Powers did not hesitate to indicate quite clearly that it was for them, and for them alone, to settle the big issues and to act accordingly.

When Germany—still the Germany of Chancellor Brüning—withdrew for the first time from the Disarmament Conference, her return on the strength of a promise of equality was negotiated in London by Great Britain, France, and Italy. The Great Powers arrived at an agreement among themselves—the agreement of December 11, 1931—and presented the Disarmament Conference with this agreement as a *fait accompli*, though the question of German armaments was, to say the least, of as much interest to Poland or to Czechoslovakia as to Italy. The Polish delegate at the Conference made a statement at a plenary meeting to the effect that agree-

ments negotiated outside the Conference could not be considered as binding members left out of the negotiations.

In 1933 we had the Four-Power Pact. Ramsay MacDonald suddenly left Geneva and the Conference for Rome, and the astonished world learned that Germany—the Germany of Hitler—Great Britain, France, and Italy had made an agreement under which major issues were to be settled by the four Great Powers. Economic questions, European frontiers, and so on were to be decided by a directorate consisting of Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Ramsay MacDonald, and whoever happened to be Prime Minister of France. This plan collapsed. The Four-Power Pact, when it was finally signed, was much less ambitious, and in due course it was quietly buried. Yet it was in the spirit of the Four-Power Pact that in 1938 the new Czech frontiers were settled at Munich by Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Daladier, with the Czech delegates waiting in an anteroom.

When, in 1934, Hitler introduced military conscription in Germany, in defiance of the Versailles Treaty, France appealed to the League of Nations. But even then the League was to be only a rubber stamp to endorse the findings of Benito Mussolini, Ramsay MacDonald, and Pierre Laval. For the meeting of the Council of the League was preceded by the Stresa Conference, most ill-fated and ridiculous of all conferences. Stresa did not restrain Hitler, but did encourage Mussolini to start his Ethiopian campaign.

The Ethiopian war provided further examples of the disastrous confiscation of the League machinery by the Great Powers, of the attempt to exploit the League, devised as an instrument of collective security, for the game of power politics. First we had the Hoare-Laval plan. I am not concerned now with the plan itself—

enough has been said about it—but with the *leger de main* by which certain Powers tried to barter away the biggest issue of all, an issue on which all the peoples of the world had taken their stand against aggression, for a triangular deal between Italy, Great Britain, and France.

The sanctions against Italy had been voted. Committees of the League were working at their implementation. But Pierre Laval did not renounce the hope of striking a bargain at the expense of Ethiopia. At the end of October 1935, in a “free and frank interview”, he succeeded in convincing Sir Samuel Hoare. Following this free and frank interview, both Laval and Sir Samuel declared, at a meeting on November 2 of the Co-ordination Committee, that they would continue their efforts at conciliation. This was the cue for Van Zeeland (who had come from Brussels for the occasion) to propose that the League should give a mandate to Great Britain and France to proceed with this mediation. The mandate was not given. One after another the delegates of Soviet Russia, Poland, the Little Entente, and Spain explained politely but firmly that the settlement of the conflict was a task for the entire Council of the League, and that no mandate of any sort could be given. Nevertheless the governments of Great Britain and France continued to negotiate, and the outcome of these negotiations was the Hoare-Laval plan.

This attempt failed. The Members of the League refused to accept the plan, and in Great Britain the popular indignation swept away Sir Samuel Hoare. But the independent rôle of the Great Powers was not finished. For the lifting of sanctions in the Ethiopian affair, which sounded the death-knell of collective security, was due to a unilateral decision made by Great Britain. Formally the sanctions were lifted by the League Assembly. In fact they were disposed of on June 18,

1936, when Anthony Eden announced to the Commons that the British Government considered it necessary to put an end to the sanctions.

There is a little anecdote that perfectly epitomizes the attitude of the Great Powers in the inter-war period. At the Lausanne Conference in 1932, which was to settle finally the question of German Reparation payments, all negotiations were conducted between Germany (von Papen), Great Britain (Ramsay MacDonald), and France (Edouard Herriot). Meanwhile representatives of the smaller Allied and Associated Powers, for some of whom the Reparation payments formed more important Budget items than either for France or for Great Britain, were kicking their heels in the lobby of the conference hotel together with the journalists, sometimes less well informed than the latter.

One day MacDonald walked out, beaming, from the conference room, and announced that a final agreement had been reached and that its signature was imminent. At the announcement the Yugoslav delegate stepped forward and said: "I hope we shall be able to see the agreement before its signature, and to make our observations."

"Of course not," replied MacDonald, indignantly.

It was this attitude, this disregard of the rights and interests of the smaller nations, culminating in Lord Runciman's mission and the Munich agreement, that was largely responsible for the tragic drift of the smaller nations into "neutrality", at such cost to themselves, and with such grievous detriment to the Allied effort in 1940.

One of the Swedish delegates put the position to me quite bluntly when the sanctions against Italy were lifted. "We have allowed ourselves to be fooled once. We enthusiastically voted the sanctions, for we believed

that the Great Powers had at last been convinced of the necessity for collective security. Now we see that we have only been pawns in a game of power politics. We shall not be fooled a second time."

Collective security was dead. So was the ideal of collaboration between free nations "equal in status", to quote the Balfour report on the British Commonwealth.

The I.L.O. survived. Thanks largely to a succession of outstanding and courageous men at the helm—Albert Thomas, Harold Butler, John Winant,—it succeeded in developing an admirable activity. This activity was not interrupted by the war, and the Conference of the I.L.O. at New York in January 1941 was proof of the continued vitality of this institution. But the link connecting it with the League of Nations had become a purely formal one. The activities of the I.L.O. at Geneva had had scarcely any connexion with those in the League building only a few hundred yards away. The conviction that the rights of labour are intimately connected with the peace problem had vanished.

The Cassandras, those of us who issued repeated warnings that dictatorships are a permanent menace to peace, who understood the real meaning of the Japanese aggression, of Mussolini's robber expedition in Ethiopia, of the conquest of Spain, of the seizure of Austria, were contemptuously dismissed as "ideologists" and "war-mongers". Yet when Armageddon came the "ideological front" reappeared at once. The climate of the belligerent countries immediately became the climate not of 1914 but of 1918. There still are, of course, people who continue to think in simple imperialistic terms, who hope that once victory is achieved everything will fall back into the old pre-war pattern, who are preparing today for the return of an "untrammelled" economic system, of the "competitive struggle for markets", of

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“unfettered sovereignty”, of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. But they are very few.

God knows, Neville Chamberlain refused long enough to see not only that National Socialism and Fascism were articles of export, but that their very existence was incompatible with the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless, when the conflict came he realized that it was not a case of Poland or Great Britain versus Germany, but a battle for the maintenance of European civilization. On August 24, 1939, he said in the Commons :

If, despite all our efforts to find the way of peace—and God knows I have tried my best—if, in spite of all that, we find ourselves forced to embark upon a struggle which is bound to be fraught with suffering and misery for all mankind, and the end of which no man can foresee, if that should happen, *we shall not be fighting for the political future of a far-away city in a foreign land ; we shall be fighting for the preservation of those principles of which I have spoken,*¹ the destruction of which would involve the destruction of all possibility of peace and security for the peoples of the world.

And on September 2 Mr. Winston Churchill put the same idea in more inspired words : “This is not a question of fighting for Danzig or fighting for Poland. We are fighting to save the whole world from the pestilence of Nazi tyranny, and in defence of all that is most sacred to man.”

The issues of peace and democracy are now linked together again. There is today a practically unanimous conviction that peace cannot be guaranteed if totalitarian and anti-democratic régimes survive this war ; there is practical unanimity that it concerns all of us if a dictatorship is set up in any country. And there is growing unanimity that certain cardinal rights of man must be universally set up and guaranteed. The Sankey-Wells

¹ The italics here and throughout are mine.

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declaration of rights is a pointer whose importance will grow.

There is practical unanimity that international collaboration for the maintenance of peace must be much closer than was the collaboration in the League of Nations, and that there must be an international force to restrain future aggressors. And a great majority realize the full implication of the statement that the conception of the absolute sovereignty of States is dead. It is realized that the rule of law between nations cannot be established unless there exists a supranational authority, backed by sufficient force.

There is a growing unanimity of opinion that political and social questions cannot be dissociated. President Roosevelt has put among the four necessary freedoms the freedom from want. There are still vested interests which oppose and will continue to oppose very strongly any profound modification of the pre-war “individualistic” and “competitive” economic order. But it becomes more and more obvious that “freedom from want” cannot be assured unless there is a great measure of planned economy, even a great measure of Socialism.

Collective security, democracy, and social security are linked up again, just as they were in 1919. And the Atlantic Charter, though much less explicit than Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, is based on these three principles.

But what about the last cornerstone of the 1919 ideology, the self-determination of nations? We find it in the Atlantic Charter. But what about public opinion?

II

It is a strange spectacle indeed that we find when we turn to this question of self-determination and independence of nations. At the outset there seemed to be no doubt that the war was being fought for the restoration of the independence of the nations subjugated by Hitler. But somehow since the entry of Soviet Russia into the war this issue appears to have been obscured in many minds. In a peculiar partnership diehard imperialists and left-wing Socialists have discovered that after all the independence of small nations is not a desirable war aim. On this question G. D. H. Cole and Victor Gollancz agree with *The Times*; the *New Statesman and Nation* is in agreement with the *Sunday Dispatch* and the Marquess of Donegall, Professor Harold Laski, with Professor Carr.

A detailed analysis of all the pronouncements on the subject would lead us too far. I shall limit myself to a few quotations, taken at random, which will give the general trend of this reasoning.

The Times said in its notorious leader of August 1, 1941 (which, incidentally, led to complications in Turkey and was most energetically exploited by German propaganda):

Leadership in Eastern Europe is essential if the disorganization of the past twenty years is to be avoided, and if the weaker countries are not to be exposed once more to economic disaster or to violent assault. This leadership can fall only to Germany or to Russia.

G. D. H. Cole writes in his extremely clever book *Europe, Russia, and the Future*:

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The idea of nationality as a basis for independent statehood is obsolete, [and a few lines further:] In that event is it not most likely that the problems of Poland, and of the Balkans, and of Hungary will be solved by their inclusion as Soviet Republics within a vastly enlarged State based on the U.S.S.R.? At this prospect some Social Democrats, I know, will hold up their hands in holy horror. But I, for one, should regard this as a far better solution than the return of these States to their past condition of precarious, poverty-stricken, quarrelsome independent sovereignty, or than any restoration of capitalism in them.

Victor Gollancz says in *Russia and Ourselves*:

In terms, it is tentatively suggested, of three great Unions, an *enlarged*¹ U.S.S.R. (herein lies the greatest hope, for instance, in the Balkans), a Union of Western democratic Socialist Republics, and Anglo-America. In some such conception lies the way forward. What we in the West must unequivocally regard as its evils may well be inseparable from the attempt to establish Socialism in that particular territory and in those particular circumstances, and may also be an inevitable feature of Socialism when it is established in various Eastern European countries.

The *New Statesman and Nation* (December 27, 1941) states that "the vague points of the Atlantic Charter, with their contradiction between the promises of freedom from want and of the restoration of the *petty sovereignties of Europe*,¹ are no substitute". The Marquess of Donegall, in the *Sunday Dispatch*, visualizes a

Far Eastern trading block under China, Russia trading for Europe, and the U.S. and the British Empire dealing for the rest of the world; and, as the only armed force, an international air force, consisting of the members of the great nations that we can trust, the British Empire, the United States, Russia, and China.

(Incidentally, that is a very fine compliment to the

¹ My italics.

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Polish, Czechoslovak, Dutch, Free French, etc., airmen who are fighting today.)

John Strachey writes in *Reynolds News* that on Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, "represented or misrepresented by their respective governments, will fall the task of world settlement, and—do not let us shirk the issue—for a time at least the task of world rule."

Vernon Bartlett agrees. He writes in the *News Chronicle* :

The U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and the British Commonwealth have no desire to grab territory ; they want to see the smaller nations grow strong and confident by federation ; they have surely learnt by now that peace is indivisible, and that each one of them must accept the responsibility of seeing that it is maintained in the vast area where *its influence is preponderating*.¹

There are certainly important differences between these various conceptions. Preponderating influence is not the same thing as the outright annexation advocated by Cole and Gollancz. Nevertheless the underlying conception is very similar. It is born of the conviction that the most desirable solution, or the only one, is the formation of three or four great units with a central planning authority, whether by the creation of big State units and the simple destruction of small ones, or by the placing of the big States in the position of suns, around which the smaller States will revolve like satellites. It is born of the conviction that the small nation-State is played out. It is, to put it bluntly, the imperialist outlook.

Subjectively, beyond question, neither G. D. H. Cole nor John Strachey nor Kingsley Martin considers himself an imperialist. But objectively their contempt of petty sovereignties, their conviction that small nations are

¹ My italics.

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unfit to rule their own destinies, their reluctance to envisage a world in which great and small nations will be equal partners on a co-operative basis, constitutes the very essence of imperialist thinking. And really, when one reads about the enlargement of the Soviet Union, about the distribution of spheres of influence, about the necessity of leadership in certain areas, one begins to wonder whether this war, which started as a war of liberation, is not taking shape in certain minds as a final redistribution of the world between several Great Powers—to-day Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and China ; to-morrow, perhaps, Germany as well. Ramsay MacDonald's "of course not" no longer appears as the belated echo of a dead world, but as a prophetic vision of the mood of too many progressive Britishers of today.

What are the reasons underlying this conviction of the obsolescence of smaller State units? There is first of all, of course, what I should call the æsthetic argument. The simplicity of a scheme involving only a few large units instead of a medley of big and little States, is certainly attractive. Maps would be simplified, and so would be the teaching of geography. It is also easier to imagine planning for territories under one central authority, or territories in which, at all events, one partner has a preponderant voice, than for groups of States with equal rights. Essentially, however, I think the arguments of the adversaries of small nation-States could be summarized under two headings—

(1) The existence of "petty sovereignties", the "balkanization" of Europe, is a permanent danger to peace, for the multiplication of frontiers leads necessarily to permanent friction and the creation of "danger spots".

(2) New inventions, and particularly the development

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of railways, motor-cars, and aeroplanes, have made big economic units a necessity. The frontiers of the "petty sovereignties" have hampered international trade, and have been among the main causes of the economic collapse which, in turn, was one of the main causes of the present war.

In this view the national sovereignty of small States is as obsolete as were the petty German principalities in the nineteenth century. Just as the nineteenth century was the century of the integration of the German States in the German Reich, and of the Italian States in an unitary Italy, on the basis of nationality, so today the time has come to transcend the national State and the national frontiers, and to attempt the organization of bigger units on a wider basis.

Let us dispassionately examine these two premises. First of all let us consider the political danger of the existence of "petty sovereignties", the dangers to peace that arise out of the existence of small nation-States.

If we cease to reason in terms of abstractions, and to rely on slogans like the marvellous German propaganda slogan of the "balkanization" of Europe, and turn to facts, we shall see that the danger to peace arising from the existence of "petty sovereignties" is simply non-existent. No drawing of frontiers can be perfect in areas of mixed nationalities, and between 1919 and 1939 there was a lot of revisionist agitation in certain of the smaller States of Europe. But no war arose out of it.

The Greco-Albanian and Yugoslav-Albanian frontier disputes never produced even a remote danger to peace. Even the long-standing and extremely bitter dispute over Macedonia between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria did not constitute a real menace to peace. The I.M.R.O., the Macedonian terrorist organization, did a lot of shooting and murdering in Yugoslavia. At certain

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moments, when the Fascists were in power in Bulgaria, after the assassination of the great Bulgarian peasant leader Stambuliski, who stood for Balkan collaboration, the I.M.R.O. movement was supported and financed by the Bulgarian Government. Nevertheless the Government did not dare to consider for one moment the possibility of an isolated Bulgaro-Yugoslav war; nor did the Yugoslav Government dream of waging war against Bulgaria in order to eliminate the real source of the internal danger which the Macedonian unrest represented. Eventually King Alexander and King Boris arrived at an understanding between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and for a time the Bulgarian Government withdrew its support from the I.M.R.O. Vantche Mihailov, the sinister leader of the Macedonian murder gangs, was obliged to leave Bulgaria and go into hiding abroad. He has reappeared today in Macedonia—a tool of Hitler and Mussolini.

Nor did the Hungarian grievances—so long as they were purely Hungarian—endanger the peace of Europe. There was, indeed, a moment after the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, engineered by Ante Pavelich, to-day the Poglavnik of Croatia, when Yugoslav feeling against Hungary ran so high that there seemed to be a danger of war. In fact, by the standards of 1914 there was every reason for Yugoslavia to declare war on Hungary. For Pavelich and his associates had been supported by the Hungarian Government, and everything pointed to Budapest as the centre in which the murder had been organized. There existed unimpeachable evidence that at Yanka Pusta and elsewhere the Hungarian Government had organized training centres for Croatian terrorists, where the would-be murderers were thoroughly instructed in the manufacture and handling of bombs and other explosives, or



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taught to use their revolvers. The assassins of Alexander, like other assassins before them, had been trained in Hungary, had been furnished by Hungarian officials with first-class faked passports for their travels, and had been liberally financed by the Hungarian Government.

And there was a strong temptation for the Yugoslavs to seize this occasion for finally eliminating the dangers of Hungarian revisionism. For the odds were heavily in favour of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia alone was stronger than Hungary, and infinitely better armed. And at that moment she could have counted on the wholehearted support of her partners in the Little Entente, for Dr. Benes still ruled in Czechoslovakia and Titulescu directed the foreign policy of Roumania. Moreover, European opinion was fully prepared to consider the assassination of Alexander as an act of aggression.

Yet there was no war. Both Yugoslavia and Hungary accepted the mediation of the League of Nations. And after long and weary debates, the rapporteur of the League Council—his name was Anthony Eden—was able to produce a report, accepted by all parties, which finally liquidated the "incident". Thus even the League of Nations, that minimum of international organization and international collaboration, proved sufficient to deal with what in nineteenth-century circumstances would certainly have developed into a war—a Balkan war.

In two other cases in which disputes arose between smaller Powers, the existence of the League of Nations and its machinery proved equally serviceable in the maintenance of peace. In October 1925 there was a "frontier incident" at Demir Kapu between Greek and Bulgarian troops. The arms had spoken. Immediately, on October 22, the Bulgarian Government appealed to the League. On October 23 the President of the League

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Council, Aristide Briand, sent a telegram to the Greek and Bulgarian Governments urging them to withdraw their troops behind their respective frontiers. On October 26 the Council met and repeated this injunction. British, French, and Italian officers were dispatched to the spot in order to report to the Council on the execution of the withdrawal. On October 28 the Bulgarian and Greek Governments informed the Council that they would conform to its request. And finally the whole question was settled by a resolution of the Council of December 25. There was no war.

Still more spectacular was the success of the League in the dispute between Colombia and Peru. In February 1933 Peruvian troops invaded the territory of Leticia. This territory had been awarded to Colombia under the Solomon-Lozano Treaty of March 24, 1922, but the award had been contested by Peru. Colombia now appealed to the League. And not only was the intervention of the Council—backed by the menace of sanctions—sufficient to stop all military action immediately, but during the whole period of the examination of the merits of the dispute by the Council the territory of Leticia was placed under the administration of a commission set up by the League and placed under the flag of the League. The League commission administered the territory from June 23, 1933, to June 19, 1934. At that date the territory was handed back to Colombia, in conformity with an agreement reached between the parties under the auspices of the League. There was no war.

It is true that one dispute between two smaller Powers, the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, could not be settled by the League and degenerated into a protracted and sanguinary war. This, however, is one of those exceptions that prove the rule. To begin with,

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in this dispute there was a marked reluctance on the part of the European Great Powers and the leading South American States to consider the possibility of applying sanctions. This reluctance is explained in turn by the fact that the Chaco dispute was only formally a dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. In fact both Governments were pawns in a much bigger game. Behind Bolivia and Paraguay oil interests loomed large ; a whole intricate game of power politics was being played in South America, in which one at least of the leading South American States was deeply involved.

It was not the existence of "petty sovereignties" that endangered peace between 1919 and 1939. It was the existence of powerful imperialisms, the aggressiveness of certain big Powers. The Greco-Bulgarian frontier dispute was easily settled by the League. But when, in 1923, a Greek bandit murdered the Italian General Tellini, who was a member of the frontier commission, Mussolini did not appeal to the League. He shelled and conquered Corfu instead. The Great Powers decided that it was too delicate a matter to be left to the League, and transferred the dispute to the Conference of Ambassadors. This Conference bribed Mussolini by accepting extravagant claims for compensation against Greece for the murder of Tellini and meekly condoning the shelling of the civilian population of a peaceful island. Thus at the very beginning of his career Mussolini was presented with a handsome success for his first violation of international law. The Corfu award did endanger the peace of the world, for it assured impunity to any Great Power that flouted international law.

The assassination of King Alexander supplied a second proof of this impunity. I have related how the League succeeded in peacefully settling the dispute between Yugoslavia and Hungary arising out of this murder.

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But that was only half of the story. In fact Ante Pavelich was supported as much by Italy and Germany as by Hungary. There were camps in Italy as well as Hungary for the training of Croatian terrorists. And this murder had been planned in Rome as well as in Budapest. Even Berlin had a hand in the murder, because Hitler, though not greatly interested in King Alexander, was deeply interested indeed in bringing down Louis Barthou, who had brought Soviet Russia into the League and was trying to form an alliance in order to stem German expansion. This side of the affair was not disclosed in the League proceedings. The Little Entente delegates were persuaded to refrain from the indictment of Italy or Germany. Great Powers were taboo. That did endanger peace, for it confirmed that the Great Powers were sacrosanct.

It was the Great Powers that broke the peace of the world. Japan, a Great Power, was the first to set out on the path of war by the conquest of Manchuria. Mussolini followed with his war against Ethiopia. It was not Yugoslavia or Greece, the neighbours of Albania, who waged war against that unhappy country : it was Mussolini who on Good Friday 1939 sent his planes and warships to shell and bomb Albania into submission. And Adolf Hitler is not the dictator of a petty State.

It may be argued, of course, that the Ethiopian war, the conquest of Albania, of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, and so on, prove that the existence of "petty sovereignties" did in fact endanger peace, for they constituted a temptation for the stronger neighbour. G. D. H. Cole uses this argument when he says that "It is inevitable¹ that great States should seek to engulf their neighbours." But the argument is unacceptable. Not only is it virtually the argument of La Fontaine's

¹ My italics.

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wolf, addressed to the lamb, but it simply does not conform to the reality.

The present world war started the day Japanese troops invaded Manchuria. And not only is it difficult to consider China as a "petty sovereignty", but we have the Tanaka plan to confirm that even the conquest of China was to be only a stepping-stone to the final contest with Great Britain and the U.S.A. Mussolini's Ethiopian and Spanish campaigns were likewise only stepping-stones to the final mastery of the Mediterranean, to the conflict with France and Great Britain. And Hitler in one of his latest speeches made it abundantly clear that he did not attack Poland for the sake of Danzig or Polish Pomerania. Danzig and the "Corridor" were pretexts. His goal was the conquest of the Continent and Russia, the elimination of Great Britain from Europe, and finally the domination of the world.

Thus the story of 1919-39 teaches us that the existence of small nation-States and their independence were no danger to peace; they menaced nothing and nobody. A minimum of international organization, even with the formal maintenance of full national sovereignty, would have been sufficient to eliminate any danger to peace from this quarter. Unrestricted sovereignty was in fact a danger for peace, but it was the unrestricted sovereignty of the Great Powers.

This means that it is not a discrimination between sovereignties that is needed. What is necessary to ensure peace, to ensure collective security, is to bring ALL national sovereignties under the rule of law. The formation of big coalitions through the absorption of the smaller States, or the assuring of a privileged position to the Great Powers, would only ensure that the next war would be a world war from the start.

The political history of the inter-war years teaches us,

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in fact, the necessity for the establishment of a supra-national authority. It teaches us that this authority must have armed forces at its disposal in order to oppose any aggression, armed forces to which all States must contribute. It does not teach us that the existence of smaller States within this new and strong world organization is an anachronism.

Now let us examine the economic aspect of the question of small States in these same inter-war years. Here again the prevailing tendency is to make the existence of the small States, the "atomization" of Europe (to use G. D. H. Cole's picturesque expression), the villain of the drama. We have read many impressive accounts of how the Peace Treaties lengthened inter-state frontiers by thousands of miles, how existing economic units were disrupted, and how innumerable Customs barriers hampered the flow of world trade. Oswald Dutch, in his *Economic Peace Aims*, affirms that "The defect of the national States lay in their unnatural structure. They had passed through no natural stages of development and were without logical origin". And G. D. H. Cole goes so far as to declare that "So dire are the fruits of Europe's economic atomism that it is quite possible to argue that, in a purely economic sense, unification under the Nazis might be better than no unification at all". It is true that Mr. Cole, probably remembering the hunger-stricken populations of Poland or Greece "unified" under the Nazi heel, qualifies his statement and deprecates the suggestion that the people of the occupied countries are better off today than they were before the German conquest. But the gist of his argument is that it is impossible to think of economic reconstruction

¹ I shall be quoting rather extensively from Professor J. B. Condliffe's book on the "Reconstruction of World Trade." This book is a work of a special character. It was intended primarily as a report for the international conference on reconstruction of world trade, which was to meet at Bergen on August 27, 1939. For this reason it was based on a series of special studies prepared by leading economists of all nations for this report, and for the same reason the author aimed at achieving a maximum of objectivity and impartiality.

without an amalgamation of the smaller States into big units.

The economic picture painted by these opponents of the independence of the smaller States is vivid and impressive. Only, like the picture of the dangers to peace created by the existence of small States, it happens to be untrue.

I do not suggest, of course, that the existence of the many Customs barriers, some of them very high, between the smaller States did not contribute to the economic unsettlement of the Continent. I shall not attempt to vindicate all the economic measures taken by the smaller States, especially those which attempted to imitate the autarkic policies of Germany and Italy. And I am far from advocating simply a return to the *status quo ante*.

What I do affirm is that (1) the economic cataclysm which came in 1929 was the result of the policies of the Great Powers; (2) the economic plight of the world was due as much, if not more, to political as to purely economic causes; (3) the efforts of the smaller States to remedy the economic position by regional understandings, and by a reduction of these Customs barriers which loom so large in the indictment of the smaller States, were thwarted by the Great Powers; and, consequently, (4) the continued existence of small nation-States cannot prove an obstacle to the economic rehabilitation of the world.

One preliminary remark is well worth making. The countries which weathered the economic blizzard of the inter-war years were, in fact, small States. Sweden, with her Socialist Government and her intelligent economic policy, remained practically unscathed throughout the whole period. She succeeded in preserving a balanced economy and in maintaining the very high standard of life of her inhabitants. In a lesser degree the same may be said of Norway and Denmark. Little

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Switzerland also showed great power of resistance. Thus history has proved that small States as economic units are not intrinsically incapable of survival. Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland had been neutrals in the first world war. All these countries confidently hoped to remain outside the future war if it was to come. It is not a pure coincidence that precisely these countries, which firmly believed in the possibility of maintaining their neutrality in any conflagration and were thus more or less free from fear, were the countries which most successfully resisted the economic depression. The essential lesson of 1919-39 is, in fact, not only that there can be no divorce between politics and economics, but also that in troubled periods it is the political factor that is paramount.

Professor Condliffe writes :

The primary responsibility for the breakdown, therefore, lies not with economic facts, but with economic policy. The problem is a political one, even in the sphere of economic developments. Governments, fearful of their strategic and political security, have interposed barriers to the progressive interdependence which is inevitable if economic tendencies are allowed to work freely in the modern world.

And elsewhere :

While at every stage of the breakdown there can be found reasons for further interference in the economic interest of important groups of producers threatened by heavy loss as a result of prior intervention, the ultimate causes of the breakdown are dominantly political and social in character. . . . Since 1918 there has been not only a great dislocation of economic specialization but a reluctance to face the cost and sacrifices involved in a gradual reduction of that dislocation. More important have been the continuation of war policies in peace-time and the gradual subordination of economic welfare to

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the totalitarian mobilization of economic activity in systems of economics.

This fundamental truth was realized throughout the whole inter-war period. If we re-read the findings of the innumerable economic committees and conferences of this period, if we return to the dusty files of the discussions in the Second Committees of the League Assemblies (the Second Committee dealt with economic and financial questions), we find a single leitmotiv continually recurring : "It is impossible to think of economic rehabilitation so long as political confidence is not restored."

In a world which at any moment might collapse—and the Manchurian affair, the rise of Hitler to power, the Ethiopian war delineated only too clearly the shape of things to come—there could be no long-term economic policy, no possibility of readjustment. The plans for great international works, sponsored by the I.L.O. as one of the solutions of the unemployment problem, collapsed because nobody dared to invest in them. The migration conferences never produced any result, because the financing of the flow of migrants demanded long-term investments. The agrarian reform in Poland, the redistribution of land among the peasants, was hampered by the prohibitive interest rates demanded in the great financial centres for financing it ; and the rates were prohibitive because they included an implicit insurance against war risks. For a short period, between the Locarno Treaties and 1931, there was a silver lining to the clouds on the horizon, a temporary economic recovery. People believed then that peace might be maintained. But as soon as the clouds lowered over the political horizon the economic fabric was cracked beyond repair.

There were, of course, other contributory causes. But

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nothing can be farther from the truth than Oswald Dutch's statement that "The world economic crisis of 1931 began in Central Europe and spread from there." It was not in Vienna that the great economic crisis started, it was in New York. The origin of the collapse of the Kreditanstalt in Vienna, and later of the collapse of the whole German banking system, was the Wall Street crash which led to the withdrawal of American credits from Europe. Professor Condliffe writes :

There is no doubt that the proximate cause, not only of the Austrian Kreditanstalt difficulties in May 1931, but of the German banking failure in July and the fall of sterling in September, as well as of the disequilibria that led to exchange control measures in so many countries after the depreciation of sterling, was a liquidity panic marked in each case by sudden withdrawals of short term credits.

And that was the moment that the Hoover administration chose for raising the American tariff wall, for almost completely closing the American market to European goods. Let us quote Professor Condliffe again :

The Hawley Smoot tariff of 1930 was a fatal blow to any remaining hope of international economic equilibrium. It was followed almost immediately by a crop of tariff increases in other countries. In some cases the reprisal motive was very strong. In others there was a strong defensive reaction against the loss of export markets and the fear of enhanced import competition.

The reversal of the British commercial policy which followed was hardly less disastrous. The new tariff policy and the Ottawa agreements closed a second market to the European countries. As Professor Condliffe states, the new British policy

was a decisive factor in the widespread adoption of exchange control, the raising of tariffs, and the adoption of quantita-

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tive trade restrictions and regulated national economic systems. It threw the smaller manufacturing countries of Europe, as well as the agricultural-exporting countries the world over, into something approaching consternation. The longer-run effects deriving from the collapse of the world trading system that had rested upon sterling for over a century cannot yet be assessed. The decisions of 1931-32, it is becoming clear, marked the end of an era not only for Great Britain itself, but for the rest of the world. Nineteenth-century concepts of monetary stability, of international specialization and co-operation, and of the relation between politics and economics, were revealed as no longer operative, or adequate. The end of the story cannot yet be foreseen, but the significance of these historic events does not diminish as the passing years reveal the amplitude of their repercussions.

President Roosevelt tried to reverse the process. Mr. Cordell Hull's trade agreement policy was directed toward a reconstruction of world trade, toward a reconstruction of the world economy. The opposing forces were, however, too strong, and only small results were achieved by this policy.

Finally we must not omit from this picture the disrupting forces of the totalitarian régimes. The Mussolinian and Hitlerian slogan of autarky had no economic aims. The forces of Germany and, in a lesser degree, of Italy were marshalled for non-economic aims—for wars of conquest. In April 1936 the chief of the department of "strategic economy" of the German War Ministry wrote :

Strategic economy (Wehrwirtschaft) merges entirely with the economic system renewed and transformed by National Socialism. Strategic economy covers all human life, and therefore transforms the social structure. It rests on the absolute will to military preparedness. It is the economic principle of the totalitarian State, and constitutes the economic preparation for future war, which will also be in the highest degree totalitarian.

Professor Condliffe sums up his study of the pre-war economic policies in these words :

It is difficult, therefore, to resist the conclusion that the conflict of tariff policies in the world just before the present war mirrored the international political situation only too accurately. The British trading system, based on the unchallenged stability of sterling and a great free-trade market, had broken down and been replaced by an opportunist policy conservatory of vested interests. Totalitarian policies were making vigorous and determined attempts to create new centres of world trade designed to strengthen the economic bases of military power. The United States was moving in the direction necessary to restore world trade, but slowly and with reservations deriving essentially from a profound reluctance to accept the consequences of effective and responsible participation in an interdependent world.

Where do the small countries, whose innumerable frontiers and Customs barriers are supposed to have been the main reason for the economic unrest of the inter-war years, come into this picture? They come in, but in a quite different way. For throughout this whole period the small nations struggled to remedy the troubles which could be related to their particular position. They tried to neutralize their frontiers, to counteract the consequences of their "atomization". They repeatedly tried to form groupings that would permit a freer flow of goods. All these attempts failed—through the fault of the Great Powers.

Let us take first the story of the so-called Oslo group. The World Economic Conference at Geneva proposed a tariff truce. Eventually, under the leadership of Great Britain, a draft convention, embodying in part the findings of the Conference, was adopted on March 24, 1930. This convention never came into operation, for the necessary ratifications were not forthcoming. Repre-

sentatives, however, of Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Sweden, and Norway met in October 1930 at the Hague, in November at Geneva, and finally in December at Oslo, where a convention was signed providing that none of the countries concerned would impose new duties or increase existing duties without consultation with the other signatories. In 1932 Finland added her signature to the convention.

This "tariff truce" was meant as a first step toward tariff reduction, toward the creation of a zone of free trade. In fact, in July 1932 Belgium and Holland signed at Ouchy a convention providing for reciprocal and progressive tariff reductions, and negotiations were started to include the other signatories of the Oslo group in this scheme. It came to nothing, however, for the Imperial Conference at Ottawa insisted—on the basis of the most-favoured-nation clause, which at this same conference had been ruled out of inter-Imperial relations—that all concessions made within the Oslo group must also be granted to the British Empire. This decision gave the death blow to the Ouchy initiative. The members of the Oslo group continued to meet to discuss possibilities and exchange information. In 1937 an agreement was even signed aiming, since tariff reductions were impossible, at expanding the trade between these countries by a relaxation of the quantitative restrictions on imports. But this agreement was terminated in May 1938. And war in Finland and afterwards in the Scandinavian countries ended even the consultations.

The Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) endeavoured between 1928 and 1934 to secure the acceptance of a Baltic clause as an exception to the most-favoured-nation clause, and thus to forge a larger economic unit out of these three States. In vain.

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Similar efforts at the Balkan conferences at Istanbul, Bucharest, and Salonika after 1930 met with the same ill-success. The more ambitious scheme of preferential treatment for grain and other agricultural exports from Central and Eastern Europe, following the Warsaw Conference of August 1930, attended by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Estonia and Latvia, was no more successful. As Professor Condliffe states :

The economic need of these small countries was desperate, but economic motives were not strong enough to move the great trading countries or to secure unanimity of action among the Eastern European countries themselves. The former were preoccupied with their own economic difficulties and unwilling to penalize the great agricultural exporting countries outside Europe. The latter were divided by political differences *and under heavy pressure from the even more bitter struggle among the Great Powers for political hegemony.* (My italics.)

This struggle between the Great Powers was most marked in the so-called Danubian area, in relation, that is, to the "Succession States" that had emerged from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Throughout the whole period repeated attempts were made to re-establish the former economic links between the Succession States. The Stresa Conference of 1932 for the valorization of cereals, the so-called Tardieu plan, and the attempts to achieve a closer economic union between Czechoslovakia and Austria initiated by the Czechoslovak Government, were all doomed to failure, because neither Italy nor Germany would allow a closer economic union between the Succession States. For this closer economic union between the Little Entente States on one side and Austria and Hungary on the other would have been sure to lead to a political understanding. And for Mussolini

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in particular such a political understanding would have meant a strengthening of the French security system and of French influence in Europe. This the Italian dictator would not allow. He encouraged the revisionist agitation in Hungary, and used all his influence on the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, to prevent any understanding between the Succession States.

The sequel to these events is well known. On February 12, 1934, Dollfuss, on the orders of Mussolini, shelled and machine-gunned 'out of existence the workers' movement in Austria, which had been a force making for international goodwill. In the summer of the same year King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Barthou were assassinated, and Barthou was replaced by a man who could be bribed by Mussolini—Pierre Laval.

No Danubian economic understanding came into being, but Austria and Hungary were linked up by the so-called Rome protocols to the Italian economic system—without any profit to them, or, for that matter, to Italy. Later Hitler's Germany stepped in, and Austria disappeared.

We cannot better sum up the economic story of the inter-war years than by two fine quotations from Professor Condliffe's book. Speaking of the innumerable conferences between the smaller Powers, he says :

The reality behind these conferences, however, is to be found in a relentless political struggle between the Great Powers for control over the smaller nations of Europe. In that struggle economic relations were steadily worsened and all attempts at regional understandings were thwarted.

And later :

Political conflicts among the smaller Powers have been a cause of disunion ; but the political conflict that has wrecked all the regional initiatives launched in recent years has been the bitter struggle of the Great Powers for hegemony on the continent of Europe.

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What are the lessons to be drawn from this history? The first is, of course, the rejection of the theory that it was the existence of small nation-States that rendered impossible a rational organization of the European economic system. For all the attempts at building up effective collaboration between the smaller Powers were thwarted by the imperialism of the Great Powers, who wanted the "leadership" which G. D. H. Cole now advocates as the best solution. The second lesson is that while politics are conditioned largely by economic factors, economics are conditioned no less by political factors. And in the inter-war years the political factors were predominant, as they will be after this war.

I shall try later to give a broad outline of how the necessities of planning, the necessities of the organization of a new economic order, can be reconciled with the conception of nation-States. But as this question is primarily a political one, as the people who are conquered today would be prepared even to accept economic hardships in order to maintain their existence, I will deal first with the political aspects of the question.

IV

At the Peace Conference in Paris Mr. Lloyd George assured Paderewski that he could understand the needs of Poland better than any other statesman, because he himself was a member of a small nation. He used the same argument in a discussion with General Botha concerning the national problems in South Africa. Mr. Lloyd George was, of course, in one sense right. He is a member of a small nation: he is a Welshman. But this fact had hardly any bearing on his political career. Mr. Lloyd George the M.P., Mr. Lloyd George the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George the great Prime Minister in the first world war, the member of the Big Four in Paris, did not act as a Welshman. He was a "British" statesman.

This complete divorce between nationality and state-membership is characteristic of Great Britain. In political life Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Welshmen forget their nationality and act simply as British subjects for the weal of Great Britain as a unity. (It is strange to note that in this freest of all countries the term "citizen" has not yet displaced the old word "subject".)

No Englishman regards it as strange when a Welshman like Mr. Lloyd George, or a Scotsman like Ramsay MacDonald, occupies No. 10, Downing Street. In Parliament there is a Scottish group, but though the Cabinet includes a Minister for Scotland, this, so far as I can ascertain, is a manifestation rather of regionalism than of nationalism in the Continental sense of the word. Home Rule for Scotland, Home Rule for Wales, never have played, and I think never will play, a part comparable to that of the Home Rule for Ireland move-

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ment. Scottish and Welsh nationalism are politically of no more importance than the Breton autonomist movement in France. Broadly speaking, the conception of nationality in Great Britain is a non-political one. Parliament is divided on party lines, not on national lines. And I do not think that any Englishman would refer to a Scotsman as a "foreigner".

This conception of nationality as a matter of purely private concern, easily reconcilable with allegiance to a non-national State, is, however, peculiar to Great Britain. Everywhere else the term "nation" has a political connotation and a political meaning, though by no means a uniform one. In France we find the opposite of the British conception. As a result of the centralistic policy of Louis XI, Richelieu, Louis XIV, the Revolution, and Napoleon, the French concept of nationality has become identified with the concept of French citizenship. There is, in fact, only one word in French defining both these concepts, the word "nationalité".

I remember very well my first encounter with this French conception. It was in 1905. We students of Warsaw University walked out on the first day of the revolution and decided upon a "Students' strike." We vowed not to return so long as Russian remained the language officially used by the University. The Tsarist Government remained unbending, and so we were obliged to go abroad in order to conclude our studies, and I matriculated at the University of Paris. Asked for my nationality, I gave it, of course, as Polish, which the Registrar refused to admit. He explained to me that as there was no Polish State there could be no such thing as Polish nationality, and that as a Russian subject I was necessarily of Russian nationality. We quarrelled for a long time and finally agreed to a compromise. I was enrolled as Russian and—in brackets—Polish.

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There are, perhaps, much bigger differences between a Provençal, who at home as often as not speaks Provençal and not French, a Catalan-speaking inhabitant of Perpignan, a Breton who even today may not be able to speak a word of French, and a native of Ile de France or of Normandy, than there are between a Scotsman and an Englishman. But they all consider themselves members of one nation, the French nation. This identification of nationality with citizenship goes so far that the negro children of Senegal are taught that "our ancestors, the inhabitants of Gaul, had blue eyes and fair hair". During the French occupation of the Rhineland the story was widely circulated, and widely believed, of a black soldier who returned to his barracks exclaiming indignantly: "Why do the people stare at me? Have they never seen a Frenchman?" This story may be true or not. But there is no doubt at all that there are black and coloured Frenchmen. The deputies from Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Senegal to the French Parliament, and the coloured Governor-General Eboué, who is continuing the fight against the Germans in Africa, regard themselves as members of the French nation.

France and the French nation are not the sole example of a nationality moulded by the State. In the course of centuries the Swiss State has welded together the Italian-speaking peoples of Ticino, the French-speaking peoples of Vaud and the Valais, and the German-speaking peoples of Berne and of Basle into a single nation—the Swiss nation. It is true that cantonal patriotism has remained strong, and that a Swiss will generally refer to himself as a Genevese, a Bernese, or a Vaudois, and not as a Swiss. It is true that Gottfried Keller and Jakob Burckhardt belong to the history of German literature, just as Jean Jacques Rousseau and Henri

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Amiel belong to the history of French literature. It is true that the sympathies of the Swiss in the first world war were largely divided along the linguistic frontiers, the French-speaking Swiss being favourable to the Allies and the German-speaking Swiss to the Central Powers. (Today the situation is different and the German Swiss are strongly anti-Hitler. But this is a war which transcends national sympathies—it is a war of democracy against Fascism.) Nevertheless there can be no doubt that the Swiss national consciousness and the Swiss nation are living realities.

Walloons and Flemings, the former closely related to the French and the latter as closely related to the Dutch, are today one nation, the Belgian nation, and have a strong consciousness of their common nationhood. If Brussels and the Walloon provinces had not formed a part of the dowry of the Burgundian wife of Maximilian of Austria, but had been reunited, together with the rest of Burgundy, to the French monarchy in the fifteenth century, and if the Flemish provinces of Belgium had been united with the Netherlands after the successful revolt of the Dutch provinces in the sixteenth century, there would have been no Belgian nation. As it is, this nation exists, and neither the Germany of William II in the years of occupation during the first world war, nor the Germany of Hitler, succeeded in disrupting the unity of Belgium. There did exist in 1914–18 a Council of Flanders, there were in the inter-war years and there are today some Flemings who preach the gospel of the Germanic race, but they have no more importance than the Quislings and Musserts.

There can also be no doubt of the reality of the Argentinian, Peruvian, or Uruguayan nation. Here again it is the State that has created the nation. Actually, until the beginning of the nineteenth century all the Latin

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American States (Brazil excepted) were provinces of the Spanish Empire. The revolutionaries who revolted against Spanish rule, all of them descendants of Spaniards and Spanish-speaking, were conscious of a difference between themselves and the Spaniards in Spain, but it was by no means certain what States would finally emerge from the revolution, and the Bolivians and Colombians did not regard themselves as such. Bolivar himself favoured a lesser number of States than finally emerged. He tried hard to create a single unit out of the several "Bolivarian" States, as they are called to this day. In the final settlement, however, Latin America broke up roughly on the lines of the ancient Spanish administrative divisions, for even these purely artificial divisions had already created a sense of community. And today in Latin America there are just as many separate nations, each of them deeply conscious of its own nationhood, as there are States—no more and no less.

This process of the emergence of nations as products of States is still going on. The Canadian and the Australian nations bear testimony to it. There can be hardly any doubt that the emergence of a united Canadian nation, of a Canadian national consciousness, is the direct result of Canadian self-government, of the gradual weakening of the links uniting Canada with Whitehall. And an Australian nation can hardly be said to have existed before the establishment of the Australian Commonwealth in 1900. Today these nations do exist, and the word Canadian, for instance, does not mean simply an Englishman, a Scotsman, a Frenchman or a Ukrainian with Canadian citizenship, but means a member of the Canadian nation.

And the U.S.A.—the melting-pot: what has made a nation of these descendants of all nations of Europe if not the existence of the American State?

However, this nation-building power of the State is not unlimited. Alongside the States in which citizenship and nationality are synonymous we find States in which these concepts are sharply distinguished. The classical example is South Africa. A very interesting book has recently appeared under the provocative title *There are no South Africans*. In fact the long political ascendancy of General Hertzog and the large following of Dr. Malan prove that the majority of the Afrianders continue to be a separate nation, co-existing with the British in the South African State, but absolutely refusing to lose their national individuality.

The two post-war attempts to build up single nationhoods on the basis of a single State in Europe also failed. Czechs and Slovaks agreed in 1917 at the Pittsburgh convention to unite in the building up of a single State of Czecho-Slovakia. (The name was to be spelt with a hyphen.) And I have no doubt that after the war Czechs and Slovaks alike will desire to wipe out the partition imposed by Hitler in March 1939 and that there will again be a Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, there has not emerged a Czechoslovak nation, unhyphenated. Czechs and Slovaks have retained their separate nationhoods, their separate national consciousness. Similarly Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had agreed during the first world war to unite in a single State—the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was to be an equal partnership. There is every probability that this partnership, too, will not be dissolved. Pavelich and his gang, pretending to represent the new Kingdom of Croatia, have as little right to speak for the Croat nation as Tiso and Tuka to speak for the Slovaks. It is Matchek, the great peasant leader, today a German prisoner, who represents the Croats, and Matchek never accepted the idea of a disruption of the Yugoslav State.

But here again no new nation has emerged. The name of the State was changed to Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia has continued to be the country of three nations—the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. All the attempts to ignore this essential fact, all the attempts to rule the country as the land of a single nation, the Yugoslavs, have failed and have been the cause of perpetual unrest.

This consciousness of separate nationhood, based on the bonds of common descent, common language, and common history, can thus prove stronger than the bonds of common statehood. And it can outlast centuries. The Catalans of Perpignan, the Basques of Bayonne are today Frenchmen. But the Catalans of Barcelona and the Basques of Irun are emphatically not Spaniards, but members of separate nations. The original Czech State collapsed in the sixteenth century: the Czech nation survived. The Serb State was wiped out in the fifteenth century: the Serb nation survived. Upper Silesia was separated from the Polish State in the fourteenth century. Six hundred years later the plebiscite showed that the people of Upper Silesia remained Polish. Latvia and Estonia have never been independent States in a modern sense; yet the Lett and Estonian nations were realities.¹

¹ The twentieth century has given us examples which seem to prove that in the conflict between the nation as a group determined by common origin, and the nation as the sum of citizens of one State, it is the first grouping that prevails. I refer to the question of immigrants. The policy of the United States and of the Latin American States has always been based on the assumption that as soon as an immigrant has become an American, Brazilian, or Argentinian citizen he becomes also a member of the American, Brazilian or Argentinian nation. The State was not interested in the language these citizens spoke at home; it permitted Italian, German or Polish schools and newspapers. For a long time the system proved completely workable, and the sentimental ties with the countries of origin and with the language of origin did not disrupt the national unity.

In 1914-18, however, the United States had trouble with the "hyphenated" German-Americans. The "Americanism" of many of these citizens proved unable to stand the strain of the conflict between their country of adoption and their country of origin. To-day the system has

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It is essential to realize that it was not the upper classes, not the intelligentsia, that maintained the existence of nations, as entities independent of the State. It was the common people. The concept of nationality is essentially a democratic concept. It is no accident that the symbol of the unity of the French nation, a unity transcending the differences between Armagnacs, Lorrainers, and the people of the Île de France, the first genuinely French patriot, was a peasant girl, Jeanne la Lorraine—Joan of Arc. It is no mere coincidence that collapsed completely in the Latin American States, and is endangered even in the U.S.A. In 1938 the Brazilian Government felt compelled to close down the German schools in Brazil. These schools were, in fact, not endeavouring to turn out German-speaking Brazilians, but purely and simply Germans, whose allegiance was to the German Reich and to Adolf Hitler and not to Brazil. The investigations of the Dies Committee in the U.S.A. and of the Taborda Committee in Argentina, and the attempted putsches in Bolivia and Paraguay, have made it more than clear that the loyalty of a great majority of the citizens of German and Italian origin in the Latin American States, and of a substantial number of these people in the U.S.A., was first to the people of their kin in Europe, and that the loyalty to the State and to their fellow-citizens was bound to be discarded in the conflict between them.

The nation was victorious in the conflict with the State. The most instructive example of this growing importance of national ties is given by the Volga Germans. They are descendants of colonists brought to Russia by Catherine II. This means that they have been Russian subjects for 200 years, that for 200 years their only ties with Germany were their German descent and German language. In the first world war these ties did not count. The Volga Germans, as well as the German Baltic barons, fought in the Tsarist army without any qualms. The Bolshevik revolution enlarged the national rights of the Volga Germans. They were recognized as a federated republic, the republic of the Volga Germans, and they obtained full self-government. For twenty years these workers and peasants have been educated in the Communist creed, for twenty years their schools and their newspapers inculcated in them hatred of Fascism. They appeared to be happy and loyal Soviet citizens. However, as soon as the German-Soviet war started these German Communists felt that their loyalty to the German people came first, even if the leader of these people was Adolf Hitler. The Volga Germans became such a hotbed of fifth columnist activities that as Hitler's armies approached the Volga the Soviet Government saw no other solution than the wholesale deportation of the 600,000 Volga Germans far from the front to Siberia. Bearing in mind the strain this deportation in the middle of a war must have put on the Russian communication system, it is easy to realize the magnitude of the danger the Volga Germans must have presented.

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the slogan of France "one and indivisible" was forged only by the French Revolution: it is in accordance with the normal historic process. French noblemen have served the German Emperor against France in bygone days; Germans have been Marshals of France. The Serbian nobles were converted to Islam and merged in the Turkish ruling class, and the Czech aristocracy became Germanized. The Polish aristocracy in Upper Silesia became German, and the Lithuanian nobles after the union of Lithuania and Poland accepted Polish culture and Polish nationality. The toiling masses resisted. The peasants and miners of Upper Silesia remained Polish, the Serb, the Czech, the Lithuanian peasants continued to cling to their language, to their way of life. And it was these peasant masses who, becoming articulate in the nineteenth century, revived the Czech, the Serb, the Lithuanian nation. It was this survival of national consciousness in the masses that invalidated the equation between State and nation.

There will be no Socialism before independence.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

WE have seen that there can be no single definition of nationality. Nationality means something different to an Englishman and a Frenchman, to an Ulsterman and a Southern Irishman, to a French Catalan and a Spanish Catalan, to a Pole and an Argentinian. An all-embracing definition of a nation can be given only in tautological terms—"A nation is a group that considers itself to be a nation". For even the seemingly very comprehensive definition of Louis de Brouckère, "A nation is constituted by the community of those who have at the same time the will and the means of living together", does not cover all the possibilities. For instance, non-Zionist Jewish nationalists, and the majority of Jewish Socialists, regard themselves as members of the Jewish nation, but have neither the will nor the means of living together in Palestine, and insist simply on their right of retaining their nationality while living in the diaspora among other nations.

That is why "self-determination" is the only principle on which a just solution of national problems can be based. In its usual connotation this principle implies, however, more than the simple and hardly disputed affirmation that a nation is a group that considers itself to be a nation. In President Wilson's Fourteen Points it implied also the right of each nation to determine whether it wanted to live in its own nation-State, or whether it was willing to be part of a larger State unit. The authors of the Versailles Treaty accepted this interpretation of self-determination when re-drawing the

map of Europe. They cancelled, for instance, the London Treaty, which had given Dalmatia to the Italian State. After much bloodshed the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination for Ireland. Today the Atlantic Charter has reaffirmed this principle. Point 3 of the Charter says explicitly that the signatories "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them".

A substantial section of British opinion, however, including ex-appeasers as well as certain Left-wing writers, is now fighting against this principle of the self-determination of nations, insisting that smaller States are "obsolescent" and denying that national rights imply the right to a separate nation-State. Mr. G. D. H. Cole, in his book *Europe, Russia, and the Future*, states this case with exceptional vigour.

Mr. Cole does not deny that nations as such are entitled to certain rights. He says :

For most of us—even of those who see the need—international government is not so much an inspiring ideal as an unwelcome necessity. That makes it indispensable to think out clearly in our minds the means of preserving cultural nationalism, with its appropriate institutions near to the everyday lives of men, within the broader framework of the international State. The nations must have their parliaments—or soviets—to voice their common desires ; they must have leaders who speak their language and think their thoughts ; their institutions must be officered by men and women who speak their language and share the outlook of the people with whom they have to deal.

But he absolutely rejects the idea that the rights of nations should extend to separate statehood. The small States are anathema to him. His argument is twofold, both political and economic. His political argument is summed up as follows :

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The idea of nationality as a basis for an independent statehood is obsolete. Economic development, including the development of the economic arts of war, has destroyed it finally. The independence of small States, and, indeed, of all States save the largest and richest in developed resources,¹ is impracticable now that a mechanized army and air force belonging to a great State can simply sweep aside all the resistance that they can offer. The utmost "independence" any small State can hope for in the future is a false independence, behind which lies the reality of complete domination of a greater neighbour. That or existence on mere sufferance, or as a buffer between greater neighbours, almost certain to become a battleground if those neighbours fall out. Assume the revival of the pre-war European State system, even with federations of the smaller and weaker independent countries. What chance would a federated Danubia have of resisting either a united Germany or a united Russia, were either minded to enslave it—that is, except by enslaving itself to the other? For how much would the military might of federated Balkania count in any future conflict? For nothing, as an independent force."

This argument is a peculiar example of Sahib mentality, a curious example of forgetfulness of very recent facts. For if this war, in which France did not defend herself any longer than Poland, and Singapore held out less long than the Polish Peninsula, has proved anything, it has proved that even the largest States and those richest in developed resources cannot defend themselves successfully single-handed. This war can be won only by a coalition, comprising four of the largest States—Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Mr. Cole's argument leads necessarily to the conclusion that the idea of any absolutely independent State is obsolete. It is an argument for establishing a worldwide system of collective security. It is true that without an adequate organization of collective security

¹ My italics.

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the aggressor Powers that have prepared for war will always have the initial advantage; it is true that without collective security the "freedom from fear" cannot disappear. In this respect, however, Great Powers and small Powers are all in the same boat, and there is absolutely no reason for discrimination.

Mr. Cole's second argument is economic. He continues:

Nor, military considerations apart, have such groupings any sufficient basis of economic strength. Can Balkan or Danubian federations solve the problems of peasant poverty? Yet these are the basic problems of all Southern and Eastern Europe, and there will be no stable European order until a solution of them has been made possible.

Here again the argument in itself is sound. But there is a *non sequitur* between it and the condemnation of small States and federations of small States. The argument proves the necessity of worldwide economic collaboration, of elements of worldwide organization transcending all national sovereignties. For without such collaboration, without such organization, not only the problems of Southern and Eastern Europe, but the problems of France, Great Britain, and the United States as well, are insoluble. No Power today is completely self-sufficient. Even the creation of huge units such as Mr. Cole envisages, would not eliminate the necessity for a certain amount of interstate planning, and if that is so, here again no reason can be found for discriminating between smaller and greater States.

I have quoted Mr. Cole because he has perhaps argued most forcibly and effectively the case of the adversaries of small States. Mr. Cole, however, is far from being isolated in his views. It thus becomes necessary to examine the question whether in fact fully guaranteed local government (in contradistinction to self-

government) is not sufficient to meet national needs, whether the insistence on national independence is not simply a quibble over a word.

In a purely rational world Mr. Cole might be right. In a world of angels, where the majority nation inside the State would not take an unfair advantage of its majority position, he would certainly be right. But humanity is not composed of angels. And it is not moved only by rational causes, just as it is not moved only by economic causes. There can be no doubt that the term "national independence" has a profound psychological and emotional basis, that the desire for national independence, and not simply for national rights in the framework of a larger State unit, has been and continues to be one of the most potent motives of heroism and sacrifice. There can be no doubt—we shall return to this aspect of the question—that the innumerable heroes and martyrs of Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway, and the other occupied countries are fighting precisely for national independence. To neglect this psychological factor is to close our eyes to one of the most important realities in the present situation.

Scores of examples could be adduced to prove the irresistible force of the desire for full national independence. I will limit myself to two. Sweden and Norway were two democratic countries, each with full self-government. The only link between these two countries was the person of the King. But even this loose union appeared to the Norwegian people to be an intolerable humiliation, for the ruling dynasty was a Swedish dynasty. And Sweden and Norway separated peacefully in 1905.

In the preceding chapter I exemplified the nation-building power of the State by the history of Canada and Australia. This history, however, points also in a different direction, in the direction of the State-building

power of a nation. It proves that as soon as a nation achieves full consciousness of its separate nationhood it automatically strives to obtain the maximum of independence for its State. Neither Canada nor Australia has ever seriously contemplated secession from the British Empire, or rupture of the links with the British Crown. But both insistently claimed, and finally obtained in the Westminster Statute, the recognition of their full sovereignty and independence, the recognition that as members of the British Commonwealth they are "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another".

Here again it is important to note that the idea of national independence, of the right of each nation to its own State,¹ is essentially a democratic ideal. Its implication is, as Nehru's dictum proves, that full democracy can only be realized within the framework of a national State.

This intimate connexion between the fight for democracy and the fight for independence cannot be better exemplified than by the story of the 150 years of Poland's struggle. The Polish insurrection of 1794 was Kosciuszko's insurrection. And Kosciuszko, who had fought in the United States with Washington, was a partisan of the French Revolution, as were also his comrades in arms. One of his first acts had been the liberation of the peasants. After the third partition of Poland, Polish legions were organized in revolutionary France, and they fought in Italy under a banner on which these proud words were inscribed "Gli uomini liberi sono fratelli" = free men are brothers. The Polish insurrection of 1830 was started by freemasons and republicans, and the soldiers of 1830 fought the troops of the Tsar under the banner "for your freedom and ours". The revolu-

¹ Or to membership of a federal State on the basis of the absolute equality of the federated nations. This, however, is a question to be examined later.

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tion of 1863 was started by the "Reds" against the advice of the conservative "Whites", who joined only later in the struggle. The first manifesto of January 22, 1863, began with the words :

In the first moment of this sacred struggle the National Central Committee declares all sons of Poland, without any difference of religion, origin, or status, equal and free citizens of the country. The land which the peasant population has hitherto tilled as tenants or serfs to-day becomes its property.

Neither Marx nor Herzen had any doubt that the Polish revolution of 1863 was a popular revolution, meriting the sympathy and the support of the European working class. In fact, the foundation of the First International was a direct outcome of the general agitation in favour of Poland. And after the collapse of the revolution two of its leaders, the generals Dabrowski and Wroblewski, became military leaders of the Paris Commune.

In the years between 1863 and 1914 the Conservative elements of Polish society reasoned precisely along the lines of Mr. Cole's argument. They insisted that nationality could be divorced from statehood, and that the Polish nation ought to accommodate itself to foreign rule and concentrate only on the cultural development of the Polish nationality, as the only thing that mattered. In Austria, where after 1867 the cultural rights of the Poles were respected and where the Poles had provincial self-government, the Polish Conservatives were the staunchest supporters of the Dual Monarchy. And even in Russian and Prussian Poland the Conservative class, the great landlords and industrialists, proclaimed the gospel of loyalty to the State, fondly hoping that as a reward for this loyalty they might obtain a reversal of the policy of forcible Russification and Germanization

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and devote themselves to the pursuit of the economic interests which linked them with the occupying Power.

The Socialist Party, however, inscribed in its programme the fight for the independence of Poland. It was the reasoned and profound conviction of the founders of Polish Socialism that independent statehood was the necessary condition of the full freedom of the Polish people. And in the years immediately preceding the first world war the political counterpart of Pilsudski's military organization, which prepared the Polish independent intervention in the approaching war, was the Confederate Commission of the Polish Independence Parties, comprising the Socialist Party, the Peasant Party, and the party of the radical intelligentsia, then headed by Wladyslaw Sikorski.

The independence of Poland was proclaimed on November 7, 1918, by a Government representing the Socialists, the peasants, and the radical intelligentsia. Its head was the great Socialist leader Ignacy Daszynski. And when in 1920 the Russian armies approached Warsaw the national Government was headed by the peasant leader Wincenty Witos as Premier, with the Socialist leader Daszynski as his deputy.

That supreme realist Lenin, who had lived in Poland before the war, well understood this necessary connexion between Socialism and national independence. There was at that time a "fraction" (Political group) of Polish Socialists, headed by people who afterwards left the Polish movement and became merged in the Russian or German movement—Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Radek, Dzierzynski—which opposed the fight for independence. They affirmed that economically the three parts of Poland were already indissolubly linked up with the partitioning States, that the severance of these links would spell misery for the Polish worker, that

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proletarians were interested only in a Socialist revolution and not in nationalist fads. Lenin fought them wholeheartedly and passionately. We read in the memoirs of his widow :

But the war would inevitably—Ilyich had no doubt about that—develop into rebellion ; the oppressed nationalities would fight for their independence. This was their right. The International Socialist Conference in London in 1896 had already confirmed this right. The underestimation of the right of nations to self-determination at such a time, the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913, in the face of impending war, filled Vladimir Ilyich with indignation . . . But the most serious controversy over the question of the right of nations to self-determination was carried on with the Poles. The latter, Rosa Luxemburg and the Rozlamovcy, maintained that the right of nations to self-determination does not necessarily mean the establishment of separate States. Ilyich appreciated the reasons why the Poles were disturbed about the question of right to self-determination.

And in 1915, in answer to an article by Radek in the *Berner Tagwacht*, Lenin wrote : “ It is senseless to contrast the Socialist revolution and the revolutionary struggle against capitalism with *one* of the questions of democracy, in this case the national question.”

One of the men who best knew pre-war Europe, one of the shrewdest and most intelligent observers, the former Director of the I.L.O., Harold Butler, sums the case up admirably. He writes in *The Lost Peace* :

It was easy enough to condemn the peace settlements, the “ balkanization ” of Europe, from armchairs in London. It was all very well for the economists to demonstrate by industrial and banking statistics that the new grouping of States was unworkable—and to a large extent they were right. But national sentiment takes little account of statistics. To the traveller who witnessed the ecstasy with which all the liberated peoples were revelling in their

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newly won freedom, it was obvious that the peace settlement was in its broad lines not only right, but inevitable.

The changes which the educational curricula and the propaganda in Soviet Russia have undergone exemplify admirably the importance which the conception of the State as the home of a nation still possesses. It is not Soviet patriotism, it is Russian patriotism, even Russian nationalism, that has been fostered in the U.S.S.R. of recent years. The whole of Russian national history, not only the history of the Russian revolutionary struggle, has become sacrosanct. It would be possible to explain in terms of Socialism the glorification of Kutuzov, the victor of 1812. For Napoleon's army was an invading army, and resistance to foreign aggression is wholly consistent with the Socialist outlook. The apotheosis of Peter the Great could also be defended on the ground that at the time Peter I represented a progressive force in Russia, modernizing the backward Muscovite monarchy. The disgrace of the official poet of the Soviet régime, Demian Biedny, calls, however, for a different interpretation. For Biedny's crime had simply been that he poked fun at St. Vladimir, the prince who Christianized Russia, and his comrades in arms. It is true that the official explanation was that the introduction of Christianity was at that moment a measure of progress ; in fact, however, the protection of the memory of St. Vladimir was simply a proof that the whole of the Russian national tradition must be incorporated in the fabric of the Soviet State.

And the recent cult of Suvorov gives a complete proof that in the Soviet Union of today national sentiment and the national and State tradition overrule all other considerations. For Suvorov cannot be considered as a representative of progressive thought, even for his time ; Suvorov cannot be considered as a man who defended

Russian soil against foreign aggression, and who for that reason has a right to the gratitude of the country. Suvorov's only title to the position of a national hero is that he waged successive aggressive wars against Turkey, against Poland fighting for its independence, and against the French revolution.¹ It was not in a war against Napoleon that Suvorov retreated with his armies across the Alpine glaciers. His adversary was the young General Bonaparte, at that time a soldier of the French revolution.

It is not, however, only a question of national psychology. There are very serious and positive reasons for basing the post-war order on a *co-ordination* of independent national States, and not on the amalgamating of smaller States and Great Powers into larger units. Louis de Brouckère, one of the most profound thinkers of today, a recognized leader of international Socialism, has stated the case perfectly in three articles written for *France*. I shall give two quotations. In the issue of January 24, 1942, we read :

Finally the economic side, the financial side, and the military side, important as they are, are far from constituting the totality of social activity. There remains the political aspect. There remains the juridical aspect. There remains the whole vast problem of education—and I do not forget that education in its broadest sense comprises scientific research and artistic production. There remains the hardly initiated work of social welfare. Does not the national community play an essential part in these fields? Is it not necessary for working successfully in them to have a profound mutual understanding? This freedom of action, which is rendered possible and easy by mutual understanding, can it not be developed better than anywhere precisely in these fields? And here the

¹ These were wars characterized by appalling cruelty. The wholesale slaughter of the population in Bessarabia, and of the population of the Warsaw suburb of Praga, revolted the conscience of Suvorov's contemporaries.

small nations are at an advantage. The Government is nearer to the people, democracy is more direct.

And in the issue of January 7, discussing the proposal that the small States should not incur any international obligations to give military support to collective security, de Brouckère writes :

[In this case] the small nations would no longer be associates equal in dignity and in liberty. They would be protected, and consequently placed in fact under a protectorate. They have too profound a love of their independence to accept such a situation for long with resignation and patience. Their dissatisfaction would grow rapidly, and the experience of recent decades has proved that the dissatisfaction even of small nations may be the cause of dangerous troubles for the international order. The whole world would lose in tranquility what the small nations lost in dignity. Apart from that, the world would renounce an important means of progress. For it must be well understood that the small States are not an abnormal survival of the past.

The issue of equality of nations is, in fact, the dominant issue. And this equality can be maintained only if nations, even very closely connected in organizations transcending the nation-State, none the less maintain their independence, their full self-government.

Democracy is essentially majority rule. It is in principle the subordination of all sectional interests to the general interest, based on the assumption that the importance of the share of the citizen in the general interest of the community overrides, or ought to override, his share in sectional interests. This assumption holds good as long as the community is fairly homogeneous and the divisions within it run on parallel lines. (With the important reservation, however, that there are certain rights—the rights of man—which cannot be impaired by any majority decision.) All citizens being equal, the decision acceptable to the majority must, *ex hypothesi*,

be considered as just and fair. But whenever divisions are on several different lines pure majority rule becomes inadequate. That is why in the existing federal constitutions the balance between the representation of the population as a whole and the representation of the different State interests is assured by the system of representation of States in the Upper Chamber irrespective of the number of their inhabitants. Even so, in the United States conflicts between Federal and State governments, and complaints of encroachment by the Federal authorities, are far from unknown.

In Switzerland these conflicts sometimes become acute. They are most acute in the French-speaking cantons. For the French-speaking Swiss are a minority, and the people of Lausanne or Geneva are hypersensitive in regard to any majority decision which smacks of the imposition of German conceptions. The bitter struggle waged by the French-speaking cantons against a single federal penal code, based on the Germanic conception of right, bore eloquent testimony to difficulties which can arise even within the framework of a single nation. How much more strongly would decisions carried by a majority made up of members of the majority nation be resented within the framework of a huge unit.

The most ardent advocates of Federal Union fully realize the existence of this problem. If Clarence Streit excludes from his proposed Federal Union India, China, and the U.S.S.R., it is because he takes the representation by numbers as the basis, and he is keenly interested in a structure which provides that the U.S.A. can never be outvoted.

Even from the economic viewpoint it is arguable that only an independent State can guarantee the full development of economic resources. Professor Condliffe writes, in the book from which I have already quoted so much :

The Greeks thought a certain degree of economic self-sufficiency was one of the essential requirements of independent statehood. No community which did not contain within itself a minimum degree of economic self-sufficiency could develop the cultural and political life that was deemed an essential attribute of independent nation-life. This idea has survived, particularly in the small countries with vivid national traditions. To them, political independence and the preservation of their characteristic ways of living are more important than great wealth. They are prepared to justify measures which, even at some economic cost, check the tendency towards extreme specialization ; but they are more than willing to participate in a world market which is complementary of their own resources. Their quarrel is not with internationalism, but with a cosmopolitanism that would estrange and destroy their individuality. Their attitude is that many moral values and cultural ideals are interwoven with political independence, which must be regarded as worth preserving for its own sake, even at some economic cost.

Professor Condliffe stresses the political implications of economic independence, though the " extreme specialization " of which he writes is even economically unsound. What, however, is very seldom mentioned is that independence may be, and often has been, a paying economic proposition.

The disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that huge economic unit, is often quoted as an example of disastrous economic results of the establishment of a series of economic sovereignties. And if we look at the picture through the windows of a Vienna banking house or a Hungarian aristocratic residence, these lamentations are justified. If we turn, however, to the dwelling of a Croatian or a Polish peasant the picture will be quite different. We shall see that the Pole and the Croat actually gained economically by the establishment of independent Poland and of Yugoslavia. They gained because

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their own governments were interested in the development of the country, in the wellbeing of its inhabitants, while Vienna and Budapest always sacrificed the interests of these outlying provinces with their alien inhabitants to the interests of the ruling nation.

Vienna always hampered the industrial development of what was then called "the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria", for it wanted to conserve that territory as a market for Austrian industry. Budapest similarly hampered the industrial development of Croatia. All the factories owned by the Government—the armament factories and the factories and repair shops of the State railways—were established in Hungary proper. The tax system, the tariff system, everything was organized to promote the development of Hungary proper at the expense of Croatia. All the railway lines converged on Budapest. And the railway tariffs—the famous Baros tariffs—were so cunningly devised that a farmer of the Croatian wheat belt had to pay more for the transport of wheat directly from Osijek to the Adriatic—450 kilometres—than if he sent the wheat via Budapest, a distance of over 700 kilometres.

In Western Poland industrial development started only with the establishment of Polish independence. The marvel of Gdynia and the establishment of the Central Polish industrial district were only possible as parts of a national plan for raising the standard of life of the Polish population. And Milan Hodza states in his book, "Federation in Central Europe" that "from 1920 to 1931 the profits of Slovak peasants increased by 170%."

Thus, even from the economic point of view the essential unit, the planning unit, need not necessarily be huge; even in the economic field the independent State is not yet played out.

VI

The first point is that the world will still continue to be *organized* in a number of separate nations. The violence of the reaction against Nazism was due more to the attempt to stamp out national freedom and individuality than to anything else. To suppose that nations who have made unprecedented sacrifices in order to serve their national identity are going to surrender it once they have regained it is surely contrary to common sense. To remake their national lives will be the first and dearest wish of all of them, even the smallest, and their right to do so is implicit in the conception of democracy. The national ideal is still the source from which the vitality, the culture, and the rich diversity of our civilization will be drawn.

HAROLD BUTLER, *The Lost Peace*.

THUS national independence and the existence of separate national States were firmly founded in the pre-war days not only on the national psychologies but on very real national interests. How does the question stand today? What are the desires and the tendencies of the people who matter, the common people and the underground workers of the countries incorporated in Hitler's New Order, the people of Poland and Czechoslovakia, of Holland and Belgium, of Norway and Greece?

There is a group of people here in Great Britain who indulge in wishful thinking. They have elaborated a plan for the future of Europe which seems to them attractive, and they simply assume that it cannot be other than attractive for the people in the occupied countries. We read fairly often that the émigré governments in London are not fully representative of the people at home. And this assumption is partially, but only partially, right. And then we find the affirmation

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that the people who today are fighting the Germans in the occupied countries, the saboteurs and guerrillas of Poland, the chetniks of Yugoslavia, do not care a fig for their national independence, that they would gladly see their country become a part of the Soviet Union, that the only thing that interests these fighters is social revolution. This school of thought is perfectly epitomized by the following quotation from the *New Statesman and Nation* :

It is, however, too early to treat these schemes as anything more than suggestions. If the Russians realize their hope of beating the Germans before the end of this year, their prestige and their leadership will be decisive in Eastern and Central Europe at least. The future of the Balkans will be decided not by exiled courts in London, but by the peasant armies still fighting with steadfast courage in the mountainous interior.

It is the wish of the Russians to erect a big (which would not on that account be a strong) Poland as a buffer between Germany and themselves. But we are sceptical about the old-world conceptions of a balance of power which inspire all these arrangements sketched by conservative exiles in conservative London. The Europe that emerges after it has shaken off the German yoke will not be the Europe whose divisions and corruptions invited the Nazi attack. It may achieve a revolutionary fraternity, and dismiss these timid variations of the old pattern of nationalism and sovereignty in order to advance towards a wider union of peoples.

A second group, more alive to the realities of today, admits that the underground workers are fighting primarily for their national independence. Julius Braunthal, speaking of his country, Austria, writes in *Left News* :

If I judge rightly the psychological repercussions of the Nazi experience on the minds of the people in Austria, I believe that the Austrians, although they intensely dread the resurrection of the "independence" of their country,

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because it has meant permanent and indeed hopeless mass unemployment and misery, will none the less restore her sovereignty in the initial stages of the revolution. I, for one, feel even sure that on the very first day of the revolution in Austria the Austrian republic will certainly be proclaimed.

And G. D. H. Cole writes :

It is hardly to be expected that any of the exiled governments in London now domiciled in Great Britain will fail to demand the restoration of the State which it still purports to represent and, over and above this, there will be many citizens of these States who will readily identify the restoration of their own liberties with the restoration of the States by whose downfall they were lost. Revolutionary movements generated under the stress of foreign conquest will tend to take a strongly nationalistic form ; and this nationalism will tend to express itself in a demand for a return to sovereign independence.

But having admitted it, Mr. Cole and the others simply brush aside this recognition as purely irrelevant, and continue to vaticinate about the obsolescence of small States, to appeal to "supranational sentiments", to develop their own theories. Is such an attitude, which refuses to distinguish between right and wrong in international politics and preaches the naked doctrine of force, like Professor Carr, compatible with democracy and Socialism? I, for one, have serious doubts of it.

It would be quite a different proposition if the assumptions of the first group were true. And therefore it is important to examine whether in fact it is only the émigré governments (and, by the way, all the émigré Socialist leaders) who insist on the restoration of the national independence of the overrun States, whether in fact for the underground workers of Europe the question of national independence has lost its meaning, or at least its prime importance.

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The simple answer is that the people who put forward this assertion have obviously never troubled to ascertain the real opinion in the countries overrun by Hitler, and have preferred to rely comfortably on their armchair intuition. For anyone who has read the underground press, or who has interviewed any of the workers who have escaped to Great Britain, is left in no doubt that it is precisely the fight for national independence, and not the fight for social revolution, that is in the foreground.

In fact, it is not even necessary to acquaint ourselves with the situation in the occupied countries in order to come to this conclusion. It is enough to follow the Soviet broadcasts to the occupied countries. These broadcasts, designed to appeal to the people, designed to give them what they want, appeal to their national sentiment, and to their national sentiment alone.

To prove my contention I shall first turn to the underground movement I know best, the underground movement of Poland. This movement today unites people of all classes and all social creeds. The underground press, with over one hundred papers, represents all shades of public opinion. A complete analysis of all these shades would lead us too far. It would, moreover, be unnecessary. For our purpose it will be sufficient if we show that even for the press which is controlled by the Polish revolutionary Socialists, by the men who are fighting not for a return to the pre-war pattern of the Polish State but for a Socialist Poland, the question of Poland's independence, of the reconstitution of the Polish State, continues to be essential, and that they share the view of their predecessors of 1905 and 1914, and the view of Jawaharlal Nehru today, that Socialism is inseparable from national independence.

The title of the leading Polish Socialist underground paper is in itself a manifesto. It is called *Wolnosc*,

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Rownosc, Niepodleglosc = Liberty, Equality, Independence. And here are some illuminating quotations. The May Manifesto of the Polish Socialist Party in 1940 concluded with these words :

For the struggle for an independent Poland !

Long live Liberty !

Long live the Government of the people in the People's Poland !

Long live Socialism !

We see that the fight for the independence of Poland takes pride of place in this manifesto. In the leading article of an issue in 1941 we read : " The question of the independence of Poland and the question of Socialism are inseparable." And in another issue :

The defence of Warsaw was the fight for the independence of the nation ; it was also the bloody contribution of the Polish worker to the great fight of the people against international Fascism, a fight which spread from Madrid to our city.

In another issue, in an article commenting on the first Polish-Czechoslovak agreement, we find the following statement :

Among the people who are fighting the totalitarian flood, thought about a new Europe follows different paths from the theory and practice of Fascism. The direction of this road is indicated by the Polish-Czechoslovak understanding. Its basis is the respect of national and *State* independence and the creation of a working community in certain defined political, economic, and cultural questions.

In an article under the title " The fight for the Third Republic " (the first Republic was Poland before the partitions ; the second, Poland from 1919 to 1939), which prophesies " the armed insurrection of the people of Europe ", and gives an outline of the post-war world, we read :

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We have a double aim : the liberation of the Polish State, and the founding of this State on the firm basis of a government of peasants and workers. This duality, however, is only apparent. There is no room for the creative work of the toiling masses without the liberation of the country—and without a complete change of its interior life Poland cannot subsist as a State between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. . . . The problems of the separate nations create one big common problem, the problem of Europe. There does not exist a real force, equal to the might of Fascism, which could liberate the nations separately, as there was no force which could enable them to defend their independence separately. There will be no independent Poland if there is not at the same time a resurgence of France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Holland. (The article was written before the Balkan campaigns.)

I shall conclude with a quotation from the May 1941 manifesto of the underground workers of the People's Poland :

We declare that Poland will always remain faithful to the supreme principles of collaboration for international liberty, equality, and democracy, and will endeavour to create a Union of the free peoples of Europe, based on the principle : the free with the free, equals with equals. That is the sense of the testament of 1918 [Poland's first people's Government], and these are the perspectives of the struggle which the Polish workers, peasants, and intellectual workers are waging for an independent Poland—the true mother country of the Polish people among the free peoples of Europe.

I think these few quotations, which could be supplemented by countless others, prove beyond any doubt that the independence of Poland is the major issue for all Polish revolutionaries who are fighting today. And there can be no doubt that the position in the other occupied countries is essentially similar. The fight of the Yugoslav chetniks is primarily a fight for the indepen-

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dence of Yugoslavia ; it is led by Yugoslav patriots who expressly adopted the name of " chetniks ", the name of their ancestors who fought the Turks for the liberty of their country.

The *News Chronicle* reported not long ago that in a demonstration of Yugoslav Communists the portrait of King Peter was carried beside that of Stalin. Does this not show that in order to pursue their policy of resistance even the Communists in Yugoslavia have adopted the slogan of an independent Yugoslavia, of which King Peter is the symbol ?

And that is also the explanation why the entire resistance in Holland is centred around fidelity to the House of Orange, in Norway around fidelity to King Haakon. Certainly both Queen Wilhelmina and King Haakon have by their attitude thoroughly deserved the love of their subjects. But this fidelity to the crowned rulers is due much less to an explosion of monarchical sentiments in the occupied countries than to the consciousness that today Queen Wilhelmina and King Haakon, as the recognized heads of the Dutch and the Norwegian States, symbolize the existence of independent Holland and independent Norway.

No scheme worked out in quiet London studies for the greater felicity of the people of the occupied countries will be able to prevail against the unanimous determination of the European nations to live in their own States as free people. And it would perhaps not even be worth while to discuss the matter were it not for a very real and actual danger which these paper schemes present. We all agree that the mobilization of Europe against the Hitler régime, and a European revolution, are necessary for our victory. We all agree that the underground workers in the occupied countries, the men and women who are daily risking their lives in order to

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obstruct Hitler's war machine, are important allies. Mr. Cole and Mr. Gollancz, to name only two prominent representatives of the Left, are staunch believers in this important factor of a European revolution. They hope it will extend even to Germany. And their fight against "Vansittartism" is largely based on the assumption that it is sheer folly to discourage the potential German revolutionaries; they declare that British propaganda should give the Germans the promise of a better future if they fight Hitler. Yet, by a strange paradox, they do all they can to discourage the people who are not potential, but actual fighters against Hitler, the saboteurs and guerrillas of Poland and the chetniks of Yugoslavia. They do their best to persuade them that their fight is completely senseless, for the best thing they can hope for is to exchange one alien rule for another, the rule of the "bad" Germans for the rule of the "good" Germans or the rule of Russia.

This glib and irresponsible talk of "an enlarged Soviet Russia"—to quote Mr. Gollancz—is a veritable godsend for Dr. Goebbels, who uses it to support his contention that Mr. Eden has "sold out" Eastern Europe to Russia. Meanwhile, as already mentioned, the official Soviet propaganda, which is well aware of the real sentiments of the populations in the occupied countries, disclaims absolutely any Soviet desires for aggrandizement, and bases all its appeals on the love of national independence of the oppressed peoples. *Difficile est satiram non scribere.*

VII

WE have tried to establish the principle that the self-determination of nations is far from being obsolete, and that it necessarily includes the right of each nation to determine whether it wishes to live in a separate independent State. This principle does not exclude the possibility of the union of several nations in a single State, as was the case with the Czechs and Slovaks or the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It implies, however, that such unions must be entirely voluntary, based on the will of the nations concerned.

Nor does the principle of self-determination exclude the building up of vaster economic, political, and military unions, transcending the frontiers of the several States. It implies simply that the basic unit within such vaster unions will be the independent State, and that all the component States will be on an equal footing, irrespective of the number of their inhabitants and their wealth. It implies that each of the member States of these vaster units will surrender exactly the same amount of sovereignty.

I am fully aware of the difficulties of the problem of reconciling this absolute necessity of maintaining the independence of States with the equally compelling necessity of evading the pre-war muddle, and of achieving a rational organization of the post-war world. It is not my ambition to produce a full blue-print of the future organization. In general I am rather suspicious of blue-prints in political and social matters. The more so while we are still in the middle of a war, whose unpredictable future course must have an influence on the shape of the future world, if only through changes in

psychology. How many of the blue-prints made in the first year of the war have become obsolete, first through the entry of Italy into the war, then through the German attack on Russia, and finally through the Far Eastern war! In my "thinking aloud" I will confine myself to erecting certain signposts and tracing a very general outline, admitting of innumerable variations within its framework, but quite definitely leaving out of it certain possibilities which may seem to others attractive.

The essential basis of my argument will be that this war is really a world war. The war of 1914-18 was also called a world war. And if we look at the signatures on the peace treaties the name seems justified. We find, in fact, on these treaties the signatures of nearly all the European countries, of Great Britain and the Dominions, of the United States, of China, of Japan, and of a score of Latin-American Republics.

These signatures are, however, misleading. The United States never ratified the Treaty of Versailles, and rejected all European obligations before the ink was dry on Wilson's signature. The British Dominions entered the war only out of loyalty to Great Britain, and never lost the conviction that for them it was a kind of colonial expedition. China and Japan were formally the allies of Great Britain and France. But when in the middle of the war one of these allies, Japan, presented to the other ally, China, the famous 21 demands, which were simply a Japanese bid for domination over China, nobody raised a finger. This incident was considered to be a purely local one. Except in regard to the distribution of the German colonies, the peace settlement was a purely European settlement. And in many quarters even the League of Nations was considered simply as a guarantor of the European peace. The reluctance of Latin American countries to permit the League to take any effective

action in an American dispute, the Chaco conflict, was paralleled by the indignation of many Frenchmen when it appeared that the League had to discuss the Japanese attack on Manchuria, and, still worse, that in the defence of Ethiopia it dared to impose sanctions on Mussolini, a potential ally against Germany.

It was not, indeed, the League of Nations that compelled Japan to abandon her 21 demands. A special conference, the Washington Conference, forced Japan to sign a document linking up the independence and territorial integrity of China with the "open door" economic policy. And we all remember how the governments of Great Britain and France thwarted all action against the aggressor after the seizure of Manchuria by Japan. Neither London nor Paris was willing to acknowledge that British or French interests could possibly be influenced by happenings in so distant a country as Manchuria.

India was considered to be a purely domestic British problem. No country considered it of any interest to itself whether the people of India were granted self-government or not. Amritsar was a purely local story of scant news-value outside India and Great Britain.

This sectionalist attitude of all nations was perfectly illustrated by the attitude of the British Dominions in the inter-war period. In the Ethiopian affair Canada and Australia wholeheartedly supported the Baldwin administration when it decided to terminate the sanctions policy. They were completely in agreement with Sir John Simon that the independence of Ethiopia was not worth the sacrifice of a single British warship.

South Africa, however, refused to accept this reversal of British policy, and fought to the last for the maintenance of sanctions. The South African delegate, Mr. te Water, said in the League Assembly:

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My Government has again examined its own conduct in this matter scrupulously and conscientiously. It can find no new factor in the present situation which did not in fact, or potentially, exist when it announced its decision from this place to honour its obligations and to participate in collective action against the aggressor nation. On the contrary, the destruction of Ethiopian sovereignty by Italy, and the annexation of the territory of a country which at no time menaced the safety of Italy, creates now the exact state of affairs which this League was designed to avoid, and which we are still pledged to prevent by every agreed means in our power and to refuse to acknowledge. . . . And so I beg to announce the decision of my Government that it is still prepared to maintain the collective action legitimately agreed upon by the resolution of this Assembly of the League of Nations on October 10, 1935. We offer this course, which in our deep conviction will alone maintain the League of Nations as an instrument of security for its members. We commend it to this Assembly, even at this eleventh hour, as the only way which will ensure salvation to the nations.

These proud and splendid words meant, however, only that Ethiopia was an African country, and that its annexation by Italy was a menace to South Africa. For when European countries were concerned South Africa, as well as Canada and Australia, supported Chamberlain's "appeasement" policy. It may even be said that their influence on the formation of this policy was far from negligible. The reason is apparent. These "European quarrels" seemed so remote to the Dominion statesmen that they did not see how they could have any influence on the situation in the Dominions. They did not dream that Hitler's bid for the hegemony of Europe could spell any danger for their own countries.¹

¹ One exception must be made. The Labour Government of New Zealand was always consistent in its support of the policy of collective security. Its representative on the Council of the League of Nations, Mr. Jordan, made memorable interventions both in the Ethiopian affair and later in the defence of the Spanish republic.

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This time the situation is different. This war is a world war, and a total war not only in name but in fact. The war hammers today at the doors of Australia, it hammers at the door of every American country. Canada has already had its black-out. Chinese troops fought in Burma alongside the British soldiers, for the defence of Burma was as much the defence of China as of an outpost of the British Empire. General Chiang Kai-shek went to India to mediate between the British Government and the Indian patriots. And Washington is as directly concerned over the future of British-Indian relations as London and Delhi.

And ineluctably the peace settlement after this war must be a total settlement, a world settlement. We must hope that the governments and the peoples have learnt the lesson that the destinies of Manchukuo, Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, China, France, Great Britain, Brazil, and the United States are inextricably intertwined.

It follows that the system of collective security which will have to be established must be established on a worldwide basis. And, since this system will have to be based on compulsion, it follows that all States will have to surrender part of their sovereignty to a worldwide organization, whether it be called a reformed League of Nations or by any other name. Whether this worldwide organization will have its own army, drafted from the population of the Member States, or whether in peace time there will be only national armies under the orders of their national governments, which will be obliged in case of emergency to transfer contingents to an international authority, is more or less immaterial. It is also not essential, though highly desirable, that this worldwide authority should have the monopoly of the air forces, perhaps even of the whole of

civil aviation. What is essential is that this worldwide organization should have at its disposal a force capable of checking any aggression, and that it should have the authority to supervise all national armaments and to enforce on the aggressive Powers the disarmament which the Atlantic Charter demands.

The problem of collective security is not the only one that cannot be solved by the creation of several huge units, but only by a worldwide organization. There are purely technical problems which can be solved only on a worldwide basis. Some of these have been tackled already on that basis by the League of Nations. The work carried on by the Transport Section of the League, and the magnificent work of the Health Section, must be continued, and it can only be continued within the framework of a worldwide organization.

Nor is this enough. The fourth point of the Atlantic Charter states :

They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

This statement implies that the virtual monopoly of certain raw materials in the hands of certain Powers must be neutralized. But equality of access is not sufficient. There must be rational, organized production ; rational, organized allocation ; rational, organized distribution, not only of monopoly raw materials like rubber, nickel, tin, or mercury, but also of certain essential non-monopoly raw materials and products like wheat or steel.

Even in the pre-war world, international cartellization aimed in certain fields at a rationalization of production and distribution on a worldwide scale. But the trusts

and cartels were interested in profits, and profits were easier to obtain by the restriction of production and the maintenance of high prices. The new world which we want to build will aim at the wellbeing of individuals and nations. There will be no place in it for the burning of wheat or of oranges, or for the feeding of locomotives with coffee-beans. This aim, however, can be attained only if there is a worldwide organization planning the distribution and the production of the essential raw materials. Thus rational economic planning as well as collective security postulates the existence of a worldwide organization.

And here we come to grips again with the problem of the independence and equality of nations. For a just plan, a plan promoting the general well-being of all nations, can be framed only by an organization in which all nations, great and small alike, collaborate on equal terms. Otherwise the danger that the more powerful States will take advantage of their preponderant position to further their own national economic interests, to the detriment of the interests of the smaller States, will always be present. This is the essential objection to a conception based only on numbers, and to the proposal that certain Great Powers should be granted spheres of "preponderating influence".

Hitler's New Order is a glaring example of such a misuse of "preponderating influence". But the same conception, though of course in an infinitely less brutal form, underlay Naumann's conception of *Mitteleuropa* in the last war. I have shown in an earlier chapter how provinces of Russia, Germany, and Hungary were exploited by the dominating nations. And everyone knows how long the vested interests of Lancashire successfully opposed any development of Indian national industry, how even today India is industrially undeveloped

simply because any industrial development was inconsistent with certain interests of the British ruling nation.

The creation of several huge economic units, be they as vast as the continent of Asia or the union of the British Commonwealth with the United States, will never achieve the ideal of complete economic autarky, of a completely rational economic planning. It will necessarily lead, on the contrary, to economic conflicts between these units, conflicts which may lead to new and yet more highly organized intercontinental wars. Thus the entrusting of a part of the task of economic planning to a worldwide organization, based on equal partnership of all nations, is the necessary corollary of collective security.

Between this worldwide organization, however, and the individual independent State there is still room for fairly close unions of several States in regional organizations. There may even be a series of concentric groups in such unions. There are classical juridical definitions of different kinds of unions between States—personal unions, real unions, confederations, federations. I do not think it is of much avail to discuss the present day in these terms borrowed from the old text-books. The old international law is dead. One has only to look up what it had to say about neutrality, and compare the definitions with Mussolini's non-belligerency, with the policy of the United States before her entry into the war, or with the position of Switzerland, Sweden, or Vichy France today, to see how entirely inadequate the pre-war concepts are.

There may be completely new forms of union between States in the future, forms dictated by circumstances, by the necessities of adaptation, which it will be impossible to classify under any of the standard definitions. Thus the Polish-Czech understanding is already being called

a confederation, but it has several distinctive traits of Federal Union. I shall confine myself, therefore, to a very broad outline.

The worldwide organization will necessarily provide only the general framework of collective security and the general framework of an economic plan. On the other hand, it will be necessary to harmonize the national economic plans in order to prevent overlapping; and it will be necessary to co-ordinate the defence provisions of neighbouring States. The solution of the problems of this adjustment of national economic systems and defence provisions will call for regional collaboration. Such an attempt at regional collaboration was Mr. Churchill's splendid scheme of Anglo-French union, rejected by those who betrayed France. Such attempts are also the Polish-Czechoslovak and the Yugoslav-Greek agreements signed in London. President Benes put the reasons for such agreements very aptly, when he said to the *Sunday Times* :

Economic planning will be essential. A planned unit would comprise several nations. But of course the association must be well balanced. Apart altogether from political antipathies, Czechoslovakia cannot be confederated with a country of the magnitude of Germany. Even when planning the Customs union between Czechoslovakia and Poland we know that it will take some time for both national economies to adjust their commerce, industry, and agriculture to mutual requirements. It is the well-being of all the partners of such a planned unit which counts.

The Polish-Czechoslovak confederation declares as its purpose the promotion of a "common policy with regard to (a) foreign affairs, (b) defence, (c) economic and financial matters, (d) social questions, (e) transport, posts, and telegraphs". It will also "assure co-operation among its members in educational and cultural matters". Even

common organs of the confederation may be established. But the maintenance of two separate State units is assured.

The text of the document establishing the confederation leaves no doubt that both Poland and Czechoslovakia consider it only as a nucleus of a wider confederation. Article 1 says: "The two governments desire that the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation should embrace other States of the European area with which the vital interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked up." And in the joint letter of congratulation sent to the Greek and Yugoslav governments after the conclusion of their agreement this area is defined as the "vast region stretching between the Baltic and the Ægean seas".

The collaboration of these four Allied countries has, indeed, already started. At the International Labour Conference in Washington the four delegations presented a common resolution. On January 7, 1942, at the invitation of Jan Stanczyk, the Polish Labour Minister, they founded a common "Central and Eastern European Planning Board". And this Board stated in its first declaration:

We agree on the essential need for close collaboration among the peoples and governments of the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe, while the war is still being fought, and later, after peace comes back to the world. The East European region has its own problems, and these must be handled and solved by mutual consent and friendly collaboration of the respective nations. Doing so, they believe that the democratic world of today and to-morrow will be enriched by a new sincere effort and by a constructive experiment in the way of the building of a better order. The co-operation of all these nations constitutes a step towards the establishment of a future world based on mutual friendship. It is in that spirit that the idea of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board was conceived, and it is in that spirit that the founders want

to see it work for the benefit of their peoples, their part of the world, and all democratic peoples.

I know perfectly well that these schemes of regional confederation are very unpleasant for those who continue to think in terms of power politics, in terms of imperialism. It is only too clear that a voluntary union of the States between the Baltic and the Ægean seas could no longer be parcelled out into "spheres of influence" for the Great Powers; that such a union could not but be an equal partner in the larger European union, including Great Britain and probably North Africa, which might and probably ought to be another intermediary organization between this regional union and the world organization.

The necessity for such a European organization for purposes of collective security was formulated by the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, M. Ninchich, in an interview reported in the *Sunday Times*. M. Ninchich said:

These two wars have shown that in totalitarian war the fate of the British Empire and the fate of the Soviet Union is at stake. It is not necessary that an international organization aiming at security and collaboration should include from the start all the European nations. But it is essential that Great Britain and Russia should take their stand by the side of the lesser States—in the first place the actual Allies of these two Great Powers, those who have been the victims of aggression. It is only natural that these States should be the first to feel an urgent need for ensuring themselves a more peaceful future. Without Great Britain, without this small island of yours off the coasts of Europe, that is impossible.

Each of these organizations, the world organization, the European organization, and the regional organizations, will call for a surrender of part of the sovereignty

of the component States. One may ask, therefore, will national independence have any meaning after so many attributes of sovereignty have been surrendered? I think the answer lies in two directions. First of all it would be a fundamental principle that the wider organizations would wield only so much power as was expressly surrendered to them for the mutual benefit of the component States. Thus the principle of independence would be maintained. Secondly, the principle of the equality of nations should be upheld. And that means not only that each nation or State should surrender an absolutely equal part of its sovereignty, but also that within the organizations this principle of equality should be maintained.

Of course, the principle of equality is like zero in mathematics, a goal to be approached as closely as possible, and not a reality to be completely achieved. The French revolution proclaimed the equality of all men, but it retained financial qualifications for the electorate; complete political equality with votes for all did not exclude glaring economic inequalities; and even in Utopia the equality of men will mean only complete equality of opportunity. The juridical equality of States in the pre-war world did not exclude the bullying of small nations by the Great Powers. We must, therefore, define what we mean by this equality of nations, which we consider the necessary basis of the future world order.

First of all, equality of status. The formula of the Balfour Report holds good for the future world organization as well as for the British Commonwealth. It could read as follows: "The States are autonomous communities within the League of Nations (or any other name), equal in status, and in no way subordinate one to another in respect of any of their domestic or

external affairs, though united by a common pursuit of the wellbeing of humanity, by a pledge of common defence against any aggression waged against any member of the League, and by full association as members of the League in the economic planning of the world." Here is the crux of the matter. Any future organization must be based on the *co-ordination* of States and nations and not on the *subordination* of one nation to another.

This principle implies that it will not be numbers alone that will count. Everyone will agree that a system under which the combined numbers of India and China could dominate the whole world organization, overriding the wishes and interests of the English-speaking peoples, would be unjust. In the same way the small nations have the right to demand an organization in which the might of numbers and the weight of economic force cannot be misused to the detriment of their interests. This means that in the executive organs, and in the legislative organs, if any, of the regional organizations and the world organization a balance must be struck between the representation of the whole population and the representation of States. Here again there exist various possibilities, already embodied in several federal constitutions; there may arise new formulas, probably even different ones for the regional organizations and the world organization. But the principle of juridical equality of all States must be the basis.

And on this basis the real equality, the equality of opportunity, of all nations must be built up. No nation can be considered as a "market" for neighbouring States, no industrial development ought to be hampered in order to protect the vested interests of other industrial States. We must make an end, once and for all, of the imperialist conception of "spheres of influence", of

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“preponderating influences”. Mr. H. G. Wells has forcibly expressed this truth :

There is a particularly prevalent word among all these people who are avoiding the threefold Revolution which alone can bring peace and a resumption of civilization to Europe. That word is “Hegemony”. The Japanese love it. It is a word I would make taboo everywhere. The world is to reconstruct itself under the benevolent “Hegemony” of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, or Panamerica, Japan or a Pan-Slavic union, and so forth and so on. Certain big Powers are to boss the show. The little peoples are to cuddle up and be protected. And exploited. We are to live in a world of five or six jealously competing Hegemonies, with faint squeaks from the nationalisms or races on which they will be seated. No more Imperialism ! Wicked stuff that was ! Just Hegemonies !

VIII

APPENDIX

THE CASE OF CENTRAL EUROPE

I HAVE tried to outline the solution which seems to me to be the only just one : the independence of all nations that desire to exist as independent States, within the framework of a worldwide organization of collective security and economic planning ; with the possibility of regional unions within this general framework.

I have shown that the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement, the Yugoslav-Greek agreement and the declaration of the four countries at the International Labour Conference, foreshadow the creation of one of these regional unions—the union of the peoples between the Baltic and the Ægean seas. For the time being the discussions around this future union are conducted only by the four allied governments primarily interested. Their declarations leave, however, no doubt that this union will be open to other peoples in the same region, who, like those of Hungary, Roumania, or Bulgaria, have been drawn by traitor governments into the Axis camp. (Had it not been for the last-minute revolt of the Serb people and King Peter’s own courageous decision, Yugoslavia might today have been in the same position as Roumania.)

Thus a close grouping of over 100,000,000 people is already taking shape. In a total world settlement, however, a settlement which will embrace the 500,000,000 Chinese, the 400,000,000 Indians, and the United States (which has not many more inhabitants than Central Europe, but has infinitely more horse power), this union will not be self-sufficient either economically or militarily. It will have to be linked up closely with still another grouping. And here necessarily the question arises : what grouping ?

There is in Great Britain a school of thought that sees these countries as complementary to Germany, as forming with Germany a rational economic unit. Mr. G. D. H. Cole, for instance, writes :

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Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Balkan countries would form a second planning group quite as large as could be effectively unified, either politically or economically, at the present stage of human development in the arts of government and administration.

And in another place :

It is right for Germany to be closely associated with the less developed areas of Southern and Eastern Europe. Germany is the natural market for much of the produce of these areas ; and German industry is in the best position, by way of exchange, to foster their economic development. Under the Nazis this process of exchange becomes one of exploitation. But there is no reason why it should be so under a different German régime.

Thus Germany is to be the centre of this new grouping, a market for its produce and in turn an exporter of industrial goods. For this school of thought what is hateful in Hitler's new order is only its brutality ; the "unity" brought about by the German conquest is on the whole beneficial. It is affirmed that to break up this "unity" would mean renewed chaos ; that it is impossible and wicked to attempt its disruption.

I have found in the *New Statesman* this summing up of the situation : "you cannot unscramble scrambled eggs." Metaphors are picturesque, but dangerous. Of course, nobody would dream of unscrambling scrambled eggs, for first of all there is no earthly reason for doing so. But when a bomb has wrecked a passenger train or destroyed a house and you face a bloody mess of twisted iron and broken limbs, it would be hardly helpful to leave it at that and say with a shrug of the shoulders "you cannot unscramble scrambled eggs." The thing to do is first of all to try to save the human lives, to try to remould the mangled bodies, and then to rebuild the railway track, to build a better house.

The economic "unity" created by Hitler in this war will have to go, lock, stock and barrel. These writers and politicians who are so fascinated by the word "unity" that they would like to maintain Hitler's new order, and only purge it of its brutality, disregard two essential considerations. The first is that this economic "unity", built up in part, as in the Balkan countries, even before the war, is of such a nature that it is inseparable from the aim which it is intended

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to achieve—the domination of Germany over other peoples. It may be granted that this domination could be exercised in a less brutal form ; the wholesale murder of the intelligentsia, the suppression of schools, the revival of slavery are not necessary ingredients of this "unity". They do not follow necessarily from the assumption that Germany and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are complementary and ought to be welded in a single economic, or even political unit.

It is clear, however, that such a grouping under German "leadership" would maintain the supremacy of the inflated German industry, and stifle, in the interests of that industry, the industrial development of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which is the only solution for their future. Doreen Warriner, who is a leading expert, writes in her pamphlet "Eastern Europe after Hitler" :

As a long-term policy the connexion of these countries with the German war machine will be disastrous for three simple reasons. One, the German policy definitely discourages industrialization, the chief hope of relieving pressure on the land. Two, it fosters the growth of industries, like cotton and soya, which are more suited to overseas production, while it checks the growth of demand for the high quality foodstuffs. Finally it aims at enslaving the peasant population. Germany can only seek Lebensraum in the densely populated East by uprooting local populations.

It may be granted, again, that the ruthless expulsion of Poles or Czechs would be impossible after the war. But the trend expressed in points One and Two would remain, even with a change of régime in Germany. During the last war, indeed, this trend was implicit in the programme for Mitteleuropa drafted by Friedrich Naumann, who was a German Liberal. Any unity based on Berlin, with Berlin as the planning centre, would be highly detrimental to the economic development of Central and Eastern Europe.

The second objection to the plan of maintaining the "unity" achieved by Hitler's conquest is still more important. Even if the linking up of the countries between the Baltic and the Ægean with Germany were not harmful, even if it would be economically beneficent, it is impossible psychologically. Here in Great Britain discussion between "Vansittartites" and "anti-Vansittartites" is possible ; distinctions

may be drawn between "Germans" and "Nazis", between "good" and "bad" Germans. In the countries which for years have been groaning under the Nazi heel this discussion is completely irrelevant. The peoples of Poland and Czechoslovakia, of Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as the people of Holland and Norway, of Belgium and France, will simply refuse to be linked up after the war in a *tête-à-tête* with any Germany, good or bad. Later they may collaborate with a future democratic Germany within the framework of a world organization, within the framework of any organization that will provide the assurance that Germany will be neutralized by other more powerful influences. But they will absolutely and unconditionally reject any continuance of the "unity" achieved by Hitler's hordes. They will absolutely and unconditionally reject any organization of their part of Europe under German "leadership", or in any form which allows Germany by her weight of numbers or the superiority of her industrial equipment, to-day largely achieved at their expense, to play a dominating rôle.¹

Just as impracticable is the second solution favoured by many writers in Great Britain, the linking up of these countries under Soviet leadership, or even as parts of an enlarged Soviet Union. Here again it is only complete ignorance of

¹ Some of the advocates of "unity" seem to recognize the validity of this argument. They try to blunt its edge by an escape into wishful thinking. They affirm, in fact, that the oppressed peoples themselves are in favour of the maintenance of this "unity". Thus Mr. Cole writes :

From the purely economic point of view, it is quite arguable that it would be better to let Hitler conquer all Europe short of the Soviet Union, and thereafter exploit it ruthlessly in the Nazi interest, than to go back to the pre-war order of independent nation-States with frontiers drawn so as to cut right across the natural units of production and exchange. *This is a part of the reason why there is in the nation-States which Hitler has over-run no general repudiation of the Nazis' "economic new order".**

To this last assertion there is a plain answer : It is untrue. The statement that there is no general repudiation of the new economic order is not only unsupported by any evidence but is flatly contradicted by an enormous amount of evidence with which Mr. Cole has evidently not bothered to acquaint himself. I challenge him to quote from the underground press of Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, Holland, or Norway a single sentence which would support his contention. I defy him to quote a single sentence from the pronouncements of the Poles or Czechs who have escaped from the Nazi hell and are now in Great Britain.

* My italics.

the countries concerned, or a complete disregard of their interests, a complete indifference to the opinions of "natives", that can explain this suggestion. Mr. Cole, for instance, writes : "It is very doubtful whether the backward countries of Eastern and Southern Europe are suitable for parliamentary government. Some sort of Soviet system may suit their needs much better, as it has undoubtedly suited the Russians."

It is rather curious to read that Poland or Czechoslovakia are backward countries unsuited for parliamentary governments. As a matter of fact Poland had had a Parliament since 1422. The Polish counterpart of the liberty of the citizen section of Magna Charta and of Habeas Corpus, the declaration "*neminem captivabimus nisi jure victum*", is dated 1505. Poland is a Roman Catholic country in which the Inquisition was non-existent, in which religious freedom was respected during the centuries in which France and Germany were torn asunder by religious wars and it was not quite safe to be a Roman Catholic or a dissenter in the British Isles. The libertarian trend of the Poles is and always has been as strong as that of the English. Any totalitarian régime is as profoundly abhorrent to the Pole as to the Britisher.

If we turn now to the Eastern European attitude toward the Soviet régime, it is a fact that the Communist party in Poland was no stronger than its English counterpart. And throughout the whole of Central and Eastern Europe we might look in vain for a Communist movement comparable in strength to that of Germany or France. Communism could be brought to these countries only by Russian bayonets ; it would mean foreign rule and a foreign spirit.

Reynolds News reports that Sir Stafford Cripps said at Bristol :

I am certain that we can make a contribution to the reorganization of post-war Europe, a contribution which no other country can make, for the people are not afraid of us. The common people of the occupied countries are relying on us to get the sort of world which they—and we—want after the war.

The wording is cautious and diplomatic, but its meaning is clear. The "common people" of the occupied countries do not look toward Soviet Russia, they do not see their salvation in a Soviet system. They look toward Great Britain and they long for the establishment of a true democracy.

There is one central point which alone renders impracticable any Soviet solution of the problems of Central and Eastern Europe. These countries are largely peasant countries. And the peasantry is individualistic and strongly attached to the individual ownership of the peasant's bit of land. Even in Soviet Russia the establishment of kolkhozes met with furious opposition in the Ukraine, where there was a peasant class based for centuries on individual ownership of the land (in contradistinction to Russia proper, where this individual ownership was introduced only by the Stolypin reform a few years before the first world war). The peasant masses of Central and Eastern Europe are still more firmly attached to the principle of individual ownership of the land. They see their future in the development of the co-operative movement on the lines of the Danish movement, and they would firmly reject the collectivization that is inseparable from the Soviet system.

Economically they are entirely right. Let me quote Doreen Warriner again :

Under the influence of the Russian Five-Year Plan many Socialists looked to collectivization as the right solution and affirmed that "the peasant is as dead as a doornail". This overlooked the fact that Russia both before and after collectivization had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe and a politically far more backward peasantry. Russian collectivization has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower, and the conversion to new methods has not achieved anything like such good results as, for instance, the Bulgarian co-operatives or the Polish co-operatives in some districts. Collectivization of a certain kind ought to be carried through by the peasants themselves ; but it is not, and cannot be for reasons we shall later investigate, a real remedy for rural poverty due to overpopulation. The Soviet Union's successes in increasing food production have been in colonization, that is to say, in opening up new areas for cultivation, and not in reforming peasant life.

The Central and Eastern European Federation will be established on a basis of friendship with Soviet Russia. But it will not be linked up with the Soviet system either politically or even economically. It is even doubtful whether there will be a very great amount of trade between these countries

and the Soviet Union. Doreen Warriner states that it is difficult to see what these countries could gain by closer trade connexions with the U.S.S.R.

The negative side is thus completely clear. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe could be linked up with Germany or Soviet Russia only as the result of a "Diktat" outraging all the principles of the Atlantic Charter, disregarding completely the will of the populations concerned, and sowing the seeds of discontent and of a revolt of incalculable momentum.

On the positive side a detailed answer is impossible to-day. All will depend on the nature of the future world settlement, of which the settlement of this section of the world will be a part. All we can do is to indicate three distinct possibilities. The first is that this Federation (to take the most convenient name, without committing ourselves to all the technicalities the word implies to-day) of the peoples between the Baltic and the Ægean will be linked up with the outside world only through its partnership in the worldwide organization. I have already stated the reasons why I personally do not consider this the perfect solution.

The second possibility is a unified Europe including Great Britain—with the reservation that Germany's and, it may be, Italy's initial position within this unified Europe will need very careful consideration, and that the existing unity centred on Berlin will be ruthlessly broken up. The third possibility is the close linking up of the Central European Federation with a Western European Federation based on the close Franco-British partnership which was outlined in Mr. Churchill's historical proposal.

In both cases the linchpin of the whole organization is Great Britain. Great Britain is to-day the leader of the European peoples in their struggle for freedom. They all stand and fall with Great Britain. The Air Force which defends the British shores is an Air Force composed of members of all the fighting European nations. This alliance should not and cannot be disrupted. The more so as the economic rehabilitation of the European continent will also largely depend on economic collaboration with the British Isles. Even in pre-war times the tendency of the Central and Eastern European countries to increase their trade with Great Britain was very noticeable. This trend was reversed

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only because it seemed necessary to "appease" Hitler by not interfering with his plans of economic domination of Europe. In post-war Europe this quite natural and rational trend will again become apparent.

Sir Stafford Cripps, speaking of the peoples of Europe, said: "They are not afraid of us." It is a profoundly true remark. The peoples of Europe have confidence in Great Britain because they know that a partnership in which Great Britain will participate and lead will not degenerate into a tyranny of the stronger over the weaker. They believe that such a partnership can be established on the same basis as that on which in 1569 the Union of Poland and Lithuania was established—as a union of

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
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