

IS THIS
THE NEW EUROPE ?

By

STANISŁAW STROŃSKI

Former Polish Minister of Information

nr. 722

IS THIS THE NEW EUROPE ?

By STANISŁAW STROŃSKI

I.

THE MOSCOW MAP OF JUNE 5th, 1945

On June 5th, 1945 at 5 p.m. (a whole month after the end of hostilities in Europe and the unconditional surrender of Germany which was signed at Rheims on May 7th, 1945, at 2.41 a.m., and at Berlin, on May 8th, 1945, at 0.16 a.m.) the representatives of four powers, Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and France, that is Field-Marshal Montgomery, General Eisenhower, Marshal Zhukov and General de Lattre de Tassigny met together in Berlin for the first time and issued a joint declaration on the occupation of Germany. Their joint statement announced that Germany (in her frontiers of December 31st, 1937, that is to say before the Austrian Anschluss) would be divided into four occupation zones, British, American, Soviet and French, but it did not contain any references to the delimitation of these four zones, with the sole exception of Greater Berlin, which was to be occupied jointly by all the four powers. Another joint statement said that authority in each zone would be vested in its military commander, and that a control commission representing the four zone commanders would be set up for dealing with matters affecting the whole of Germany.

More detailed news came from Moscow. On that same day, June the 5th, 1945, a map (1a) showing the boundaries of the four zones and the area of the Russian occupation was handed to the Soviet press (*Izvestia* and others). A dotted line indicated the then actual limit of the Soviet occupation, while a thick line, much farther to the West, showed the boundary which was said to have been agreed upon. The official commentary to this Moscow map read:

"In accordance with the agreement concluded between the Governments of the U.S.S.R., Britain, the U.S.A. and France the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. will occupy that part of Germany (including East Prussia) which lies to the East of the following line:

"From a point on the shores of the bay of Lubeck, where the boundaries of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklemburg meet, along the Western boundary of Mecklemburg up to the frontier of Hanover, then along the Eastern frontier of Hanover up to the frontier of Brunswick, subsequently along the Western frontier of Prussian Saxony up to the Western frontier of Anhalt, then along

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

GENERAL SIKORSKI'S ACHIEVEMENT: Polish Library, Glasgow, 1944.

THE TWO POLISH CONSTITUTIONS OF 1921 AND 1935: Polish Library, Glasgow, 1944.

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER: Hutchinson, 1944.

THE NEW LEAGUE OF NATIONS, DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS, A COMMENTARY: Polish Library, Glasgow, 1944.

THE CRIMEAN REVENGE: Polish Library, Glasgow, 1945.

DOWNWARD PATH, Polish Library, Glasgow, 1945.

WHAT POLES WANT: Polish Library, Glasgow, 1945.

AE
M382176




Схема ЗОН ОККУПАЦИИ ГЕРМАНИИ



The Partition of Germany (map 1a)

the Western frontier of Anhalt and again along the Western frontier of Prussian Saxony, and along the Western frontier of Thuringia up to the point where it meets the frontier of Bavaria, and from this point it runs eastwards, along the Northern frontier of Bavaria, until it meets the 1937 frontier of Czechoslovakia.

"This map also shows that the area of Greater Berlin will similarly be divided into four occupation zones."

Two days later, on June 7th, 1945, this Moscow map was also made known in London and New York (see map 1b) and *The Times* (no. 50,162) commented it as follows:

"The Moscow announcement giving a detailed demarcation of the Russian zone of occupation in Germany has been read with



The Partition of Germany (map 1b)

some surprise in London. It is not questioned that the zone is substantially as given by Moscow, but it is felt that the announcement should have come more fittingly from the Control Council. Nothing is gained by such independent action."

The haste with which Moscow announced the zoning arrangements in Germany and in particular the agreed limit of the Russian occupation, thus implying that British and American troops had moved too far eastward and consequently must withdraw (and they did) was an obvious pointer to the fact that these arrangements were more advantageous to Russia than to Britain and the U.S.A.

The bewilderment in London and Washington was due less to the unilateral divuligation of the zoning arrangements in Moscow than to the extent of the Soviet occupation which far exceeded everything that was anticipated in this respect by the public in Great Britain and America.

Rumours about decisions concerning the occupation of Germany were circulated shortly after the meeting of the three foreign secretaries—Messrs. Cordell Hull, Eden and Molotov—in Moscow in October, 1943, and the setting up of a European Commission with the task of working out the plan of a settlement for the post-war period. These rumours became more precise after the Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin meeting at Teheran in December, 1943, though neither of the official communiqués issued after these conferences contained any reference to the occupation of Germany. Some papers published then details and maps. It was then reported that Britain would occupy North Western Germany, and America the South-West, while Russia would be left in control of the Eastern Reich, but it was presumed that the Russian zone would not stretch beyond the Oder. Even in these early stages the news went round that Berlin was to be jointly occupied by all the major allies.

Against the background of these guesses and surmises, the news that the Russian occupation was to follow the reaches of the Lower Elbe, almost right up to the very gates of Hamburg and Lubeck, that further South the Russian zone was to bulge far West of the Middle Elbe and reach a point half way between Dresden and Cologne and include the whole of Mecklemburg and Anhalt, Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia, must have come as a bolt from the blue and make people wonder why the Western powers had allowed Russia to advance so far West, almost to the heart of Western Europe.

The Moscow map of June 5th, 1945, showed the boundaries of the occupation zones in Germany only. It transpired later that the limits of the Russian occupation were drawn further South West of Prague, West of Vienna and then along the disputed Italian-Yugoslav border and the Eastern shores of the Adriatic. This division of the whole of Europe into two halves, of which the Eastern is occupied by Russia, is very telling indeed.

II.

A MAP OF 2,000 YEARS AGO

When I studied this map of June 5th, 1945, showing the boundaries of the occupation zones in Germany and Central Europe, it suddenly occurred to me that I had seen this frontier line, bending along the lower reaches of the Elbe. Yes, of course, my memory served me right, though it had to go so far back, to my school-years. Every schoolboy in Europe was and is familiar with it. This dotted



The Boundaries of the Roman Empire in Europe (map 2)

line along the lower reaches of the Elbe showed the Easternmost limit of the Roman Empire, of the Rome of Augustus and Tiberius, in the first years of our era, almost 2,000 years ago (map no. 2).

Augustus and Tiberius planned at first to set up the frontiers of their Empire on the Elbe, not on the Rhine. For thirty years, from 15 B.C. to A.D. 15, the whole area between the Elbe and the Rhine resounded with the heavy clatter of Roman arms. Before the year 9 B.C. the great Nero Claudius Drusus had defeated and subdued the Bructeri and Chatti tribes who dwelt West of the Weser and the Cherusques East of that river. After his death, Tiberius

took over, subjugated the Chauques and Longobard tribes who lived on the Western bank of the Elbe and finally reached that river in 5 A.D. It was in this area, in the famous Saltus Teutobergensis, not far from the banks of the Weser, that Quintilius Varus, Tiberius's successor, fell into the trap carefully prepared for him by Arminius, the Cheruscan leader; in that memorable battle in 9 A.D. he himself was slain and three Roman legions were decimated; this disaster shook Rome to her foundations and profoundly affected Augustus himself. But the younger Drusus, Germanicus, avenged Varus in a series of victories over Arminius in the years 14-16 A.D. and once more reached the Elbe which was then the chief waterway for Roman reinforcements from the sea. However, Tiberius, who by that time had succeeded Augustus, decided to withdraw the frontiers of Rome from the Elbe to the Rhine.

But let us return to the present partition of Europe (map no. 3).

The present delimitation of the Western and Eastern occupation zones along the lower reaches of the Elbe bears a striking resemblance to that division of Europe of nearly 2,000 years ago, when the Western or Roman world ended on the banks of the Elbe.

What is the meaning of that?

It simply means that all the advance of Western civilisation in Central and North Eastern Europe, all that was gained, step by step, by the toil and creative genius of 2,000 years has been lost at one stroke: Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States have been severed from the West and left in the grip of an Eastern Power.

But this is not the whole story yet.

Indeed, further south, the comparison between the state prevailing in the era of Augustus (see map no. 2) and in our own days (see map no. 3) shows that even then the limits of the Western world stretched further East than to-day.

All the lands south of the Danube and partly also north of it were then included in the Roman Empire. Thus Noricum comprised present-day Austria including Vienna, Pannonia-Hungary, Illiria and Macedonia—Yugoslavia, Moesia and Thrace—Bulgaria, and Dacia, on the northern banks of the Danube, was almost coextensive with pre-war Rumania, including Bessarabia. All these countries—a large part of Austria with Vienna, and the whole of Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania—are now occupied by Russia.

The reader would be well advised to take more than a perfunctory glance at these maps, as indeed the present partition of Europe into Eastern and Western halves illustrates the greatest and the heaviest blow she has suffered in her whole long history.

What is the true essence of Europe's history and wherein lay the gist of her progress?

The history of Europe is the history of the growth, both spiritual and material, of our civilization and the record of her territorial



The Partition of Europe in 1945 (map 3)

expansion. This civilization, born in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean, on the shores of North Africa, Hither Asia and Southern Europe, reached maturity in Greece and Rome, and then was transformed and permeated by Christianity. It is this blend of Christian doctrine and of the Greco-Roman heritage which for 2,000 years has moulded the world in which we live and in which we want to continue to live. The growth of this civilisation, and its expansion to the North, West and East of Europe are the history of our continent, and they alone account for the unique preeminence which it has achieved in the world.

This 2,000 years old map of the Roman Empire shows the initial boundaries of Europe, the original home of our modern and Christian Greco-Roman civilisation. After the dark ages, about 800 A.D., that is nearly 1,200 years ago, Charlemagne largely restored the unity of the civilized and Christian world and even the very name of Roman Empire, and extended its Eastern Limits from the Elbe to the Oder. A century or two later, when Poland, Bohemia and Hungary embraced the Christian religion, the limits of Europe were almost identical with those which existed in modern times and lasted till the outbreak of the last war. Indeed the post-Versailles frontiers in Eastern Europe—those of the Scandinavian and Baltic States, of Poland and the Balkans—clearly showed the Eastern frontiers of the Western and Christian world.

What has happened now?

The frontiers of our Western and Christian world have receded. They are now far short of what they were 1,000 years ago when the peoples of Central Europe embraced Christianity, far short even of what they were under Charlemagne, they are back to the days of Augustus, 2,000 years ago. This is a colossal setback of Western Europe, and the East has scored a victory more resounding, more far-reaching than any it has ever achieved in the past.

If this new and calamitous partition of Europe between East and West will last, it will mark the beginning of a new era in her long and checkered history, and also the most tragic change in her destiny.

III.

WHERE TWO WORLDS MEET

It is no exaggeration to say that the present partition of Europe from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, along the Baltic, then along a line from Lubeck to Trieste and then along the Adriatic and the Northern frontier of Greece, is not a mere political boundary: it is the frontier between two different worlds and two different civilizations.

No one has ever denied, nor can deny to-day, the deep gulf which separates the civilization of Europe from that of Russia. The cleavage has always been there, abysmal and not contested by either side. The point is not which world is better, but that these are two different worlds. The Chinese are still convinced that their civilization, a brilliant one to be sure, is superior to that of Europe and America. The Mohammedan world, which for a thousand years, between the VIIth and XVIIth centuries, actually achieved a leading position in several fields of human endeavour, also was inclined to regard its own civilization as superior to any other. Ever since the days of Ivan the Terrible, in the latter half of the XVIth century, the Russians were prone to raise similar claims, which, however, were never admitted by the world of the West. Nevertheless, these

claims were repeatedly advanced, they gained momentum in the XIXth century, when Russian writers and thinkers contrasted their allegedly superior civilization to that of the decadent West. But they were never raised as blatantly and arrogantly as now, under Stalin. There is no need to debate here which civilization is better or superior; all that need to be established is the fundamental difference of the Russian and Western worlds.

Russia is not merely different: she wants to be and to remain a different world.

Her vastness alone would differentiate her from Europe. Indeed European Russia itself is larger than the whole of the rest of Europe (6 million sq. km. and 5.4 mil. sq. km), and with her Asiatic possessions she is four times larger than non-Russian Europe (21 million sq. km. and 5.4 sq. km.). These figures refer to pre-1939 Europe; to-day Russia has annexed or occupied 1½ million sq. km. in Europe thus she controls about two-thirds of Europe, and she is five times larger than the Western fringe of our continent which is not yet directly ruled by her.

The difference between Europe and Russia were deepened by the mistrust which the latter always felt towards the former and by her persistent and conscious efforts to raise an iron curtain between herself and the Western world. This is the only feature of Russian history which has never changed throughout the centuries. Both Tsarist and Bolshevik Russia (or, more precisely, both her past and present rulers) feared Western influence. Russia was a closed and unknown country until the end of the XVIIth century; the modernising reforms of Peter the Great were limited in scope and met with much opposition; Catherine II was merely anxious to provide her uncultured empire with an outward veneer of polish; and even in the XIXth century the infiltration of Western ideas was counteracted and delayed by official policy which viewed their spreading with misgivings. But it was left to Soviet Russia to bring to perfection this conscious policy of isolation from all Western influence and indeed from all contact with the ideas and civilization of the West: no one leaves Russia or gets there, unless on official business; no printed word or broadcast from abroad can be read or heard in Russia; the ignorance of the ways of the West is carefully fostered in Russia and every attempt abroad to find out the truth about conditions in Russia is bitterly fought and discouraged by every possible means.

More important still is the active and aggressive will of Soviet Russia to sever all her links with the Western world and to build a new order not based on Christian foundations and the moral, social and legal concepts which have been slowly evolved in the course of twenty centuries of European history. Even all the attempts of the German Nazis to frame a new society in revolt against the legacy of 2,000 years of Christian order were often—in spite of all their criminal wickedness—rather hesitant and clumsy

and half-hearted when compared to the iron determination and devilish skill of the Russian Bolsheviks in eradicating the old moral concepts and superseding them by their own, fundamentally different. In Soviet Russia, all the essential tenets of our Western and Christian civilisation have been uprooted and radically revised, not merely about God, who, according to them no longer exists, but also about the nature of man and the character of home and family, about goodness and humanity, about human dignity and freedom, about labour and creative genius, about right and justice.

Could it be true that the abyss which now separates the two worlds to the West and East of the iron curtain drawn across Europe is as deep and unbridgeable as the gulf which divided the civilised Rome of Augustus and Tiberius from the barbarians of 2,000 years ago?

At first glance, such a thought is likely to be dismissed. For were not the tribes of ancient North-Eastern Europe, outside the orbit of Imperial Rome, only nameless savages populating countries unknown and inaccessible, and dwelling in caves or in the depths of dark and damp forests? Such an assumption would be totally unwarranted.

It is known to-day that there was much intercourse across these frontier marches, that, for instance, Herman-Arminius who defeated Varus, had seen service with the Roman legions and had been decorated by the Romans; that not merely such cases were not infrequent and actually many barbarians had served in the armies of Rome, but that Roman institutions and customs were known and often imitated by the peoples who live outside the Roman Pale; that, briefly, there was no watertight barrier, erected on purpose, between these two worlds (as we were wont to imagine before the recent advance in historical and archeological knowledge), but, actually, the future conquerors of Rome were quite familiar with her ways and habits. Christianity also spread in non-Roman Europe long before the fall of the Empire; its progress was in many places no less vigorous and rapid than in the Roman dominions; and the unity resulting from the parallel growth of a common faith was of particular significance for the future course of events. From all this it is clear that in those distant days there was no conscious and active will on the other side of the barrier to cut themselves off from the Western world, but on the contrary much eagerness to learn from, and assimilate themselves to it, while to-day the most striking feature of the situation is this conscious isolation of the Russian and Soviet world from the West and all its beliefs and ideals, which are uncompromisingly denounced and opposed.

The present frontier drawn across Europe is a frontier between two worlds, though our minds, so averse to the study of essentials, so prone to dismiss unpalatable facts and to every form of escapism, are unwilling to admit that truth.

The portent and consequences of this sudden transfer of the frontiers of Europe from its Eastern marches to its very heart cannot possibly be exaggerated.

For 10 nations and 100 million people, who live in the area between the Baltic and the Adriatic and find themselves to-day under Soviet-Russian rule, this redrawing of the frontiers of Europe is tantamount to a change of allegiance from the Western and Christian world to that of the Eastern and Soviet ideals and concepts, and that basic fact cannot be altered by the sham independence which some of these nations and peoples are still said to enjoy.

And for the world of Western civilization which believed that, after 20 centuries of achievement and slow but steady progress, it had succeeded in repelling the Eastern menace and securing its own frontiers along the 1939 Western border of Russia, this blow represents a staggering loss and a withdrawal back to its old limits of 2,000 years ago in the South, and of 1,000 years ago in the North.

On August 16th, 1945, Mr. Winston Churchill said in the House of Commons:

"... it is not impossible that tragedy on a prodigious scale is imposing itself behind the iron curtain which at present divides Europe in twain."

In these terse words Mr. Churchill summed up the present partition of Europe into two mutually inaccessible worlds, the dire menace which this division implies for those who found themselves on the wrong side of the iron curtain and for all the Christian and Western-European civilization.

The restoration of its ancient Western limits to the Slavonic world could have been an event of momentous importance. But is it? Have the old boundaries of the Slavs been actually restored? No. Russia is occupying purely German territories both East and West of the Elbe, and further South she is in control of a Germanic Vienna and of the non-Slav countries of Hungary and Rumania.

However, facts notwithstanding, the slogan of the Western frontier of the Slavs is already displayed all along the line marking the limits of Russian occupation in Western Europe.

Shortly after Russia found herself at war with Germany (consequently to the tearing up by Germany of the German-Russian pact of August 23rd, 1939, which resulted in the partition of Poland by the joint efforts of Germany and Russia, sealed by the Soviet German partition treaty of September 28th, 1939, in the occupation of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania by Russia in 1939-40, in the Russian attack on Finland in November 1939, and the Russian seizure of the Rumanian provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina in 1940) Stalin was hoisting the Pan-Slavic flag, in his speech of November 6th, 1941:

"We have not and cannot have war aims such as to impose our will or our regime on the Slav peoples or other subjugated European peoples who wait for our help and succour. Our aim is to help these peoples in their struggle for liberty against Nazi tyranny, and later to allow them to decide freely the destinies of their countries. No interference in the internal affairs of other peoples."

The hint was promptly elaborated at some length by the Moscow *Pravda*, which wrote on November 29th, 1941:

"Hitler aims at the extermination and enslavement of the Slav nations, but the Slavs will never become slaves. There is no such force in the world which could induce the Russians, Ukrainians and Bielorussians, the Poles, the Czechs and the Serbs to abandon their inflexible struggle against the German-Fascist robbers. This is not a life but a death struggle. This struggle will be carried to the bitter end, that is until the invaders will be definitely routed and exterminated. In this struggle, all the freedom-loving nations and all the great democratic powers are siding with the Slav nations and are in alliance with them."

A Pan-Slav Committee was set up in Moscow. It publishes a monthly review *The Slavs* in Russian, though many contributors belong to other Slav nations. One of the members of that committee who is also one of the editors of its review, M. Nicholas Dierjavin wrote a book "The age-long struggle of the Slavs against the German aggressors," (96 pages) which the committee published in 1943.

This Pan-Slavism which so suddenly burst forth in Moscow on the morrow of the German attack on Russia is not something brand new; it is an old Russian idea which has been given a new lease of life after it was in oblivion for close on a hundred years.

About 1840 a Slavophile school of thought made its appearance in Tsarist Russia. It was launched by a group of writers; among them the most prominent were Alexis Khomiakov, the brothers Alexis and Ivan Aksakov and I. P. Kireyevsky; later Pogodin, Shevyrev, Samarin, Danilevsky, Dostoyevsky and Vladimir Soloviev also joined this group. What their doctrine amounted to was primarily the belief that Russia was not only different from Western Europe but also that the Slav civilization was spiritually superior to that of Western Europe. It was advantageously contrasted to the "Decaying West", and the thinkers who urged the westernisation of Russia such as Alexander Herzen, Vissarion Bielinsky, Bakunin, Gronovsky and others were dubbed "Zapadniks" that is 'Westerners.' The Slavophiles regarded Russian peasant communal ownership of the land as one of the proofs of the social superiority of Russian civilization; they denounced Peter the Great's attempts to make Russia a part of Europe, and urged the unity of all the Slavs. The fate of Poland, partitioned between Russia and Germany and cruelly oppressed by Russia, cast its shadow on these lofty ideals. After 1860 however, the Slavophiles turned Pan-Slavs pure and simple; they demanded no longer the unity of the Slavs but the incorporation of all Slav nations and territories into Russia; and in this sense Pan-Slavism became the official creed of Tsarist Russia; its promoters were the chief of the gendarmerie (Tsarist secret police) Peter Shuvalov, the minister of justice, Count Pahlen, the minister of the interior, Valuyev, the chief protagonist of the movement in the press, Katkov, and lastly Pobiedonostzev, the last great champion of Tsarist autocracy. The famous Slav congress held in Moscow in 1867 under the official patronage of the aforesaid dignitaries roundly denounced Poland for refusing to become Russian. However, this Pan-Slav movement which was practically identical with russification or, to use a then fashionable Russian euphemism, with the gathering of all Slav rivers in the Russian sea, had but little success and withered away.

In the decade between 1908 and 1917, both before and during the first world war, a new trend towards not only the unity but amity and understanding of the Slav nations came to the surface, and it became known as Neo-Slavism. Late in 1917, however, Russia went Bolshevik. The Slav nations of central Europe were even more sensitive to this change than the Western nations, they perceived more quickly that it was tantamount to a permanent rift between Russia and Europe, and all the Pan-Slav ideals vanished into thin air.

Between the summer of 1939 and the summer of 1941 dead silence, even deeper than in the previous 20 years of Bolshevik rule, greeted in Moscow every mention of Slav unity: not even a whisper about it was allowed when Russia signed her pact with Germany on 23rd August, 1939, when, in collusion with Germany, she partitioned Poland in September 1939, nor when, later, she

remained passive during the German attack on Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, as she had been during the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939.

But after the German attack on Russia the brotherhood of the Slavs was revived overnight. In his speech of June 22nd, 1941, when the German-Soviet war broke out, M. Molotov did not refer specifically to the Slavs; he spoke of the nations who fell victims of the German invasions. But in M. Stalin's first war speech of November 6th, 1941, the slogan of the liberation of the Slavs was already well in the fore.

In Russia such statements are never accidental. They are made with an eye on the plans made for the nearest future. Slogans are chosen and proclaimed with a view to present facts in a light favourable to the policies of Moscow.

The true facts are that the heavy hand of Moscow lay on all the Slav and non-Slav countries situated in that part of Central Europe which is occupied by the Red Army. Just as the slogan of liberation in its Russian interpretation does not imply freedom but Russian rule, so the Pan-Slav slogans are but a screen for the theory that all the Slav nations ought to renounce their national independence and willingly exchange it for subjection and submission to Russia. As in Tsarist days Pan-Slavism in its Soviet edition simply means that all the Slav rivers are to be merged in one Russian sea. The present frontier drawn across Europe is not the frontier of the Slav settlements; it is the frontier of the Russian dominions and of Russian rule.

V.

WHAT NEXT?

As early as the 18th and 19th centuries, Central and even Western Europe had the privilege of being visited by Russian armies. After Napoleon's rout in Russia in 1812, the soldiers of the Tsar entered Paris in 1814. At the congress of Vienna in 1815 and during its aftermath, Alexander I was the most important personage in European politics.

The nightmare of Cossack Europe was even then haunting many minds, and these apprehensions were finally rendered in Béranger's "Le Chant du Cosaque," in the famous words which the Cossack rider addressed to his mount:

*Tout cet éclat dont l'Europe est si fière,
Tout ce savoir qui ne la défend pas
S'engloutira dans les flots de poussière
Qu'autour de moi vont soulever tes pas.
Efface, efface, en ta course nouvelle,
Temples, palais, moeurs, souvenirs et lois,
Hennis d'orgueil, ô mon coursier fidèle,
Et foule aux pieds les peuples et les rois.*

Sometimes, however, the course of history is less swift than the gallop of the Cossack stallions, and Europe then managed somehow to muddle through.

Perhaps, she will succeed in muddling through once more?

Perhaps yes, and maybe some people may be content with that. But it would be far better to be in a position to assert that she will certainly escape unscathed. Who however can raise such a claim to certainty?

If you glance at map No. 5 which illustrates the territorial growth of Russia you will notice that the original duchy of Muscovy which is but a small dot on the map against the background of present-day Russia, has shown an amazing capacity to extend its frontiers in the course of the last 500 years, during which the frontiers of the other countries and nations of Europe have varied comparatively little. And this growth cannot be said to have been unplanned and unaided.

But perhaps it was only Tsarist Russia, not the revolutionary Soviet Union, which had such a marked predilection of aggrandizement and expansion?

To believe that would be wishful thinking. It is a well-known fact that revolutionary movements usually become expansionist and are prone to aggression. Bourbon France was often charged with imperialist designs on her neighbours, but the ambitions of Louis XIV seem modest in comparison with the vast programme of conquests on which the leaders of the French Revolution embarked in defence of its ideals and principles. It is not even necessary to go so far back to prove this: both the Fascist coup d'état in Italy and the Nazi revolution in Germany were accompanied by a rebirth of the spirit of aggression. Similarly Soviet Russia has shown the greatest zeal in the so-called recovery of Russian lands, that is in the revindication of all that the Tsars had seized by conquest and aggression, and in her Westward push she has far exceeded the furthest limits ever dreamed of by the Russian Tsars.

Is the limit reached now?

From experience we know that, in the case of aggressive and expansionist powers, every new conquest, which is always claimed (and sometimes even meant) to be the last, is only whetting the appetite of the power concerned to raise new claims and demands.

In their efforts to whitewash Russian expansionist policy, some people argue that she was and is impelled to seek outlets to warm waters and open seas. This argument seems to be far fetched—an attempt at justification a posteriori—for it is difficult to pretend Moscow began her march eastward because she was attracted by the breezes of the Pacific, then still 6,000 miles away; it is much simpler and safer to assume that she was always tempted by the territories of her neighbours, and then of her new neighbours again. But it is also certain that once Russia spread so far that the seas, once distant, came within her reach, she pushed forward to their shores, and disguised her annexionist impetus by invoking alleged economic



The growth of Russia (map 5)

necessities or her need for secure frontiers. This touching longing for security became the favourite motto of aggressive Soviet policy during this war and the foremost argument in her defence of the conquest of ten countries by Russia.

Here it may be worth noting, that the present limit of the advance of the Soviet armies in Europe may well not satisfy the Russian cravings for security and her newly-discovered love of the sea, because the Elbe, with its estuary not included in the Russian zone,

gives her only an outlet to the half-closed Baltic sea; the Rhine might be much more satisfactory, and not impossible of reaching should Western Germany show an irresistible desire to merge with the Eastern half of the Reich; and, to be sure, from the Rhine to the Atlantic the distance is trifling for men who are inured to the reckoning of space on Russian scale; the jump might be worth taking in the interests of the unity of the Continent of Europe, and why a few risks and sacrifices might not be taken for the realisation of this fine ideal?

To-day, to most men, such hypotheses will sound fantastic and improbable, and far removed from the realm of practical possibilities.

Some people probably regard the presence of Russia West of the Elbe as temporary, and her ambitions with regard to the areas still further West as a passing craze. They might be right or wrong according to what we regard as provisional and temporary. In her trade treaty with the Warsaw Government of 15th August, 1945, Russia reserved for herself coal deliveries from Poland:

"Every year, beginning from 1946 and to be continued as long, as the occupation of Germany lasts—8 million tons in the first year, 13 million tons every subsequent year during four years and 12 million tons in every year thereafter, until the occupation of Germany comes to an end."

From this alone it is obvious that the occupation of Germany by Russia is not calculated to last just a short time.

The trouble is that in our lifetime everything that came to be an appalling reality seemed a hoax and a fable only shortly before it came to pass; that contemporary history consists only of incredible events; that no expectations are ever fulfilled and the unforeseen seems ever to happen.

It is only natural that human minds assess the future in terms of past experiences. They fail to see even the present. And the future is a closed book to them.

Thus, by sheer force of habit, they pretend to see things as they were and not as they are; they go on talking about Western, Central and Eastern Europe, though Central Europe has already been swallowed up by the East; they still talk about the Baltic countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, while in fact these countries are but Russian dominions, and in all this area Russia is firmly implanted.

Those who have not yet grasped the fairly obvious truth that Russia has advanced from the Dvina, Niemen and Dnieper to the Elbe and beyond (and that her grip over the territories occupied by her is utterly different from the hold of Britain and the U.S.A. over the lands West of the Russian zone) have some hard thinking in store for them yet: they are still unaware that this may not be the end and that the question what next may face them with new and tremendous possibilities.

CHAPTERS

	Page
1. The Moscow map of June 5th, 1945	1
2. A map of 2,000 years ago	4
3. Where two worlds meet	8
4. The boundaries of the Slav World	12
5. What next?	16

MAPS

1. The Partition of Germany (two maps 1a and 1b)	2-3
2. The Boundaries of the Roman Empire	5
3. The Partition of Europe in 1945	7
4. The Western Frontier of the predominantly Slav territories about A.D. 1,000	13
5. The growth of Russia	18-19