


ADAM PRAGIER

HOW TO SAVE
GERMANY?

LONDON, 1943

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Prof. ADAM PRAGIER

L.L.D., D.Sc.Ec.

HOW TO SAVE GERMANY?

(A few remarks in connection
with "Russia and her Western
Neighbours," by Prof. George
Keeton and Dr. Rudolph
Schlesinger)


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“ . . . the herd instinct and the sense of duty to a programme of German hegemony is often equally strong amongst those Germans who have repudiated Nazism and sought refuge abroad. The will to preserve German unity in its present form remains as strong amongst the stray members of the community, whether they be pure Germans, or even sometimes nationals of German-speaking States which, but a few years ago, were not part of the Reich. Many of those have, consciously or not, served the permanent German cause with other names and other weapons.”—PIERRE MAILLAUD (*Spectator*).

The present war has given birth to a type of political writing which recalls the old *roman à thèse*. Preconceived claims are submerged in a mass of facts, observations and figures. This method is designed to produce the impression that the author was trying to discover the truth. In summing up, the author returns to his original objectives, which he presents as the result of his painstaking research. Sometimes the initiator of such an enterprise takes far-reaching measures to invest his work with a semblance of academic accuracy. This is achieved by using a wealth of quotation and bibliography and also by securing the collaboration of well-known scholars, who need not, however, be competent in the matter concerned. The title of professor is

usually quite sufficient to achieve the desired result. This method has been long popular in Germany, where advertisements of cosmetics were frequently accompanied by testimonials from university professors. One could see at every street corner in Germany large posters with the words: "According to the present state of scientific knowledge, ODOL is the best dentifrice." The words "present state" were heavily underlined. Few people, however, considered these posters to be the outcome of scientific research.

One of the most notorious examples of such political propaganda masquerading as a work of learning is the recently-published book: "Russia and Her Western Neighbours." Its authors are Prof. George W. Keeton, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of London and Director of *New Commonwealth*, and Dr. Rudolf Schlesinger. As there is no indication as to who wrote the particular chapters, I shall regard them as jointly responsible for the entire book.

* * *

On August 1st, 1941, *The Times* declared in a leader (believed to have been written by Prof. Carr) that the future peace of Europe should rely on a Russian leadership in Eastern Europe. This statement was all the more significant as it was made immediately after the signature of the Polish-Russian Treaty on July 30th, 1941. Prof. Carr's idea is merely a modification of the German doctrine of *Grossraumwirtschaft*. It is a theory to the effect that economic prosperity requires the consolidation of vast areas under one rule, and that this consolidation should override the interests, or even the very existence, of small and medium-sized nations.

Grossraumwirtschaft is, in German hands, an intellectual instrument of conquest. The Germans are the strongest nation in Central Europe, and they therefore aspire to continental leadership. The idea of *Grossraumwirtschaft* made its appearance in the German press when the theories of Anti-Komintern and *Lebensraum* had carried out their tactical work and were no longer required. Besides, the German "racial theory" and the science of geopolitics were also purely tactical weapons, serving a definite purpose. The "racial theory" bears the same relation

to genuine anthropology as geopolitics to serious political geography. They are both political myths, with only one purpose: the establishment of a theory accounting for German aggressiveness.

The City of London had long believed the "balance of power" to be essential to the security of the British Empire. It meant opposition to the Continental Power which seemed to be the strongest. After the last war this part was ostensibly filled by France, with the result that British leaders began openly to distrust her, and thus assisted the restoration of German influence. The rise of Russian power was at the same time checked, as it was believed to be socially dangerous. When this policy eventually brought about the collapse of the "balance of power" and all that it involved, no other alternative was discovered than a long series of attempts to "appease" Germany. The results are well known.

Now, it seems the peace of Europe is to be based on a delineation of the German and Russian spheres of influence on the Continent. Little is said about Germany for the time being, as it might make an unfortunate impression. But the obstinate clinging to the fictitious notion that the "good Germans" were forced to fight by "Hitler and his gang" is very significant. The declarations about "German democracy" and the need for conserving intact the economic strength of Germany also provide a broad hint of what is coming next. The logical consequence would be the supremacy of Germany over the small and medium-sized countries of Europe. It is a policy based on the assumption that America will not in the future take the slightest interest in European affairs, that France will remain weakened for a long time, and that the remaining smaller European nations, with a total population of about 200,000,000, will continue to be dispersed and powerless, so as to submit easily to the German leadership. Actually there is no reason to suppose that the small and medium-sized nations will accept such an arrangement without opposition. It is true that they had been as unprepared as France and Great Britain, but they are stubbornly resisting the occupation, which has stimulated their national feelings. These nations believe that they have as good a right to exist as the larger nations. For this reason any plan for the organisation of Europe which disregards

the 200,000,000 citizens of these countries is unlikely to bring permanent peace.

It is clear that the recognition of Russian leadership in Eastern Europe, which is freely mentioned to-day, carries with it, as its inevitable opposite number, the recognition of a similar leadership of Germany in Western Europe—about which people are still rather reticent. This would be the logical and unavoidable consequence of the application of the *Grossraumwirtschaft* doctrine as a guide for the reorganisation of the world.

There is some ground for believing that Soviet Russia would favour such developments. The famous Order of the Day of Stalin (No. 55, of February 23rd, 1942), opens certain possibilities of friendly collaboration with the future Germany. It states that "Hitlers come and go, but Germany remains." The term "Hitlerite Germany," which was introduced by Soviet Russia into several international treaties of 1941 and 1942, also suggests such possibilities. Finally, on November 6th, 1942, in his speech on the 25th Anniversary of the Revolution, Stalin expressed the same idea even more clearly: "Our aim is not to destroy all armed force in Germany, because any intelligent man will understand that this is as impossible in the case of Germany as in the case of Russia. It would be unreasonable on the part of the victor to do so. To destroy Hitler's army is possible and necessary."

It is noteworthy that each of the two wars which menaced the very existence of the British Empire started not on account of Imperial affairs, but as a result of political tension on the Continent of Europe. Besides, the time of Continental Powers and ambitions confined to one continent is over. To-day all plans of hegemony must be world-wide. The old imperialism, which was actually a form of economic competition within a liberal world, has been superseded by tendencies aiming openly at the control of the entire globe. The German and Soviet movements, both dynamic, are equally universal, despite the various differences between them. The German-Russian pact of August 23rd had only the outward appearance of a delineation of spheres of influence: east for Russia and west for Germany. It was really a truce between two Powers which were well aware that a clash between them was inevitable, because the ambitions of each of

them are unlimited and universal.

Prof. Keeton and Dr. Rudolf Schlesinger seem to have an inkling of the economic and political potentialities of Soviet Russia. Although they are lavish in handing Russia *Lebensraum* in Europe, without a thought for the opinion of the nations concerned, they declare that Communism should not spread to the west of Europe. They are particularly careful to stress, with regard to Great Britain, that ". . . it is difficult in any conceivable circumstances to see the introduction of anything closely resembling the Russian system here." Moreover, they set down as a condition of collaboration between Britain, U.S.A., and Russia, that the latter should abandon the plan of world revolution. They write: "If . . . the U.S.S.R. continued to regard itself simply as the nucleus of the world revolution, then the antagonism between Russia and the West would necessarily remain. If, on the other hand, the U.S.S.R. were to regard itself as a partner in a world system with an ideology distinct from, but not opposed to, that of the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A., then the main obstacle to collaboration would be removed." The setting out of such conditions is, of course, touchingly naive. Soviet Russia has not been thinking for some time past about a world revolution, or any revolution, but about the expansion of its economic and military potential, building up the strength of the State. The results of the 1941-42 campaign prove that her efforts were not made in vain. But Soviet Russia highly values her freedom of movement in relation to other Powers, and she realises the value of "world revolution" from that point of view. Whenever it suits the rulers of Russia, the bugbear of "world revolution" is produced in a menacing fashion and it is not likely that they would discard such an effective weapon willingly.

* * *

Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger adopted as the leading idea of their book the *Grossraumwirtschaft* theory, in Prof. Carr's version. It means the acceptance of Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe. Both Prof. Carr and the authors of the book seem to believe that such a hegemony is inevitable, owing to the absence

in that part of the Continent of any other permanent element of stability. America and Great Britain—the two writers believe—will continue to remain indifferent to the fate of that part of the world. The smaller nations living in the area concerned are too weak and divided among themselves to be capable of forming any permanent organisation. The only choice, therefore, is between Germany and Russia. Since Germany is the enemy country and will be eventually defeated, it would be unpolitic to suggest its hegemony at the present juncture; this leaves Russia, which belongs to the Allied nations, and will be one of the victors.

In order to carry out her new duties, Russia must have frontiers reaching far west. She must keep at least all that she had during the period of co-operation with Germany in 1939 and 1940. She might be given more. The authors are in favour of admitting “. . . the necessity of full recognition of Russia's needs in Eastern Europe . . .”, no matter what these needs may be. By a strange, paradoxical piece of reasoning, the agreement of Russia with Germany is to be recognized, in order to help Russia to maintain the future order of Europe, after the downfall of Germany. This plan recalls the 1925 Treaties of Locarno, for it brings back the idea of two spheres of security in Europe—western and eastern—organised along very different lines. The consequences of the Locarno Treaties are well known.

Such ideas, which the authors took for their starting point, impose on them the delicate and difficult task of explaining why Russia should keep every one of the territories she had acquired at the beginning of the war. The task is made more strenuous by the fact that different lines of argument have to be used for every territory, to suit the authors' convenience. Moreover, there are appearances to be respected, and the whole plan should not be too obviously contrary to all the principles of the Atlantic Charter and international law.

The authors have seized upon the easiest explanation of the Russian westward march in 1939 and 1940 to occupy the invasion bases of the potential enemy. They present it as a purely defensive move. This, however, would not be a sufficient ground for a permanent settlement. Some additional grounds are required. One of them sounds very sentimental, although it is actually based on power politics pure and simple: “. . . the sacrifices which

Russia will be called upon to make in the course of this struggle, her fortitude in withstanding the onslaught of the Nazis, and her ultimate victory, will necessarily win her the leadership of many Eastern European peoples, especially those who are of Slav race." This sentimental smoke screen is used to conceal the principle of leadership based on force. Stripped of its phraseology, this sentence means precisely the same as Bismarck's more outspoken remark: *Macht geht vor Recht* (Might before Right).

But the authors want to go even farther. They want to prove that, by some marvellous coincidence, all the nations which are to be submitted to the Russian leadership have always ardently desired it. Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger announce that they propose to investigate "the various border regions on both sides of Russia's western frontier and in such examination only the interests of the nations immediately concerned will be considered. It will be shown in the course of this examination that the case for Soviet rule in nearly all the territories acquired since 1939 is a strong one, whilst even apart from those considerations there is the strategical question of the danger for Russia from a "safety cordon" such as Germany tried to build up in Russia's western frontier out of States obviously too weak to resist her pressure."

The authors apparently try to excuse the permanent incorporation into Russia of the acquisitions of 1939 and 1940 by the argument that these countries might otherwise be used by Germany as invasion bases against Russia. That is presumably the meaning of the reference to the "safety cordon" which Germany was alleged to be building there. Actually there is no foundation of truth in that statement. Germany never tried to create such a "safety cordon" in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

The "safety cordon" against Russia was planned by France, with the approval of Britain, shortly after the first world war. Clemenceau had called it "barbed wire." Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger still speak about these twenty-year-old French plans with indignation, describing them as "mischievous French intermeddling with the affairs of Eastern Europe." These plans were abandoned almost from the time of their inception, because the countries designated to form the "cordon" were not too eager to assume that part. Poland, although she had waged war against Russia in 1920, did not want to participate in that plan, and refused to

march to Moscow with the foreign troops intervening in Russia, taking the view that a reconstructed Imperial Russia would be more dangerous than the Soviet Union. In later years, France endeavoured to found her own security on collective security in Europe, and wished to achieve the close collaboration of Central and South-Eastern European nations for that purpose. It meant in practice the establishment of a "safety cordon" against Germany. These plans were frustrated. The last attempt in that direction was undertaken in 1934 by Louis Barthou, who was then murdered, probably for that reason, by the Croat terrorist, Pavelic. To-day the same Pavelic is the head of the puppet-State of Croatia under Germany. Germany always did its utmost to prevent the formation of such a "safety cordon" by promoting unrest and discord among the Central European nations and magnifying their real or imaginary antagonisms. Prof. Keeton's and Dr. Schlesinger's case for giving to Russia the countries which might be used as a "cordon" against the Soviet Union is based on a false assumption. The statement that it would be "a safety cordon such as Germany tried to build up in Russia's western frontiers" is entirely untrue, for no such attempt was ever made.

As to the investigation of the "various border regions on both sides of Russia's western frontier" from the point of view "only of the interests of the nations immediately concerned"—let us see what kind of investigation it is. What are the arguments of the authors in favour of total or partial annexation of these countries to Russia?

FINLAND

The authors present that country as strongly undemocratic, probably in order to make the treatment which they reserve for it more palatable for the reader. Actually it is well known that the political and social institutions of Finland make it one of the most genuinely democratic countries in the world. General Mannerheim's dictatorship is a matter of the past. This dictatorship had its strongest support in German military circles, which favoured Mannerheim personally, and then in the interventionist policy of the Western Powers. When the independence of Finland was consolidated, dictatorship was gradually liquidated. To-day, Finland is the only enemy country to be democratic, with a population profoundly attached to democratic practice and principles. That is probably the reason why Finland is waging the war rather half-heartedly. As to the attitude of Russia towards Finland, Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger are quite embarrassed. They could say nothing except that "Russia needs her frontier rectifications which she obtained from Finland in the war of 1939-1940." Even the war itself, that is, the Russian aggression against Finland, finds no other justification than the strategic interests of Russia: ". . . to under-estimate the force of nationalist sentiment and to explain away national and racial animosities in terms of class struggle quite obviously does not fit the facts of the Russo-Finnish clash." The authors finally come to the conclusion that Finland after the war "is likely to remain a buffer State," but that it should lose in favour of Russia all that Russia conquered as a result of her aggression. It is difficult indeed to discover in this conclusion the outcome of an investigation "only in the interests of the nations immediately concerned." In fact, they have been completely disregarded and violated.

THE BALTIC COUNTRIES

The authors describe these countries, this time with more truth, as having been undemocratic immediately before their absorption by Russia. They draw the conclusion that the non-privileged classes in those countries would accept "the Soviet regime, if not as the millennium, at any rate as an acceptable alternative." The downfall of these countries is therefore represented as being practically their own fault. The authors also state that the population of these countries was never anti-Russian, but was anti-German, since the Baltic barons of German nationality were the ruling class. This observation leads up to the conclusion that: ". . . there is no reason to doubt that very large elements in all three (Baltic) States welcomed incorporation into the U.S.S.R. in 1940. It is also clear that other important elements resisted this change . . ." It is difficult to see why Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger ascribe the ease with which Russia conquered these countries to their insufficiently democratic systems of government. Why not admit that they were annexed simply as victims of the strategic plans of Russia? Surely if each of these small countries was governed as wisely as Athens under Pericles, this would not have saved them from Soviet aggression. The condition of democracy in these countries is irrelevant to the question of their conquest by Russia. If the authors want to justify the annexation on the ground that a section of the population was in favour of incorporation, they have chosen their excuse rather clumsily. In Norway there is Quisling, in France there are Pétain and Laval—and yet nobody thinks that these countries should therefore be annexed by Germany. The so-called "parliamentary resolutions" of the Baltic countries, in favour of annexation, made under the pressure of occupying Soviet troops, are so unconvincing that even Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger have preferred to pass them over in silence. They have completely failed to show any genuine grounds for incorporation.

LITHUANIA

We find rather strange historical information about Lithuania " . . . Along the Baltic, the Teutonic Knights had consistently attacked the small Baltic States since the thirteenth century, destroying the Prussians—an offshoot of the Lithuanian people—and enslaving the peoples of Northern Latvia and Estonia. The main branch of the Lithuanian peoples purchased immunity from this association of plundering with missionary activities by accepting Christianity. In consequence, they not only escaped destruction, but were able to build up out of the west Russian principalities, a powerful border State, Greater Lithuania, which at times controlled all the territory between Poland and Russia from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea . . . In the fifteenth century, Lithuania came under Polish control, and after 1569 was completely dominated by Poland . . . The loss of independence was to some extent compensated by the acceptance of Lithuanian princes as kings of Poland . . . From the middle of the fifteenth century, Polish influence in Lithuania was considerable, and the Russian aristocracy of the former Russian parts of Lithuania accepted not only the Polish language and the Roman Catholic religion, but also the Polish aristocratic system with its virtual enslavement of the peasantry." After this introduction going back to almost legendary times, there is a mention of the occupation of Wilno on October 6th, 1920, by General Zeligowski, "with French connivance." Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger claim that Poland's rights to Wilno are based only on the fact that the inhabitants of that city were Polonised in remote times, while the Jews were requested to declare themselves as Poles. Then the authors state that "such a claim, however, ignores the fact that the vast majority of the inhabitants of the whole Wilno region were and are Lithuanians, the population of the districts surrounding the city being almost exclusively Lithuanian." Then there is the now customary remark about the shortcomings of

democracy in Lithuania. The authors state that the old tradition of Polish-Lithuanian relations would render possible their federation, if some controversies were settled. On the other hand, the severe oppression of the Lithuanians by the German occupants causes them to believe that the Lithuanian peasants ". . . will welcome the Red Armies with enthusiasm when the German retreat begins." There is no conclusion concerning Lithuania, and we are left wondering whether it is to join a Polish federation or to be incorporated in the U.S.S.R.

In this sketch of Lithuanian history, complete misinterpretations and half-truths are so thoroughly mixed that it is almost impossible to extricate the real meaning of the situation.

Actually, the Lithuanians never conciliated the Teutonic Knights, and did not accept Christianity from them. They formed Greater Lithuania before, when they were still heathen. It was a short-lived State, like many others in mediæval Eastern Europe. The Lithuanians embraced Christianity at the time of the marriage of their Grand Duke Jagiello with the Queen of Poland, Jadwiga, in 1386. It was a move against the Teutonic Knights, aiming at the strengthening of Lithuania by its union with Poland, a larger country. It is not true that Lithuania was incorporated into Poland in the fifteenth century, or that its princes were compensated by being called to the Polish throne. There were constitutional obstacles. Lithuania was ruled by the hereditary monarch of the House of Jagiello, while the Kings of Poland were elected. King Wladyslaw Jagiello and his descendants alike, were elected to the Throne of Poland, but succeeded to that of Lithuania. In 1569, there was a Polish-Lithuanian union, but it did not amount to the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland, nor was there any "Polish control" over Lithuania. Lithuania remained an independent State, with its own government, treasury and army. The distinction between the two countries was so great that a citizen of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could not hold public office in Poland and *vice versa*. The links between the two countries were the Sovereign and a common Parliament. In fact, the election of a common monarch was the principal point of the Act of Union of 1569. The union between Poland and Lithuania left more freedom to each of the two partners than, for instance, the union between England and Scotland.

There is no truth in the statement about the Polonisation of the aristocracy from the "former Russian parts of Lithuania," for such Russian parts had never existed and there was no Russian aristocracy there. The statement that "the Polish aristocratic system" was imposed by Poland on Lithuania is a complete falsehood. Do the authors mean to suggest that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Lithuania was a democracy, which the Poles had to corrupt? What actually happened was that both Poland and Lithuania witnessed in the fifteenth century a process of formation of definite social classes—a process which had occurred before in the Western European countries, where it was also more far-reaching. In Poland and Lithuania this process was never quite completed and did not form a full feudal hierarchy, as it did in the west of Europe. It follows from all these exposures that in order to base arguments on historical grounds one ought first to make oneself acquainted with the subject, to a certain extent, at least.

As to Wilno, the authors question its Polish character not only on the dubious ground of the so-called "historical rights of Lithuania." They also try to use an ethnographic argument which would be more convincing were it based on accurate facts, which is emphatically not the case. In the district of Wilno ("ceded" in 1939 by the Soviet authorities to Lithuania) there were in 1939 8 per cent. Lithuanians, 72 per cent. Poles, and 13.1 per cent. Jews. In the city of Wilno itself the Lithuanian population comprised 2 per cent. of the total. A census of the population carried out in 1917 by the Germans, certainly free from pro-Polish bias, gave very similar results. It is not true that Jews were compelled to register as Poles. Under the Tsarist government the authorities had no reason to favour such a procedure, while in independent Poland the Jews insisted on their right to declare themselves of Jewish nationality and used that description on passports and in making census returns. Nobody opposed the right of the Jews to maintain their national distinctive characteristics, which they cultivated with particular care in the eastern provinces of Poland.

CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA

Even that strip of land should—according to the authors—be annexed by Russia. It is alleged to have more in common with Russia than with Hungary and to have strong pro-Soviet sympathies. It is true that it belongs to Czechoslovakia, but a trifle like that would not worry a resourceful writer: “. . . this territory was allotted to Czechoslovakia in 1919 in preference to Poland and Hungary, mainly because the Czechs wished to have a common frontier with their Rumanian allies—a reason which is no longer of importance.” The authors also quote an alleged remark of Dr. Benes, who is supposed to have said in 1919 that Czechoslovakia was taking Carpathian Ruthenia in trust, since no Ukrainian State was at that time in existence. The deduction made by the authors is that Czechoslovakia would not oppose to-day the incorporation of Carpathian Ruthenia to Soviet Russia, which might be described as a Ukrainian State. In order to prepare the ground, they start calling that province “Carpatho-Ukraine.” Such an incorporation could occur “if that should be the plainly expressed will of the inhabitants.” The authors were probably referring to that kind of “parliamentary vote” which we had observed in the Baltic countries.

It is noteworthy that the authors have also designs on Slovakia. They write rather cautiously about it, for Czechoslovakia is, after all, an Allied nation. But they hint that Slovakia is feeling that irresistible attraction for Russia which Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger discover everywhere: “. . . even within the autonomists there are many who, on account of their feelings of racial affinity with Russia, would go very far in their desire to strengthen its ties with the U.S.S.R.” This suggestion is also entirely inaccurate. Slovakia is a country of peasants, very conservative, attached to private property, and Roman-Catholic—altogether anti-Communist in tendency. One of the reasons of

friction between the Czechs and the Slovaks was the fact that the latter reproached the Czechs with too strong pro-Soviet leanings. This passage about Slovakia, rather vague in form but definite in purpose, is a typical example of the authors' willingness to find pro-Soviet sympathies in every country which is the object of Russian plans of penetration. On the other hand, it is obvious that Czechoslovakia could not exist after the loss of Carpathian Ruthenia and Slovakia. The authors find room for the truncated Bohemia in a Danubian Federation, which would be dominated by German influence—in accordance with the leading idea of the whole book. That is why the authors discerned the "pro-Soviet sympathies" among the Slovaks.

BESSARABIA, RUMANIA

As to Bessarabia, the authors state that: “. . . the racial character of the Bessarabians is both obscure and mixed, and it is plain that there are large sections of the population which prefer Soviet rule to Rumanian.” Short of a better excuse, the authors have based the proposal for the annexation of a fairly large province to Russia on the ground that “it is plain” that the people desire it. This may be plain to the authors, but not to the Rumanians, nor to a good many other people.


Even in Rumania proper, the authors discovered “. . . a strong Communist movement, seeking the incorporation of Rumania into the U.S.S.R.” There are two different lines of argument: in Bessarabia there is an obscure ethnographic situation, which might be interpreted in favour of Russia as well as of any other country; in Rumania “a strong Communist movement,” the presence of which was entirely unknown until the research of Messrs. Keeton and Schlesinger revealed it in all its strength. The upshot is that Rumania will be glad to join the U.S.S.R.

* * *

The above examples prove how skilfully the authors have managed to find in all the countries adjoining Russia a strange desire to be annexed—based either on feelings of Slav community, or on sympathies for the Soviet regime, or on hostility towards Germany. In Finland alone they could discover neither Slav blood, hostility to Germany nor pro-Soviet sympathies. They therefore had to state baldly that “Russia needs her frontier rectifications . . .” By way of encouragement they add that: “U.S.S.R. is a federal State and its federal constitution permits

the extension of the Union to other States . . . The significance of the Soviet experiment in federalism is that it has proved that peoples of different nationalities and races can combine to promote a common social ideal. There seems to be no reason why the experiment should necessarily stop with the peoples included in the U.S.S.R. in 1939."

If that observation could be taken at its face value, one might ask what, if any, are the limits of the "experiment"? Why do the authors not mention Germany or France as countries "with a strong Communist movement" and therefore prospective members of the Soviet Union? Are their Communist movements weaker than that of Rumania?



POLAND

Poland, of course, provides a major obstacle. Poland is an Allied country. It was the first to resist the German aggression. It has the strongest armed forces of any of the occupied countries. Alone among them, it has never produced a Quisling. Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger have thought it therefore wiser to tread warily in disclosing the plans they propose to inflict on Poland. They make a few non-committal complimentary remarks about the "heroic fight for independence" and they try to veil the leading idea of the book in its application to Poland.

The chapter opens with an historical sketch. In the Middle Ages, state the authors, Poland emancipated herself from the Roman German Empire, but suffered in consequence a retarding of her economic and cultural development and a "feudalisation of society leading to a decline in the authority of the monarchy . . ." In the fifteenth century, under the House of Jagiello, Polish ambitions turned eastward. The result was again unfortunate, because "Poland fell more and more under the control of a military aristocracy, which mainly profited by these adventures . . . The predominance of this feudal caste has unfortunately been responsible for the unbridgeable gap which has always existed between the Polish aristocracy and their subject, non-Polish peoples, and which has always proved a source of weakness to the Polish State." After the second Partition, the Polish nation endeavoured to effect a revival. The Constitution of the 3rd of May, 1791, and the insurrection of 1794, prove it. But the Constitution was half-hearted and inadequate: ". . . it did not touch the basic problem of serfdom and it did not even enfranchise the middle classes in the towns. All that it did was to place political power firmly in the hands of the lesser gentry . . ." The insurrection "under the leadership of Kosciuszko, a Polish aristocrat who had fought on the side of the colonists in the

American War of Independence . . ." soon collapsed. After the third Partition, and especially after the unsuccessful insurrections of 1830 and 1863, Poland dried up completely: ". . . there was a steady outflow of the best brains of Poland to France and to the United States. In exile, especially in France, poets, historians, and novelists kept alive the tradition of former Polish greatness, until in 1914 the day of liberation again seemed near."

The authors favour their readers with the following items of alleged impartial information about independent Poland:

1. In 1920 the Soviet forces were defeated at the gates of Warsaw by Polish troops "organised by General Weygand."

2. At the same time, in July, 1920, Lord Curzon presented Poland with a proposal for a Polish-Russian frontier "which followed as far as possible the line of demarcation between the Poles on the one hand and White Russians and Ukrainians on the other. This line, it should be observed, was virtually identical with the frontier established by the Russo-German Treaty of October, 1939." The authors add that Poland rejected Lord Curzon's proposal "in consequence of mischievous French intermeddling with the affairs of Eastern Europe."

3. Poland failed to achieve economic progress: "Apart from the building of Gdynia and the erection of a number of munition factories, there were no important industrial developments of any kind, although these achievements showed that with proper direction the Poles could achieve at least the industrial standard of their Eastern neighbours."

4. The situation of the workmen in Poland was desperate: "Those in employment had in Warsaw an average weekly income per family of ten shillings."

5. At the time of the Munich crisis, Poland compelled Czechoslovakia to "cede the Teschen area, where 80,000 Poles, most of them workers, and by no means attached to the existing Polish regime, were "liberated" at the cost of bringing 120,000 Czechs under Polish rule."

6. Poland was conducting an anti-Soviet policy and prevented a British-Soviet *rapprochement* even after the British guarantee was given to Poland. Thus Poland's leaders forced ". . . the U.S.S.R. to take the question of strengthening her western frontier against German aggression into her own hands

and in this way postponing an Anglo-Russian Alliance until the summer of 1941."

7. "In the Russian occupied part of Poland the period between September, 1939, and June, 1941, had seen the destruction of the power of the landlords and the emancipation of the peasants . . . Russia has achieved a social revolution by splitting up the great estates and by improving the position of the peasantry. In any circumstances the restoration of the great Polish landed proprietors with their extensive rights will be impossible."

8. ". . . The Russo-Polish agreement does not contain any other important provisions, and the most important of all—that of Poland's eastern frontier—is left quite open. In particular, the Soviet has not invalidated its acts in admitting the former Polish White Russian and Ukrainian territories into the U.S.S.R., whilst the Polish Provisional Government retains all its claims to the pre-1939 frontiers. General Sikorski even denied, after the Pact was signed, that Poland was prepared to revise these frontiers. Thus the question remains open for the peace conference, although it would seem sound policy for the Poles and Russians to reach prior agreement upon the question inasmuch as the only forces likely to liberate Poland from Nazi occupation will be the Red Army, together with those Polish forces which are operating within its framework."

Every one of these items of information about Poland is untrue and tendentious. The Poles appeared as a nation a thousand years ago—the first of the Slavs to organise a State sufficiently strong to resist the German margraves, then the Emperor and the Teutonic Knights. Emancipation from the Roman Empire of the Germans was the condition of Poland's existence. If it had not occurred, there would have been no Polish nation to-day—only a memory of a lost tribe, like the Wends or Obotrites. The first King of Poland to crown himself, without accepting the crown from the hands of the Emperor, was Boleslaw Chrobry, in A.D. 1025. His successor, Mieczyslaw II, was again invested by the Emperor, and it was not until Boleslaw the Bold, in 1076, that the crowning was performed without the participation of the Emperor—Henry IV, who was expiating his sins at Canossa. The last King of Poland to pay homage to the

Emperor did so in 1157. The process of emancipation lasted therefore 132 years. It is not true that the emancipation had an unfavourable effect on cultural development, or that it caused feudalisation in Poland. On the contrary, the feudal system was far more rigid and complete in Germany than in Poland, until it reached such strength that after Frederic Barbarossa the territorial princes overruled the Emperor. In Poland the feudal hierarchy never attained full development. As to cultural relations, Poland maintained them not only with Germany, but also with Bohemia, and then with Italy and France.

Poland's eastward tendencies have met with the disapproval of many historians, including some Polish ones, on the ground that they weakened Poland's position on the Baltic. Actually, however, the eastward expansion of Poland in the fourteenth-sixteenth centuries generally strengthened Poland against Germany. It was not a mere coincidence that caused this tendency to increase after the battle of Grunwald, in 1410, in which the Teutonic Knights were definitely defeated. Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger ascribe to the eastward expansion of Poland at that time the rise of an adventurous military aristocracy. That is not true. Poland's social structure was similar to that of the contemporary western countries. The government was, as everywhere else, in the hands of the upper classes. The proportion of nobility in the population was, however, higher in Poland than in any other country (amounting to about 12 per cent. of the total). Moreover, the nobility ranged from magnates to poor squires, equivalent to the English yeomanry. In consequence, the ruling class in Poland was far more numerous and socially varied than in other countries. The use of the term "military aristocracy" in reference to the sixteenth century is an anachronism. In view of the concessions made by the King of Poland in favour of the nobility at large, in practice in favour of the wealthier nobles, their influence was strong. But they were not a military aristocracy. Only a strong, centralised monarchy could have produced a real military aristocracy, as it did in France under Louis XIV, and in Prussia under the Great Elector and his successors. Poland never had such absolute monarchy.

Of the period of the Partitions, the authors have nothing to say except the condescending remark about the Constitution of

the 3rd of May, and the "aristocrat" Kosciuszko. They allege that the Constitution did nothing but "place political power firmly in the hands of the lesser gentry." The truth is that the Constitution carried out an important reform, by granting parliamentary representation to the towns. It did not abolish serfdom, which existed at that time in all Continental countries with the exception of France, but it gave legal status to the voluntary agreements concluded between the landlords and the peasants. Poland was at this time the only monarchy to try to improve its political system by adopting some of the principles of the French Revolution. All the other nations were openly hostile to the Revolution. Kosciuszko, a poor yeoman, who owed his education to a royal scholarship at the School of Cadets, was promoted by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger to the rank of "Polish aristocrat." The authors completely reversed the social significance of the Kosciuszko insurrection, which was actually supported by the lower classes: the townsmen and peasants. The so-called Warsaw insurrection, which was one of its contributories, was led by the shoemaker Kilinski. It was the only armed movement outside France inspired by the spirit of the French Revolution and contemporary to it. The social ideas of Kosciuszko found expression in the Proclamation of Połance of 1794, in which Kosciuszko announced the liberation of the peasants.

The authors seem to think that after the Partitions, Polish life virtually stopped. They mention only the exiles who maintained a tradition of greatness in France and America. Actually, the 123-years long period of foreign occupation was not spent by the Poles on contemplation of the past, but on preparation for the future. The Polish community underwent profound changes, which contributed to the return of independence in 1918. The Polish *émigrés* in France had finished their historical part in the development of Polish culture by the middle of the nineteenth century. America, unfortunately, never "imported the best brains of Poland."

As to the information about independent Poland, the following rectifications are necessary:

1. The Polish armies which defeated the Soviet invaders near Warsaw were not reorganised by General Weygand. This could not have happened, if only because General Weygand arrived in

Poland shortly before the battle. General Weygand advised the Poles to evacuate Warsaw, but his advice was not followed. It is hardly surprising to-day that he offered it, for nobody could be expected to show more strength of character in the defence of a foreign country than in the defence of his own.

2. The so-called "Curzon Line" of July 11th, 1920, was never meant to be a Polish-Russian frontier, but merely a demarcation line between the Polish and Russian forces at the time of the armistice which was then planned. This line corresponded to an earlier decision of the Supreme Allied Council of December 8th, 1919, by which Poland was authorised to establish a normal administration in her eastern provinces, within the limits of a temporary demarcation line. Anxious to avoid any misunderstanding, the Supreme Council of the Allies at the same time specifically reserved Poland's right to claim territories east of that line. Lord Curzon's proposal did not meet with favourable reception in Russia. The Council of People's Commissars rejected it on July 11th, that is, on the very day on which Lord Curzon presented his proposal. The Soviet Government refused to accept British mediation, in view of the recent British military intervention in Russia, but it declared itself willing to give Poland a permanent frontier further east than the suggested demarcation line of Curzon. The Soviet Government informed the Foreign Office that it ascribed its action to the Russian anti-revolutionary influence in Downing Street. Soon afterwards Commissar Kamenev informed Mr. Lloyd George that the Soviet Government maintains "its desire to give to the Polish State a more favourable frontier than Lord Curzon's Line." There is therefore no reason at all to regard the Curzon Line as a magic formula for the Polish-Soviet problems. It would further be misleading to assume that this formula was only temporarily rejected by the Poles because of their aversion to it, and that it later—by its subsequent perfection—imposed itself on Russia and Germany, when on the 28th September, 1939, those two countries tried to sanction their friendship agreement by creating the so-called Ribbentrop Line.

There is no truth in the suggestion that the Curzon Line corresponds to the ethnographic boundary between Polish and Ukrainian population. Neither is it true that it is "virtually

identical" with the Ribbentrop Line which formed the German-Russian frontier in 1939-1940. The territory between the Curzon Line and the Polish-Russian frontier established by the Treaty of Riga was inhabited by 6,000,000 people, including 2,000,000 Poles, 1,500,000 Ukrainians, 900,000 White Ruthenians, 550,000 Jews, and 100,000 Russians.

The territories occupied by Soviet Russia in Eastern Poland as a result of the Soviet aggression of September 17th, 1939, have a much larger population: 13,900,000—including 5,281,000 Poles, 4,513,000 Ukrainians, 1,800,000 White Ruthenians, 1,115,000 Jews, and 135,000 Russians.

Speaking about the rejection of Lord Curzon's proposal by Poland, the authors ascribe it to "mischievous French intermeddling with the affairs of Eastern Europe." This remark proves that they follow the guidance of German propaganda in two respects: (1) In believing that if a smaller country resists the demands of a stronger one, this can be due only to the interference of a third Power. The idea that Lord Curzon's proposal was rejected simply because it was not fair to Poland does not occur to them at all. The same thing happened in 1939, when Poland rejected Hitler's claim (now renewed by Messrs. Keeton and Schlesinger) for an extra-territorial passage across Pomerania, and Goebbels shrieked that the refusal was the result of British intrigue. (2) The hostility with which the authors observe any French influence in Eastern Europe reflects similar statements by Dr. Goebbels on this subject. The Germans have always considered that Central Europe is their own domain and that neither France nor any other Western Power has any right to interfere with this German *Lebensraum*. It is thus Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger who similarly would cut the European continent across Central Europe. Although they do not admit it outright, they are both evidently advocating the *Lebensraum* doctrine.

3. The authors are wrong when they state that Polish industry did not develop during the twenty years of independence. Poland annually invested over 10 per cent. of her national income, although it was not particularly large (£640,000,000 in 1938). Investment in industrial development amounted to about 5 per cent. of the national income. Between the census of 1921 and that of 1931, the percentage of people employed in Poland

in mining and industry increased by 25 per cent. The total value of Polish production amounted in 1929 to 19,000,000,000 zlotys, of which 68 per cent. was accounted for by agriculture and 32 per cent. by mining and industry. Immediately before the present war, however, mining and industry accounted for over half the value of the entire production.

4. The remark that the average working-class family in Warsaw earned only 10 shillings per week displays both ignorance and lack of scientific method. It is well known that the level of wages in various countries is never compared in terms of currency, but in those of purchasing power. The price of food in Poland was very much lower than in Great Britain, so that the term "10 shillings" is in any case meaningless as a basis of comparison.

What do the authors mean by the income of a working-class family? Statistics mention only the wages paid to individuals, and in most working-class families several of their members earn wages. Why do they allege that such a ridiculously small income was earned in Warsaw? Presumably to create the impression that workmen in the provinces fared even worse. In actual fact the percentage of workmen earning up to 10 zlotys per week (in 1938) was 9.4 per cent., 10-20 zlotys per week—24.7 per cent., 20-30 zlotys per week—25.5 per cent., 30-40 zlotys per week—17.8 per cent., and over 40 zlotys per week—22.6 per cent. It means that 90.6 per cent. of all workmen earned more than 10 zlotys per week—the figure which the authors quoted as being the average. The figures mentioned above refer to the earnings of individual workmen, not of whole families, and they are the average for the whole country. In Warsaw and in the other industrial towns the wages were higher. It is true that the level of wages in Poland was low, but there is no need to reduce it any further by using imaginary statistics.

5. Similar statistical methods are practised by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger in their description of Cieszyn Silesia (Teschen). They use the figures of the Czechoslovak census of 1930, which reports in the Cieszyn area, returned in 1938 to Poland, a total population of 227,000 inhabitants, including 121,000 (55.8 per cent.) Czechs and 76,000 (35.3 per cent.) Poles. This census was faked, and that can be very easily proved. According to the Austrian census of 1900, the total population was 143,000—

including 115,000 Poles (81 per cent.) and 14,000 Czechs (9.8 per cent.). According to the Austrian census of 1910, the population was 179,000—including 124,000 Poles (69.2 per cent.) and 33,000 Czechs (18.3 per cent.). The Poles had therefore a strong majority both in 1900 and in 1910, while the Austrian authorities had no reason at all to favour the Poles in their censuses. Since there was no transfer of population between 1910 and 1930, nor was there any deadly epidemic among the local Polish population, which continued to procreate rather actively, it is obvious that the results of the census of 1930 are false. According to Polish data of 1938, the population of the area under review was 238,000, including 154,000 Poles (64.5 per cent.), 89,000 Czechs (24.7 per cent.). The Polish statistics do not diverge from the results of the Austrian census of 1910. They admit that the Polish majority has decreased slightly, but it is still quite considerable (64.5 per cent.). It is absurd to suggest that a majority became the minority within twenty years, without any apparent reason to account for such a strange reversal.

Polish public opinion regards the circumstances of the return to Poland of Cieszyn Silesia in 1938 in a critical light, because they created an impression of Polish-German parallelism. Nevertheless, the majority of the inhabitants are Poles, according to impartial statistics. The territory of Cieszyn was the object of a conflict between Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1920, which incensed Polish public opinion, because Czechoslovakia had previously recognized Poland's rights to Cieszyn in 1918. The present friendly development of Polish-Czechoslovak relations and the envisaged collaboration of the two countries allow us to hope that the controversy may be settled in a spirit of conciliation and in accordance with the genuine interests of both sides. The problem of Cieszyn should no longer be made use of by outside elements to create friction between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

6. The legend about the anti-Soviet policy of Poland is often used to support various interests. Actually, Poland was the first nation to recognize the Soviet Union *de jure*. Poland did not in 1920 follow the French advice of marching to Moscow and thus securing the victory of the interventionist armies. On July 30th, 1932, Poland concluded with Russia a pact of non-aggression, to be valid for five years. On May 5th, 1934, it was

extended until December 31st, 1945. On July 3rd, 1933, Poland concluded with Soviet Russia a pact containing a definition of the aggressor. When the Soviet armies invaded Poland on September 17th, 1939, Russia both violated her pact of non-aggression with Poland and became the aggressor in the terms of the pact of 1933, signed by the Soviet Government. Poland did not accept the repeated proposals of Germany to organise a common expedition against Russia, which were made in the period following the Polish-German non-aggression pact of January 26th, 1934.

Poland was not a signatory of Munich and did not take part in the negotiations which led up to it. Great Britain and France had removed Russia from participation in European affairs and preferred to be left alone with Germany and Italy. Soviet Russia had some grounds for believing that certain Western circles might prefer a war with Germany against Russia than one with Russia against Germany. This period of appeasement, with pro-German and anti-Soviet leanings, was responsible for the Russian invasion of her western neighbours, since Russia felt insecure and wanted to improve her strategic position. When the episode of so-called Russian-German friendship was over, Russia sought the collaboration of Britain and her Allies in the struggle against her own recent ally—Germany. It is therefore quite untrue that Poland “postponed an Anglo-Russian Alliance until the summer of 1941.” It was postponed mainly by the policy of appeasement, and then by the German-Soviet Treaty of August 23rd, 1939. Hitler broke that treaty and he caused the historic date of June 22nd, 1941, to be the date of the entry of Russia into the circle of the United Nations.

The authors know perfectly well that the policy of Russia was the outcome of the appeasement practised by Britain and France. They even write quite clearly that: “The catastrophe of Munich . . . appeared to prove beyond any doubt to the Soviet that any accord with Great Britain and France was impossible . . . In 1938, in spite of collaboration in the League of Nations, the British Foreign Office and the Government of the day regarded her as a potential opponent.” If the authors, nevertheless, try to blame Poland for the postponement of Russian collaboration with the Allied Nations, they do so on no just grounds.

7. It is untrue to say that the situation of the peasantry was in any way improved during the Soviet occupation in Poland. It would be hardly fair to blame the Soviet authorities for it very much, for it would be difficult to improve conditions in time of war. The large estates were broken up, but this could not have made any great difference, since the number of holdings of over 50 hectares in the area occupied by Russia was only 0.4 per cent. of the total. The landowners did not have any "extensive rights" in Poland, and the allegation concerning them is entirely unfounded. After the war the smaller farmers will naturally keep the land which they received and this will be done in accordance with the agrarian reform which was in progress in Poland for many years before the war.

In the eighteen years of agrarian reform in independent Poland, 2,535,600 hectares of land were distributed among 629,900 peasant families forming an aggregate of about 3,000,000 people. The area of estates of over 50 hectares amounted in 1939 to no more than 15 per cent. of the total area of arable land in the country. The large estates are by no means the principal social and economic problem of Poland, for the amount of land left for distribution is not large. The real problem is the overpopulation of rural areas, due to the insufficient development of industry. Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger are trying in vain to convey the impression that the return of the territories which were for a time under Soviet occupation to Poland would mean the reinstatement of the large estates. In accordance with the law of agrarian reform, the carrying out of which is to be accelerated, there will be no estates of over 50 hectares of arable land anywhere in Poland.

8. The authors' remarks about the Polish-Russian Treaty of July 30th, 1941, are so curiously phrased that they seem to have been designed to confuse rather than to clarify the issue. The pact does not mention the frontier between the two countries, because no such mention was required. The frontier was defined by the Treaty of Riga, of March 18th, 1921, and nothing happened which could change the legal situation. At any rate, the temporary occupation of Polish territory by Soviet troops could not have had that effect. In international treaties of friendship between two countries there is never any reference to fron-

tiers, for it is understood that the signatories mutually recognize each other in the territories which they possess at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. It is not clear why the authors believe that the absence of any reference to frontiers in the text of the treaty should give ground for a Russian claim of revision. According to such a line of argument, one might as well believe that it provided ground for a Polish claim of aggrandizement at the expense of Russia. Such an assumption would be as absurd as the first.

On May 23rd, 1942, Soviet Russia concluded a treaty of alliance with Great Britain. The treaty makes no reference to any frontiers of the contracting parties. Will Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger suggest that this means that Russia is free to claim territories from the British Empire?

As to the authors' observation to the effect that Russia did not rescind its internal decrees concerning the incorporation of Polish provinces to Russia, which they euphemistically describe as: "acts in admitting the former Polish White Russian and Ukrainian territories into the U.S.S.R." it is quite irrelevant. These decrees and their rescinding or otherwise constitute a purely domestic matter for the Soviet Union, which cannot have any effect in international relations. These acts were made in flagrant violation of the rules of Section IV of the Hague Convention about the customs of war on land. They are, therefore, null and void from the point of view of international law. They come exactly within the same class of legal acts as the annexation of parts of Poland by Germany, of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany, of Corsica by Italy, or the proclamation of the "independence" of Croatia or Slovakia. Any internal laws or decrees cannot have the slightest significance in international law.

Actually, the authors make reference to international law only for the sake of appearances, but what they really have in mind is the political and military preponderance of Russia. That is why they kindly advise Poland to compose her territorial conflict with Russia—which legally does not exist—before the Peace Conference. They add as inducement the fact that the only force likely to liberate Poland from the Germans is "the Red Army, together with those Polish forces which are now operating within its framework." But it so happens that this inducement

is no longer so alluring. It is now likely that not only the Red Army, but also the American, British and Polish Armies may find their way to occupied Poland, and nobody knows which of them will get there first. Moreover, the Polish Army formed in Russia has left its territory and is now in the Middle East, under the operational command of the British Staff. The formation of new Polish military units in Russia does not seem to be likely.

* * *

All these historical observations, of which only the more characteristic are quoted above, to trace in them the thread of misinterpretation and distortion, have all a very definite tendency in view. They are designed to impress on the reader that Poland has been, since the very beginning of its existence, a dark spot on the conscience of Europe. The authors wish to create the impression that Poland was, both before the Partitions and after 1918, a country incapable of self-government and an obstacle to the peaceful consolidation of Europe. Why do they want to make the reader believe this? The reason becomes apparent in their further arguments.

* * *

Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger give much attention to Poland's frontiers. They start their observations on the eastern frontier of Poland in a rather odd way: "In consequence of Poland's status as an Allied Government, the problem of Poland's eastern boundary has been widely discussed and it admittedly abounds with difficulties." It would appear that the fact that Poland is an Allied nation makes it necessary to place her frontiers under doubt. Who questions Poland's eastern frontier? Surely not Poland herself, since she desires no aggrandizement in the east. Surely not the Allies, for the frontiers of the Allied Nations are questioned only by the enemy, not by themselves. It would be a queer kind of alliance that would result in the conquest by one of the Allies of the land of another.

Prof. Keeton's and Dr. Schlesinger's argument is based on their assumption that "any plans for post-war security in Eastern

Europe can only depend upon Russia and not upon lesser Powers." This view is reinforced by the belief that "whatever happens in the west, Eastern Europe will have been liberated by the Soviet armies . . ." The conclusion of the authors is that the freedom and existence of Eastern European nations should be subordinated to Russian aspirations of expansion. Poland is to lose in favour of Russia the entire territory occupied by the Soviet in 1939. The authors think that "when the present war is reaching its final stages, and these areas are liberated by the Red armies, there can be little question, that the White Russian and Ukrainian areas of the former Polish State will unmistakably express their desire that incorporation in the U.S.S.R. shall be permanent." This piece of prophecy is made without any reasonable support of fact. How do Messrs. Keeton and Schlesinger know that Poland will not be occupied first by American, British, and Polish troops coming from the south? How do they know that the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, who have often displayed nationalist tendencies, but never pro-Soviet ones, will desire incorporation in the U.S.S.R.? And yet the authors base their suggestion that Poland should abandon half of her territory on these purely arbitrary and personal forecasts.

They also try to find other reasons for a resignation by Poland of the eastern half of her national territory. They state that Poland may invoke in her favour historical and legal considerations. They dispose with the historical arguments by observing, with some truth, that "there is in fact no substance in exclusively 'historical' arguments, from an ethical standpoint, in a system of power politics, where each State retains what it can so long as it is strong enough, for there are in most areas many conflicting claims based on former possession, and there is no point within historical record beyond which 'historical' claims are barred."

After deprecating historical arguments, the authors calmly proceed to put forward a number of historical arguments against Poland. They are rather strange arguments in any case: for instance, the allegation that White Ruthenians and Ukrainians were living in the area concerned before Poland became a nation—that is over a thousand years ago. Surely that is carrying historical argument a little too far back. Then the authors suggest that historical argument would be in favour of giving

Western Poland to Germany, because it belonged after the Partitions to Prussia, which, therefore, has an earlier claim on it than the present Poland, which did not exist at the time. The most striking arguments are used in respect to Eastern Galicia: "The Polish claims to the Galician territories of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy is almost an illogical one, as it accepts as its basis the wrong done to the Polish nation and also to other inhabitants of the former Kingdom by the successive Partitions of Poland."

In other words, Messrs. Keeton and Schlesinger lay down that if a stronger Power has robbed some territory in the past, the victim has no right of redress.

With regard to the towns of Lwow and Wilno, the authors admit that their population is largely Polish to-day, but they explain that it was Ukrainian and Lithuanian respectively in the Middle Ages—therefore Poland has no real right to these cities. Transposed into British conditions, this argument would amount to saying that England was ruled for many years by the Romans and then by Normans. There are many remains to prove how strong was their hold on the country. It is true that the population of London and the Home Counties is quite strongly Anglicised by now, after centuries of English rule. But that does not mean anything, because London was once a Roman city, and Mussolini, as the successor of the Cæsars, has a good claim to the rule of London and Southern England. Other parts of the country really belong to the Scandinavians, because they once conquered and ruled them.

Very similar arguments are used by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger in favour of robbing Poland of her eastern provinces.

Actually, the Polish-Russian frontier is morally and legally unassailable. It was traced by the Treaty of Riga, of March 18th, 1921, which was a typical compromise. The southern section of the frontier, between Eastern Galicia and Russia, was recognized by the Council of Ambassadors on March 15th, 1923. In concluding the Treaty of Riga, the contracting parties sought a compromise which would give satisfaction to both Poland and Russia, thus ending their ancient feud. It is to be recalled that on September 9th, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars specifically denounced all treaties concerning the Partitions of Poland

in 1772, 1793 and 1795, as well as all the subsequent treaties dealing with the Partitions, up to 1833. This decision of the Council of People's Commissars, signed by Lenin and Karachan, was notified to the German Government on October 3rd, 1918. It meant that Poland was free to claim the return to her frontiers of 1772. Nevertheless, Poland, at the Treaty of Riga, resigned in favour of Russia her rights to a territory with an area of about 120,000 square miles. Russia and Ukraine, on the other hand, resigned their claims to any territories west of the new frontier, and declared their formal *désintéressement* in the matter of the Polish-Lithuanian frontier. Both the contracting parties made solemn declarations of friendship. In the years which followed, the Polish-Russian frontier was never questioned either by Russia or by any other Power. This might be a serious obstacle to the authors, but they deal with it in a truly German manner, by simply declaring "the treaty (of Riga) was the end of the war between Poland and the Soviet. It did not purport to establish a scientific or final line of demarcation and has as much or as little validity as any treaty made in such circumstances." This passage must have been written by Dr. Schlesinger, for it closely resembles the famous words of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who, in 1914, told the British Ambassador in Berlin that the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium was "a scrap of paper."

In the period of appeasement, Britain did not always follow the spirit of the treaties she had signed, but she adhered to the letter, and in any case, any shortcomings in this respect were the subject of embarrassment and disapproval. The tone of open contempt for treaties is alien to British political tradition. It seems, therefore, that a book flaunting such contempt is signed by a British name only by mistake.

The remark that the Treaty of Riga did not establish "a scientific and final line of demarcation" is ridiculous. What is a "scientific and final line of demarcation"? Is the line proposed by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger, in favour of Russian hegemony in Europe, "scientific and final," and if so, why? Is, perhaps, Hitler's conception of German mastery in Europe less "scientific"? The use of misleading and meaningless terms for

the purpose of furthering very definite tendencies is not a particularly sound method of argument.

Incidentally, the authors here make another factual error. They state that, at the Treaty of Riga, "neither contracting party . . . consulted the Ukrainians upon its provision." Actually, Ukraine was represented during the Polish-Soviet negotiations of 1921 by a special delegation, and the treaty was concluded formally between Poland on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic on the other. Article 2 of the Treaty of Riga opens with the words: "The two contracting parties, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, recognize the independence of the Ukraine and of White Russia and agree and decide that the eastern frontier of Poland, that is to say, the frontier between Poland on the one hand and Russia, White Russia, and the Ukraine on the other, shall be as follows."

Article 3 of the Treaty opens with the words: "Russia and the Ukraine abandon all rights and claims to the territories situated to the west of the frontier laid down by Article 2 of the present Treaty."

The question of the participation of the Ukrainian delegation in the negotiations was the subject of some discussions at the time. After the ratification of the Treaty there was for a long time in Warsaw a separate diplomatic representation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, while in Kharkov, the temporary capital of the Soviet Ukraine, there was a Polish diplomatic representative. After the change in the Soviet constitution and the establishment, on June 6th, 1923, of a new Federal entity, the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government, in its Note of August 31st, 1923, agreed to recognize the new State on condition of receiving confirmation of the Treaty of Riga, concluded with the R.S.F.R. and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. accepted, on December 14th, 1923, all the obligations resulting from the Treaty of Riga, concluded by the component republics of the U.S.S.R.

The authors should make up their minds on the point whether they consider the Ukrainian Soviet Republic the legal representative of the Ukrainian nation. At any rate, Ukraine had a greater degree of sovereignty in 1923 than in later years, and the obliga-

tions undertaken by the Ukrainian Government at that time are as legal and binding as any international pact can be.

It seems rather strange that the authors apparently knew nothing of the participation of an official Ukrainian delegation in the negotiations preceding the Treaty of Riga. This fact should be known at least to one of the authors, *i.e.*, to the Professor of international law (especially if he intends to write on the subject).

As to the western frontiers of Poland, the authors are naturally in favour of their revision to the advantage of Germany. They admit that Poland needs an access to the sea, but they claim that Gdynia should be sufficient for that purpose. Danzig should—in the authors' opinion—be given to Germany. Poland, however, should get a free zone in Danzig for the export of her timber. Polish Pomerania should receive an international guarantee, and there should be an exchange of populations. One of the further proposals of the authors deserves literal quotation: "Germany's protests against the isolation of East Prussia can be met, so far as economic considerations are concerned, by granting her the exclusive use of the railway and the motor road they have built, for civilian purposes, and without Polish interference."

Before the war, Danzig was a Free City, and with Poland formed one customs area. The port of Danzig was administered by a Board, half of whose members were Polish. But Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger want to make a gift to Germany of Danzig, leaving Poland with an "international guarantee" for Pomerania. After the experience of recent years with international guarantees, it is doubtful whether the authors are treating their proposal seriously. It is rather amusing that the Polish free zone in Danzig is supposed to be justified by the export of timber. This remark is probably meant to create the impression that Poland has no other interests in Danzig except the export of timber. Of a number of Poland's chief export goods (coal and coke, timber and wooden goods, cereals, sugar, bacon and meat products) all were exported through Gdynia as well as through Danzig. It might be interesting to note that the export of timber through Gdynia showed an upward tendency as compared

with that of Danzig. The following figures give an idea of the situation :

EXPORT THROUGH GDYNIA AND DANZIG, IN 1,000 TONS.					
	Gdynia.		Danzig.		
	1937	1938	1937	1938	
Coal and coke	6,407	6,526	3,734	4,030	
Timber and wooden goods	251	402	1,182	813	
Cereals	—	57	279	301	
Sugar	46	72	1	3	
Bacon and meat ...	49	52	2	2	

As to Prof. Keeton's and Dr. Schlesinger's proposal for an extra-territorial German transit zone across Polish territory, it is not new in diplomatic annals. On October 24th, 1938, an identical proposal was made by Ribbentrop to the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in Berchtesgaden. Poland rejected it, and that was the immediate cause of the German invasion of Poland. Ribbentrop called his plan *Generalloesung*. Now the same proposal is made, not in Berchtesgaden, but in London, and not by Ribbentrop, but by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger.

It is very significant that the authors always refer to Poland as "the former Polish State," describing the Polish Government as the "Provisional Government." These terms are now used by the German Government and its propaganda machine. On this side of the fighting line it is not considered that occupation has changed anything whatever in the legal status of the occupied countries and their governments. President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, have formally declared that all territorial changes occurring during the war are not recognized by the Allied Governments, while the Governments of the Occupied Allied Countries continue to be fully recognized by all the United Nations and by neutral Powers as well. It is difficult to believe that these elementary facts of international law are unknown to at least one of the authors of the book, who is a professor of international law. It appears to be their intention to introduce Poland on the international forum as a State with uncertain political status.

In writing about Germany, on the other hand, as an enemy

Power, the authors never use the term "Germany," but always refer to the "Nazis." This little dodge is meant to produce the impression that Germany is not an enemy country at all, but that the war is waged by a group of men without any international status, who, by some mysterious means are performing various acts on German territory. The purpose is to promote the view that the German Reich is in no way responsible for the actions of the strange Ku-Klux-Klan of the "Nazis."

FEDERATIONS

Apart from the problem of reconstruction in the part of Europe neighbouring on Russia, Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger write about the federal organisation of Central and South-Eastern Europe. That part of their book is probably the most significant, for it reveals the motives of the authors and shows that Germany and not Russia is the real object of their interest. The views of the authors about the western neighbours of Russia are closely connected with their opinion of the future position of Germany in Europe and in the world.

The authors propose to establish in Central and South-Eastern Europe a loosely-knit federal bloc, composed of two federations: the Southern-Slav Federation and the Danubian Union. The Southern Slav Federation would be led by Bulgaria, while "the rearrangement of internal forces would exclude the hegemony of the Serbs, which has proved a threat to the cultural development of the Croats and the Slovenes and to the political independence of all the Yugoslav peoples." The Federation would include, apart from Bulgaria, the countries which now belong to Jugoslavia, Albania and Transylvania and the Banat as independent units. Greece and Turkey might join this federation in the form of a Balkan League. The authors believe the countries belonging to this federation should keep in the future their agricultural character and continue to supply with raw materials the industrial countries of Central Europe, which would sell them manufactured goods. Agriculture would increase its production, thanks to improved methods, while the political consolidation due to the federation would guarantee more favourable conditions for the sale of agricultural products. The authors anticipate that:

“Central Europe must necessarily remain the chief customer for the raw material of these countries, supplying in return manufactured goods. This would remain true even if there were considerable industrial development within these three countries.” The Danubian Federation would comprise Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and possibly Rumania, in case the latter should not wish to join Soviet Russia. Austria and Czechoslovakia are highly industrialised Western European countries “. . . whose economic relations with Germany are necessarily close. They, therefore, form a bridge from Germany to South-Eastern Europe and, like Germany, they depend for their prosperity upon the free access to the south-east . . .” Within the Danubian Federation, Austria would also play the part of a bridge, assuring that the whole federation would pursue close co-operation with Germany.

For Czechoslovakia—according to the authors—participation in the Danubian Federation would be profitable not only from the economic point of view, but also by giving a final solution to the problem of the Sudeten, which caused the downfall of the Czechoslovak Republic. Thanks to the participation of Austria, the Sudeten question “. . . would lose much of its importance if Czechoslovakia federated with a German-speaking country, possessing a strong traditional appeal to Sudeten Germans.”

The whole Danubian-Balkan Federation, with 65,000,000 inhabitants, half of them Slav and half non-Slav, would—according to the authors—“be an equal partner in dealing with a future Germany . . .” In case of unexpected obstacles in the realisation of the broader federal scheme, the authors propose a small Central-European Federation, composed only of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. It would be a kind of reconstructed Austria-Hungary on a smaller scale. In view of the strong influence of the German element and the antagonism existing between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, that new State would certainly be as convenient a tool in the hands of Germany as the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, opening the way to German expansion in the Balkans and the Middle East. The Balkans would in that case remain split and disorganised, which would assist German penetration. Of course, Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger offer other, more palatable, motives for their plan for the recon-

struction of Austria-Hungary. They write: "... then economics and politics alike suggest that a smaller federation of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary is well within the bounds of possibility once all of them possess a genuinely democratic outlook."

The authors think that in many parts of Europe ethnographic boundaries are so vague that they can provide only "a slender basis for racial and national differentiation," still less determine State frontiers. They believe this is particularly true of the ethnographic boundaries in the area of Bohemia, Slovakia, Poland and Ukraine. The authors report that one of them, Dr. Schlesinger, tried to carry out linguistic research in that territory and form an opinion about the area of settlement of each of the different nationalities. Apparently he failed in his attempt and decided that it had no hope of success. The scientific method which he used was not without a humorous aspect: "Dr. Schlesinger, who speaks very little Czech and no Slovak, solved the language problem by speaking with the peasants in Czech with an increasing Russian accent as he travelled eastwards." Now we know how "scientific" boundaries are delimited.

At the time of Lord Curzon's proposal, there was an anecdote about him in Poland. It was said that Lord Curzon travelled over the disputed area with an umbrella (pre-Chamberlain model) which he produced to the Jewish shopkeepers in every small town, asking them to describe that object. When they replied "parasol," which is the Polish word for umbrella, he deduced that he was in Poland. When they said "zontik," he believed himself in Russia. He was greatly worried when, in a town far east of the proposed line, he heard the Polish name, and then in another town very much further west he was told the reply in Russian. Dr. Schlesinger seems to favour the method ascribed to Lord Curzon by popular legend, and he relies implicitly on its high accuracy.

* * *

As to Poland, Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger do not wish to see it as a member of the Danubian Federation, nor in fact of any other federation. They say: "There is nothing in Poland's economic structure which would suggest the desirability of her

joining some larger federation or economic unit, other than a general association for the stimulation of international trade." Poland's desire to federate with other nations is described as "imperialism" Poland, the authors admit, has long planned a bloc of countries between Germany and Russia. Within such a bloc Poland would naturally be the leader, they admit, and then turn on their strongest indignation against the "fantastic Polish proposals for a buffer-bloc between Germany and Russia, from the Baltic to the Black Sea." The authors are quite angry about the plan of such a federation, which they declare to be "obsolete" and "of merely antiquarian interest."

The negotiations for a federation, which have been in progress between Poland and Czechoslovakia for two years, are rather embarrassing for Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger. To dispose of the matter, they try to prove simultaneously that (1) there are no such political agreements; (2) Czechoslovakia does not desire them; (3) Poland does not need them.

This is rather like the man who explained in court, when summoned to return a pot, that he had never borrowed the pot at all, that the pot fell off the shelf and broke by itself, and that he returned the pot to the plaintiff quite intact.

Czechoslovakia—the authors write—concluded certain treaties with Poland, but the fact that she concluded them with Poland and not with any other country is without any meaning at all. These treaties were to be merely "a general demonstration of the solidarity of oppressed nations, which might just as well have been made with the Dutch or the Norwegians; it was intended from the Czech side to be an answer to those Right-wing-pro-Habsburg elements in British public opinion." They add that "the original motive (of the Polish-Czechoslovak understanding) was to give both countries greater security against future German aggression, but the question of Polish security can only be finally solved by friendly relations with the U.S.S.R." Actually Poland, if isolated from the Central European federation, would be in no position to maintain "friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.," but would simply become a dependency of the great Russian Empire. Such a solution would only prepare new disasters in the future, for the Polish nation would never acquiesce with that kind of servitude. Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger seem to believe that by such a mis-

leading interpretation of the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement they have succeeded in removing Poland from that agreement which, *n.b.*, can exist only because one of its signatories is Czechoslovakia and the other Poland.

No amount of argument can alter the fact that the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments made their common declarations of November 11th, 1940, and January 23rd, 1942. Both these declarations mention the need of the two countries to enter "into a closer economic and political association, which would become the basis of a new order in Central Europe and a guarantee of its stability."

Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger claim that some Czechoslovak politicians would prefer their country to join a Danubian Federation, while the association with Poland would have a collateral character. Without going into details, I may state that no Czechoslovak publication has so far opposed the union with Poland. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak Government has taken no steps of any kind to achieve a Danubian Federation. The authors also allege that "Czechoslovakian socialists have from the first opposed it (Polish-Czechoslovak collaboration), since they were suspicious of the adventurous trend of Polish nationalism and had no desire to be involved at any time in an anti-Soviet policy." After many conversations with Czechoslovak socialists, (both in the Government and out of it), I formed the opinion that they quite sincerely desire the reconstruction of Central and South-Eastern Europe on a federal basis and that they believe a close union of their country with Poland to be essential to such reconstruction. They all supported their Government in its pacts with Poland during the negotiations which preceded the common declarations.

The authors finally use a queer kind of argument when they suggest that the union with Czechoslovakia is superfluous from the Polish point of view. They state that the Poles would derive no benefit from such a union, since "their main economic interests lie to the West and East, and not to the South." Even if we should accept the view that a federation of two countries is to be decided on grounds of commercial expediency, like a short-term transaction for quick profits, this observation would still be quite absurd. It is not true that Poland's economic interests lie to the

West and to the East alone. On the contrary, owing to the autarchic policy of Russia, the Polish-Soviet trade was insignificant. In 1938, Polish imports from Russia amounted to 9.9 million zlotys' worth, and exports to Russia only 1.4 millions. There is nothing to suggest that Russia, a large, self-sufficient continent, will trade extensively in the future with her western neighbours. As to Germany, it is not in the interest of Poland to rely too exclusively on German trade. The development of commercial relations with Germany is not always a safe or desirable thing—witness the Balkan countries, in which Germany had a virtual monopoly of foreign trade already before the war. It meant a German stranglehold over their national economy.

That is why Poland endeavoured to develop her trade with Great Britain and the overseas countries on the one hand, and with the Balkans on the other. Poland's trade with Germany was tending to decrease. The German share in Poland's foreign trade amounted in 1937 to 14.5 per cent., compared with 39 per cent. in 1923. During the same period the share of other European countries in Poland's foreign trade increased from 24 per cent. to 34 per cent. There was also an increase of Polish exports to America and Africa. In 1928, Poland exported to America 31.6 million zlotys' worth of goods, and in 1938 the figure was 102 millions. Exports to Africa increased from 8 million zlotys in 1928 to 21.1 million zlotys in 1938. These figures show that Poland was endeavouring to shift the main current of her foreign trade north and south. It is noteworthy that the most important of the new railway lines built in Poland shortly before the present war was the line Herby-Gdynia, running due north.

Besides, it is clear that the political reconstruction of the Central European region will have to result in adjustments in the direction of the foreign trade of various countries. Central Europe will become, as an entity, an important element in world trade. It will be able to deal freely with all, and cannot be on any account barred from any markets.

Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger finally point out that "the only advocate of Polish-Czech economic union as such is a

Polish writer, Mr. Pragier." But they are wrong here again. In the statement which they probably had in mind, I had said that: "the need for federal organisation is greatest in Central and Eastern Europe, in the area between Russia and Germany, the Baltic and Eastern Mediterranean." Speaking about the Polish-Czechoslovak Declaration of November 11th, 1940, I described it as "the first step in that direction," that is, of course, in the direction of a political and economic reconstruction of the entire Central European area. I dealt at some length with the economic and political Polish-Czechoslovak relations, but it does not mean at all that I desired the federal reorganisation of Central Europe to be confined to aiming at the exclusive realisation of a "Polish-Czech economic union as such." My actual views, stated in *Free Europe* of June 27th 1941, found confirmation and development in the second Polish-Czechoslovak Declaration of January 23rd, 1942. This Declaration was concerned with the problem of a closer Polish-Czechoslovak union, on the background of the general relations between the two countries and with a view to the welfare of "the entire European region with which the vital interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are bound." The authors have therefore completely distorted my statement.

* * *

All the institutions studying the reconstruction of Europe are agreed that the small and medium-sized countries of the Continent should be consolidated within some kind of federal organisation. The authors of the book under review also think about consolidation. There is only one difference. Some people desire to achieve a compact bloc of Central and South-Eastern European nations, capable of independent development and free from the domination of the Great Powers which adjoin it in the west and east. Others try to find a formula which would excuse the domination of the two great Continental Powers over all other nations, and yet safeguard the appearances of "democracy" and "self-determination of nations."

In all German plans a key part was invariably reserved for Central South-Eastern Europe. Germany managed to obtain in that area a particularly favourable position. It became both the

only purveyor of manufactured goods and the exclusive intermediary in trade with overseas countries. In most cases it was also the principal buyer of the raw materials produced by the countries concerned. It was in the interest of Germany to prevent the growth of industry in Central and South-Eastern Europe, in order to maintain her economic hegemony over that region. The German influence over the economy of some of the countries in that area was so preponderant that it distorted their agricultural structure and caused the establishment of one-crop plantations, working exclusively for the benefit of Germany. The economic subordination of the Central European region gave Germany a much greater power, both economic and political, than it could ever have had with its own resources alone. That is why there is no better method of reducing German aggressiveness in the future than to reinforce and emancipate the Central European region. Such a process can make of this region a new European Power, collaborating with the other great peaceful Powers of the world. It will also compel Germany to use raw materials from overseas, instead of exploiting Central Europe like a colony. By using raw materials from overseas, Germany will be dependent on the seafaring nations of the world, and will be unable to start a new war.

That is why Prof. Keeton's and Dr. Schlesinger's observation to the effect that Poland bases her federal plans on political as well as economic grounds is no disqualification at all. Why should political considerations not be a prime motive in such an enterprise? After all, this is not a matter of a commercial agreement or a loan arrangement, but a plan for a complete political and economic reconstruction of an important area in the middle of Europe. Besides, economics and politics were never more closely interwoven than in this particular case.

A system of European security based not merely on treaties, but on structural bonds between certain nations, can put an end to the subordinate part played so far by Central Europe at the service of Germany. The political emancipation of this region must be accompanied by an industrial development and an improvement of the standard of living which would bring Central Europe into line with Western European economic standards.

In trade between industrial countries the exchange of manufactured goods is more active, although it may sound paradoxical, than the exchange of goods between industrial and agricultural countries. Such a mutual exchange permits both sides to play an active part, which allows them greater freedom in concluding their commercial agreements, and results in greater mutual benefits. The structural reorganisation of the Central European region should therefore aim at its industrialisation, which will result in an increased trade between the different countries of the region, and also a development of the trade between the region taken as a whole and the rest of the world.

It is also necessary to create such a political organisation of the Central European region as would both guarantee its security against outside interference and provide for adequate economic collaboration. Well knit together, this area can become an independent factor in international relations and one of the main pillars of a new Europe. It will also counteract the German influence in that region. Such a solution will put an end at last to the fatal division of the Continent of Europe into western and eastern spheres of security, which had such tragic consequences for both west and east. It is clear that the consolidated Central Europe will have to base its foreign policy on a solid friendship with Soviet Russia, based not only on political agreements, but on economic collaboration. Well organised, this region may become a satisfactory political partner for Russia, safeguarding her western frontier. At the same time, the security of its eastern boundary would enable Central Europe to concentrate on defence to the west.

The nations of Central Europe admittedly have many unsettled controversies, left over from a recent past, which still cause serious friction. Nevertheless, the minor nature of these conflicts permits one to hope that they may be satisfactorily composed when they will be considered from a general constructive point of view, over-riding particular ambitions on a smaller scale. That should be the aim of the nations eager to find new forms of political and economic co-operation, which would ensure peace, security, and equal opportunities of development for each of them. The task of finding new forms of international integration suitable for Central Europe and of achieving their practical

realisation should be the concern of all the Powers interested in building a new world order. It should become one of the principal topics of the Peace Conference. The more this idea is studied and advanced before the end of the war, the more preliminary work is done now, the better this new economic and political structure will function in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

We have reached the conclusion of the arguments contained in the book of Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger, and we have outlined our own ideas on the subject of reconstruction in Central and South-Eastern Europe. What would be the picture of Europe if the recommendations of the authors of the book, both explicit and implied, should be adopted in the future? What should be the picture, not only of Russia's western neighbours, but also of Europe as a whole?

Russia would keep all her conquests of 1939-1940, as a "security frontier." West of that frontier would spread the vast area of Central Europe, in a state of political chaos. That European no-man's-land was, and perhaps still is, for Englishmen the most exotic part of our globe. What are the recommendations of Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger for that part of Europe?

In the south they want to have a Balkan Federation under the leadership of Bulgaria, notoriously incapable of conducting an independent policy and notoriously subject to German influence. This Balkan Federation would be called "Southern Slav Federation," which seems to suggest that Jugoslavia might keep its present form. But little would remain of it except the name. Serbia, which was the nucleus of unity for the Southern Slavs, and which is to-day resisting the Germans with exemplary courage, would be degraded in favour of Bulgaria, Germany's ally. The destructive work of Hitler, who broke up Jugoslavia by creating a "sovereign" Croatia and a separate Transylvania and Banat, would be fully sanctioned and maintained. Within the federation thus conceived, Bulgaria would be the outpost of German influence. The countries belonging to the Balkan Federation would remain purely agricultural and primitive as before. The authors obviously desire the Balkan area to remain

an economic reserve for German expansion. They want the Balkans to remain the granary of Germany, even if they should to some extent develop their industries. There would be, however, no such risk in the federation proposed by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger, for it would be completely dominated by the Germans, who would never tolerate any industrial development in the countries under their economic control. On the other hand, the continuation of the low standard of economic development of the countries of South-Eastern Europe would make them politically defenceless. Modern warfare requires a high industrial potential. Nations without industry are incapable of effective defensive, and are at all times at the mercy of a better equipped opponent. The only European Power to have a tradition and practice of expansion in South-Eastern Europe is Germany. If the plans of Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger were realised, she would remain the master of the Balkans. Soviet Russia could at the best extend there only her propaganda activities.

In the north, the Balkan Federation would have for neighbour the Danubian Federation. The plan for such a federation is also a German idea. Its purpose is to restore, for all practical purposes, the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which was before the first world war such a convenient bridgehead for expansion towards the Middle East. Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger visualise a similar role for the new Danubian Federation. They hope that the participation of Austria and of the Sudeten Germans in the federation will guarantee what they describe as "friendly collaboration" with Germany. Since the Danubian Federation would also be associated in some way with the Balkan Federation under Bulgarian leadership, and possibly also with Turkey, Germany would have better opportunities than ever for expansion in the south of Europe and in the Middle East. Czechoslovakia, as a member of the Danubian Federation, would be completely subordinated to Germany. Besides, it would no longer be the Czechoslovakia of 1938 before Munich, but rather a truncated carcass of the former Czechoslovak Republic. The authors propose to give Carpathian Ruthenia to Russia and possibly Slovakia as well. In a thus reduced Czechoslovakia, the influence of the Sudeten Germans would be proportionately greater than before. The authors mention an "exchange of population" with

regard to the Sudeten region, but it is difficult to see how it could be carried out, since there are 3,000,000 Germans in the Sudeten and no Czechs in Germany. This proposal does not seem to be treated very seriously by the authors themselves, since in a later chapter they state that the Danubian Federation would help the Czechs to solve the Sudeten problem, thanks to the inclusion of Austria, traditionally associated with the Sudeten Germans. Thus Czechoslovakia would be completely controlled by the Germans within the Danubian Federation by three means :

(1) The Sudeten Germans, being a large section of the population in a reduced Czechoslovakia, would exert a powerful influence from within.

(2) In the Danubian Federation, Austria would be the emissary of the German Reich, collaborating with the Sudeten Germans.

(3) The German Reich itself would have a dominating position over the Danubian Federation, within which it would have its Trojan horse—Austria, its Trojan pony—the Sudeten, and Hungary, to complete the encirclement of the Czechs by hostile elements.

If the recommendations of Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger were ever adopted, the Fourth Reich would have its own Lebensraum in the Danubian Federation. As a result of its defeat, Germany would be offered by the victors the line Berlin-Baghdad, for which the Germany of William II fought in vain.

The authors state that "it is urgently necessary that the U.S.S.R., the United States, and the British Commonwealth should begin to understand each other more completely than they have done before, for these three, with China, are pillars upon which a new world system will be built." But that phrase is actually nothing but lip service paid to the customary war doctrine of the Allies. How then should the influence of the United States, of the British Commonwealth, and of China make itself felt in Europe?

It is obvious that if Germany should succeed after the Second World war in rebuilding its Lebensraum in Central Europe, and in paving a road to the Middle East, all these great Powers would have no access to the Continent of Europe except through Germany. The Continent would be divided between Soviet

Russia and Germany, no matter whether these two countries were to have a common frontier or not. The same state of things would prevail if a few puppet States were preserved in Central Europe under the pretence of federation.

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In the light of the considerations outlined above, it becomes quite clear why Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger want to leave Poland outside the federal structure of Europe. Within a Danubian, or any other federation established between Germany and Russia, between the Baltic and the Eastern Mediterranean, Poland would have a special part to play. It would not be a matter of "leadership," for Poland could not afford such aspirations, either economically or politically. It would be a position due to natural causes. Poland is situated in the centre of the area concerned, with an access to the sea and a favourable frontier with Czechoslovakia. It is the largest country of that region, both as to area and as to population. Together with Czechoslovakia, it would form a bloc of about 50,000,000 inhabitants, that is, about half of the population of the entire region. Both countries have a semi-agricultural and semi-industrial economy, with opportunities for further industrialisation. Both are strongly attached to their independence. Both belong to Western European civilisation. Both are determined to resist German pressure. Czechoslovakia and Poland, bound by close constitutional links, would be capable of providing the whole Central and South-Eastern European region with a basis of independence. The federation of that part of Europe, supported by a united Czechoslovak-Polish organism, would no longer be an open field for German penetration, or a German bridgehead for expansion in the Middle East.

Czechoslovakia alone, without Poland, could not fulfil these constructive duties within any federation. On the contrary, she would soon become the victim of political pressure and systematic economic degradation. It is in the interest of Germany to bring the whole of Central Europe down to the level of the Balkan countries. If the suggestions of the authors were adopted, the

realisation of the most ambitious German plans in Central Europe would be quite easy.

And what about Poland? The authors admit that her "heroic fight for independence" has earned her the right to be free. Translated into sober fact, it means that Poland would be rewarded by the amputation of the eastern half of the country, while the remaining portion would be completely surrounded on all sides by Germany or by countries under German control. In the north and east, Poland would still be neighboured by East Prussia, the latter being left in German hands. In the west, Germany would be Poland's neighbour, while in the south, Poland would adjoin the Danubian Federation, led by Austria and the Sudeten Germans. To complete the picture, we should add that this mutilated Poland would have a German noose tied round its neck: German extra-territorial railways and motor roads running across the Polish Pomerania, just as Hitler wanted them to run in 1939. The consolation prize offered by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger to Poland would be rich indeed: a "free zone" in Danzig and an "international guarantee" for Pomerania.

It is difficult to imagine that the authors, who are so eloquent in their apology of the *Grossraumwirtschaft* theory and so sceptical about the chances of survival of small sovereign States, could seriously believe that such a mutilated Poland could continue independent existence for a long time. It would be a country resembling Czechoslovakia after Munich. Its fate would certainly be identical with that of Czechoslovakia. According to the French proverb, hypocrisy is the homage paid by wickedness to virtue. In this case it is rather a concession to the current conception of political decorum. The whole reasoning followed by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger tends to show that Western Poland would soon fall into the lap of Germany like ripe fruit.

It is quite clear why they plan such a development. If Russia occupied the whole of Poland, her frontiers would reach so far west that they would cut into the flank of the German line of south-eastward expansion through the Danubian and Balkan Federations towards the Middle East. This would upset the German-Russian balance of power and give preponderance to Russia. It is therefore in the interest of Germany to keep Russia within the limits of Eastern Poland. That is why, eager to safe-

guard the interests of Germany, not those of Poland, Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger speak about the "independence" of Western Poland. Such a Western Poland would very soon be engulfed in the Lebensraum of the growing Fourth Reich. The line from Memel, through Brest, Przemysl, Bucharest, Burgas, runs straight south to the Near East.

The post-war structure of Europe as visualised by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger provides Germany not only with plenty of living space in the south-east of Europe and a doorway to the Middle East, but also with a splendid base for aggression for the Fourth Reich against the rest of Europe and of the world. The Third Reich took over the principles of the old pan-Germanism without any change. It professes the view that Providence, by placing the German Nation in the centre of Europe, entrusted it with the mission of creating a great empire embracing the whole European continent. The other nations have to be expelled, exterminated or Germanised. The Third Reich is making haste in the execution of this programme, for it realises that time is short. But there are in the world other people who are already aware of the fact that the Third Reich has lost the Second German War and who want to secure for the Fourth Reich all the vantage points and bases which the Third Reich has not had the time to exploit. These men simply desire to postpone the attainment of the war aims of the Third Reich until a more opportune moment. The same thing happened when, after its defeat in the first world war, the German Reich postponed the attainment of its aims for twenty years—the duration of the period of armistice which separated the two wars. It is obvious that Germany, even if it should be disarmed after the second world war, would still maintain a dominant position in Europe if its possibilities of eastward and southward expansion remained unchecked. It would still be larger than any other Continental country and stronger than the federation proposed by Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger. Were it to expand along the road to the Middle East and then engulf the remaining portion of Poland, a new bid for world domination would be the next stage.

What Power could oppose such a Germany? Not France, which tried in vain to keep Germany in check after the last war. Not Italy, which will certainly not be stronger after this war than

before. And not the smaller Western European nations, even if they are federated. Not Great Britain and the United States, which would have in such a case to acknowledge the fact that Continental Europe and Germany would be one and the same thing. In such conditions Germany would soon rebuild its war potential and apply again its time-honoured method: exploiting against Western Europe advantages obtained in the eastern part of the Continent.

Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger are so anxious to preserve the possibility of rebuilding German domination over the Continent that they candidly write: "Mr. Churchill has now specifically stated that the Atlantic Charter implies the disarmament of Germany, side by side with the elaboration of measures for Germany's economic recovery." It is important to define the meaning of the words "economic recovery," which may be varied and far-reaching.

The Atlantic Charter speaks about giving to all nations and to all people after the war an opportunity of fair living. Germany cannot be excluded from its benefits. But it does not mean at all that the German standard of living and economy should be restored on the morrow of the war to the level prevailing in 1939. This would be both impracticable and harmful. It would be impracticable because the entire German economy has been adapted for many years to war production, and the end of the war is bound to result in a powerful economic shock for Germany. According to current reports, over 65 per cent. of German production is destined for war. If the war continues much longer, that proportion may be further increased. At the conclusion of the war, the whole German economy will require a profound reconstruction. At the same time there will be political and economic changes in the countries surrounding Germany, especially in Central Europe, which cannot fail to influence German economy. It will not be a matter of returning to former conditions, but rather of establishing a new economic organisation of Germany, corresponding to the condition in which that country will find itself after its defeat in the Second World War.

A return to the *status quo* would be simply impossible. It would also be extremely harmful, for it would amount to rebuilding the economic power of Germany at the expense of the

victorious nations. It would mean the reconstruction of Germany at the expense of the countries ravaged and looted by the Germans. It would be a kind of compensation paid to the beaten German Reich for the failure of its second bid for world mastery. This compensation would provide the Germans with working capital which would enable them to prepare for a third attempt during the post-war period, which they would look upon as another armistice leading to a Third World War.

After the First World War, Germany obtained such working capital by illegal machinations. They obtained from the victorious Powers important loans, far exceeding the amount of reparations paid by Germany to the victims of its aggressions. The surplus money thus secured by Germany was used to prepare revenge. Now Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger, after the victory is won, would like to see the Allied Nations make legal concessions in favour of Germany *sub specie* of "economic recovery." These concessions would surely be exploited by Germany just as they were twenty odd years ago.

According to the Atlantic Charter and the declarations of American and British statesmen deriving from it, all the half-starved and exhausted people in Europe will be given prompt assistance, and economic collaboration, will be resumed between all countries without any discrimination. But Germany will find herself in a new position in respect to such collaboration, for she is bound to feel the consequences of a political collapse and an economic disaster caused by the distortion of her economy over a period of many years during which German industry worked exclusively for war.

* * *

Faced by the impending defeat of Germany, some circles apparently propose even before its downfall to plan such a scheme for the reorganisation of Europe as would soften the blow and make it easier for the Reich to stand the Second Great Armistice. After the last war, when appearances of revolution were organised—not without the collaboration of the Intelligence Service of the German General Staff—in order to save as much as possible from the disaster, some Germans were alarmed by the radical rites of the new *régime*. The better-informed Germans

calmed their fears by explaining that the Weimar Republic was not meant to be anything but a temporary *Auffangstellung*, designed to buttress the crumbling edifice of German power until the time when revenge would become a practical possibility.

Some circles now go a step further, proposing to prepare a similar *Auffangstellung* even outside the German Reich, by enlisting the help of the victorious Powers in reorganising Europe in accordance with such lofty ideals as equity, democracy, and self-determination. These catchwords served a similar purpose after the last war. They are by now veterans. They have been reinforced by new recruits: *Grossraumwirtschaft* and *Geopolitics*. These theories, born in Germany, have crossed all frontiers and penetrated into the camp of the United Nations, where they continue to serve the German cause in a subtle and dangerous way. They constitute an ideological fifth column. If these doctrines should influence the next Peace Conference, Germany would be the winner in this war, even though she would have been defeated in the field. If Hitler's plan of grabbing the whole world at one attempt should miscarry, the Germans would be satisfied if they received from the hands of the victorious Powers a convenient "geopolitical" position and help towards "economic recovery"—all that they require for waiting and preparing for the moment of the third decisive bid for world power.

* * *

That is the real meaning of the work of Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger. The tacit premises on which the whole logical structure of their book is founded is that the military defeat of the Third Reich should not affect in any way the dominant position of the German State in the Continent of Europe. The authors presumably desire the downfall of the Third Reich. But they desire at least as much to spare the German State any consequences of the Third Reich's defeat. Since it is obvious that the defeat of the Third Reich will also mean a fall for the German State and Nation, they want at least to prepare soft matting, which would absorb the shock and save Germany from bruises. That is the practical significance of all the recommendations of Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger.


In Bizet's famous opera "Arlesienne," the heroine never appears on the stage at all. The whole plot is woven around her. All kinds of characters sing about her in bass, baritone, tenor and soprano, sometimes in treble, but she is not to be seen.


Prof. Keeton's and Dr. Schlesinger's book is somewhat similar. It is a book about the splitting of Europe between Germany and Russia. All the changes and adjustments, all the "ethnographic" "economic" and other proposals are guided by that master motive. The main idea is to help a beaten Germany to win the peace. But little or nothing is said about Germany herself. The master plan is never openly declared. Bizet's opera at least names its heroine in the title. Prof. Keeton and Dr. Schlesinger have not even done that.

That is why I think that it would be advisable to change the title of the book to accord with its actual contents, and call it "How to Save Germany?"

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