

RUSSIA AND EUROPE;

OR,

THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

OF

THE PRESENT WAR.

BY

COUNT VALERIAN KRASINSKI,

AUTHOR OF

"THE HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION IN POLAND;" "PANSLAVISM AND GERMANISM;"  
"SKETCH OF THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE SLAVONIC NATIONS," ETC.

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M.DCCC.LIV.

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TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD DUDLEY COUTTS STUART, M.P.,

PRESIDENT OF THE

LITERARY ASSOCIATION OF THE FRIENDS OF POLAND;

AND

THE MEMBERS OF THAT SOCIETY,

WHICH HAS CONTINUED MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS STEADFASTLY TO

ADVOCATE THE RIGHTS OF INJURED POLAND, AND TO ALLEVIATE

THE SUFFERINGS OF HER EXILED CHILDREN,

*This Essay is Dedicated*

AS

AN EXPRESSION OF THE AUTHOR'S GRATITUDE AND RESPECT

EDINBURGH, *June* 1854.



## RUSSIA AND EUROPE.

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“Le patriotisme, la position et les ressources de l'empire repondent à tout; qu'on les evoque—qu'on les fasse valoir avec ordre et de la maniere dont ils doivent etre employés—et la politique finira de nous offrir des problemes.”—*Depeche du Comte Pozzo di Borgo, adressée au Comte Nesselrode, le 28 Novembre 1828.*

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By the first article of the treaty of alliance, concluded on the 10th of April of this year 1854, the high contracting powers have pledged themselves to effect the restoration of peace on a solid and durable basis, and to secure Europe against the recurrence of the deplorable complications which have disturbed its peace.

These objects cannot, however, be obtained without effecting a material change of the circumstances which have brought about the above-mentioned complications; consequently it cannot be admitted for a moment that a peace between the allied powers and Russia could ever be negotiated on the principle of the *status quo ante bellum*. It would be indeed throwing away, without any advantage whatever, all the sacrifices which the present war is imposing upon the allied powers, and perpetuating a state of things which it is precisely the object of this war to remove. In such a case the war in question would be not only useless, but even injurious, to the interests of Europe, because it would make Russia only postpone her projects of aggression to another time and more favourable circumstances than the present, and give her the conviction

that she may with impunity disturb the peace of Europe and its security, whenever she may choose to do it. To admit the possibility of such a case, therefore, would be nothing less than to accuse the Governments of Great Britain and France of being capable of breaking their most solemn pledges, and committing an act tantamount to that of high treason against their respective countries. This supposition must consequently be dismissed at once as entirely inadmissible.

The object of the present war,—*i. e.*, the establishment of the peace and security of Europe on a solid and permanent foundation,—cannot, therefore, be attained except by reducing the material power of Russia in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of her continuing those schemes of aggrandisement which she has been pursuing, with as much perseverance as success, since the accession of Peter the Great, and which have brought about those very deplorable complications, the recurrence of which it is the object of the present Anglo-French alliance to prevent.

It is almost superfluous to observe that this reduction of the material power of Russia cannot be effected otherwise than by wresting from her a part of the territory which she has, at different periods, appropriated to herself. A change in the map of Eastern Europe and Western Asia is thus indispensable and inevitable, though, considering the extreme gravity of the subject, many people postpone its discussion until circumstances render any farther delay impossible. I however think that it is precisely the momentousness of a question, in the solution of which the whole of Europe is more or less directly interested, that should induce the public thoroughly to examine and sift that question in all its bearings, because nothing can more facilitate its satisfactory solution than a universal knowledge of its real nature. This consideration has induced me to contribute, in the shape

of this essay, my mite towards the accomplishment of this object; and if the views and opinions which I am now to express should be proved, by abler writers than my humble self, to be incorrect, the cause of truth cannot but gain by a discussion which serves to elucidate a question of such magnitude as that upon which I have now ventured to enter.

I think that it may be taken for granted that the united forces of the allied powers will soon capture or destroy the fleets of Russia in the Baltic as well as in the Black Sea,—dismantle her maritime strongholds,—wrest from her, and restore to Sweden, Finland and the Aland islands,—expel her from the country south of the Caucasus, as well as Crimea,—and compel her armies to retire, not only beyond the Pruth, but even beyond the Dniester. Well, this certainly will be a great humiliation to the power of Russia; and it is by no means improbable that, considering the exhaustion of her resources, and the general discontent of her inhabitants, naturally produced by an enormous military conscription, a heavy taxation, and payments in kind, the Tzar may be induced to sue for peace, resigning the territories wrested from him by the allied powers, and submitting to the payment of a large contribution, as an indemnity for the expense of war, which, undoubtedly, must be a *conditio sine qua non* of every negotiation of peace between Russia and the Allies, and which, considering the rapid increase of specie, he may effect without great difficulty, by contracting a loan with foreign capitalists. Such a contingency may arise in a few months hence; and there can be little doubt that, should this be the case, there will be a great number of people, here as well as in France, who would hail with the greatest joy such a proposition of Russia, proclaim it as a brilliant triumph and a most fortunate event to the allied powers, and employ all their influence in order to

bring about the conclusion of peace on terms so favourable, according to their opinion.

Now let us examine what would be the real consequences to Russia of a peace concluded on the terms alluded to above. Would it materially weaken Russia, or only impose upon her a temporary check which she could easily repair? Would it not be humiliating Russia without crippling her power, and irritating her national feeling without depriving her of the means of revenge? It cannot be doubted that the loss of the trans-Caucasian provinces, Crimea, and Finland, as well as that of her navy, would produce a check on the progress of Russian dominion, in the direction of Persia and Turkey, and to her influence in the Scandinavian kingdoms as well as Germany; but I think that, instead of permanently arresting the progress of her conquest and influence, it would produce only a very temporary suspension of both, because I am convinced that, by a proper attention to her internal administration, she may easily repair her losses, and, taught by severe experience, gain in many respects a real strength, where she has now only an appearance of it.

It is well known that the efforts which Russia has been making, for more than half a century, to establish her dominion beyond the Caucasus, have been attended by an immense sacrifice of men and money; and it is an admitted fact, that the war which she has been prosecuting for many years against the Caucasian mountaineers cost her annually, in round numbers, twenty thousand men and twenty millions of roubles or francs. It is also well known that her efforts to create a formidable navy have been the cause of an immense but useless expenditure, which might have been employed with great advantage for the promotion of various branches of national wealth and power, and which are now neglected, for want of the necessary funds to promote them. The advantages which Russia might

have derived, for the furtherance of her schemes, from the possession of the trans-Caucasian provinces, as well as from that of a large naval force, were only prospective, whilst the drain created by them on her exchequer was an actual injury, arresting the progress of the vast but undeveloped resources of that country.

The great mistake which Russia committed in the pursuit of her schemes of aggrandisement,—that which, as the present events seem to prove, has rendered her power more apparent than real,—is, I believe, that instead of preparing for her external increase by the development of her internal resources, she commenced by the former instead of the latter, or to use a homely expression, she began at the wrong end. Hence the weakness of her position in many conquered provinces, the inefficiency of her naval armaments, and the wretched state of her internal administration. These premature external developments of Russia may be perhaps not inaptly compared to the parasite offshoots of a tree, which, absorbing its sap, prevent the trunk from acquiring a vigorous growth, and are usually on this account lopped off by the gardener. There are many such branches on the Russian tree, but the most prominent of them are undoubtedly her trans-Caucasian provinces and her fleet, which no country can create in an efficient manner if it be not preceded by the vigorous development of a mercantile navy. The truth of these circumstances has probably flashed more than once on the minds of the monarchs and statesmen of Russia; but they were too deeply committed in the pursuit of this line of policy to have the moral courage, or perhaps even the possibility to retrace their steps by voluntarily abandoning the schemes which they had been so diligently prosecuting, but which, under a show of strength, were often a source of real weakness to the empire. This service, which Russia would have probably never obtained from her

own government, will be rendered to her by an external storm, if it be allowed to pass, after having bruised the extremities of the giant, without impairing his real strength; and this will be precisely the case if Russia is permitted to obtain peace on the conditions which I have mentioned above.

The history of all ages shows that reforms the most salutary and the most rational, were often, in spite of their most evident and pressing necessity, not only neglected, but positively resisted, until they were forced upon a reluctant country or nation by the pressure of some extraordinary circumstances; and that they produced such beneficial consequences, that what had appeared to be the direst calamity, menacing a state with complete dissolution, proved in the end to be its greatest blessing, by having compelled it to introduce the above-mentioned reforms. Volumes could be written on this subject, but I shall content myself with quoting the example of Prussia, whose fearful disasters in 1806-7, which had nearly annihilated her existence as a state, inflicting countless miseries upon her inhabitants, proved finally a powerful cause of her national regeneration. And, indeed, it was entirely owing to the important and thoroughgoing reforms which were introduced after the peace of Tilsit, by Stein and other patriots of his school, that the Prussian armies displayed in 1813 such a noble contrast with their wretched campaign of 1806; and I think there can be little doubt, that had these reforms been fully and consistently developed into a constitutional regime, Prussia would have been now virtually in the possession of a popular dominion over all Germany. As an additional illustration of this same truth I may also mention the terrible famine which desolated Ireland in 1846, and which, though it caused many and great individual sufferings, has given a new impulse to that much-tried country, and it is now

advancing towards a state of prosperity unknown in its annals. But it is needless to multiply examples of this kind, in order to prove that a check on the external progress of Russia, which does not affect her vital strength, will only give a new impulse to her energies, and a better direction to their development, without modifying in the least her ambitious schemes. The only difference will be, that instead of continuing the line of policy which she has hitherto followed, she will endeavour to attain the same ends as before by a slower but surer process, namely, by preparing the way for her external progress by the internal development of her resources, and which will enable her to resume her schemes of conquest under more favourable circumstances than those under which she has begun the present war. This subject requires a practical illustration, however, which I shall try to give to my readers in as brief and clear a manner as possible.

Supposing Russia, being compelled thereto by the alliance of the principal powers of Europe, to sue for peace, and obtain it on the terms to which I have alluded on p. 7, *i. e.*, the resignation of the trans-Caucasian provinces, Crimea, Bessarabia, and Finland, with the Aland islands, and the payment of an indemnity for the expenses of the war, amounting to a very considerable sum, say one thousand millions of francs, or forty millions of pounds sterling,—which is by no means an immoderate supposition,—whilst her navy would be entirely lost, her maritime strongholds destroyed, and even her modern capital, St Petersburg, converted into a heap of ruins. Heavy and humiliating as such losses will be to Russia, they might be soon repaired, because they will by no means affect her real strength, if she be allowed to retain all her remaining territory, and particularly her western provinces. It is true, she may find herself in a state of great weakness,

by the exhaustion of her resources, and consequent diminution of her finances, saddled, moreover, by a heavy debt, rendered doubly galling by its being created by the payment of an indemnity to her adversaries. Yet this state of things must immediately bring about a complete change of policy in the Russian cabinet, which, once convinced of the impossibility of prosecuting its former schemes with its existing means, will direct all its energies in order to repair the losses, alluded to above, by a vigorous reform of the finances and internal administration of the country. All this may be done much more easily than is generally supposed, because the material resources of Russia are immense, and may be rapidly developed by a proper organization of the means required for this object. Thus, for instance, the revenue of the Russian customs, which, under an absurdly prohibitive system, amounts to five millions pounds sterling, may be, according to the best authorities on this subject, trebled by the adoption of a liberal tariff. The vast sums which have hitherto been uselessly spent upon the maintenance of the trans-Caucasian provinces, the fleet, naval arsenals, &c., may be employed with great advantage for various improvements, but particularly for the establishment of internal communications, which are of the most vital importance to the advance of Russia. Indeed, the great bar to the rapid development of the resources of that country, and the increase of its national wealth, is the very deficient condition of its internal communications. There are, it is true, some large navigable rivers, as the Volga, the Dnieper, the Duna, the Don, &c.; but immense tracts of land intervene between those rivers, whilst the canals, except those which unite the Volga with the Neva, and that which unites the Dnieper with the Vistula, and which was constructed under the Polish regime, are not worth naming. The greatest part of internal transport is, therefore,

effected by land carriage, on wretched roads, in summer, and with some more facility in sledges during the winter. The difference in price of various of the first necessaries, but particularly corn, caused by this want of communication, in districts situated at a distance of about three or four hundred miles, is sometimes as great as two or even three hundred per cent.; and whilst agricultural produce cannot be sold at a remunerative price in one of those districts, the inhabitants of another are literally starving. The same want of communication is the cause that many sources of national wealth,—as mines, forests, &c.,—which would be exceedingly profitable if their produce could be exported, give their owners no other advantage than a few articles for their own consumption, or are not worked at all. This great defect may now be easily remedied by the construction of railways, which may be done in Russia at an infinitely less cost than in any other part of Europe, because hardly any other expense will be required than the price of rails and the cost of laying them down. It may be objected, that Russia is in want of capital, and, being still more impoverished by the present war, she will not be able to enter with vigour on such undertakings as the construction of railways, &c. To this I answer, that if Russia once assumes the mask of a peaceful policy, and direct all her energies to the development of her internal resources, all the potentates of the Exchange of London, as well as of those of other commercial places, will be in perfect ecstasies about the wisdom, morality, and I don't know what, of the Russian Government, and will offer it as much money as it may require, without any regard to the dangers which may one day accrue to their own countries from the power of Russia, which they will be thus helping to increase; and, indeed, though some few less shortsighted individuals will foresee the conse-

quences of this solid growth of Russian power, the great proportion of people will understand, not the distant danger which may threaten their country from that quarter, but only the immediate advantage of getting a good percentage for their money. It may be also said, that the corruption of the Russian *employés*, who make every undertaking of the government the object of the most shameless jobbing and embezzlement, will greatly impede the progress of such improvements as the construction of railways, &c., rendering them not only extravagantly expensive, but also badly executed. This defect, which is undoubtedly one of the greatest curses of the Russian government, may be, however, obviated, at least to a considerable degree, and the principal parts of Russia covered with a net of railways by a very simple process, namely, by concluding contracts with English companies, who would undertake the construction of these railways, receiving payment, not in ready money, of which Russia is in want, but in stock, bearing, say five per cent., and which, considering the rapid increase of specie, these companies will have no difficulty in disposing of to advantage.\* Such a measure may not only rapidly promote the development of the internal resources of Russia, but also her external interests, by creating to her many friends in other countries,—for such, undoubtedly, will be all the holders of her stock, to whom the regular payment of their dividends must be a greater and nearer cause of anxiety than the danger by which even the most vital interests of their own country may be threatened by the growth of the Russian power.

The construction of railways, which has benefited every country where it has taken place, will produce a complete

\* The author of this treatise has been informed, from a very good source, that about seventy millions of pounds sterling will be required for uniting the principal parts of Russia with a net of railways. Can Russia have any great difficulty in obtaining this sum in the manner described in the text?

revolution in Russia, by giving a new impulse to the vast, manifold, but still very imperfectly developed resources of that country, and consequently produce a very great increase of national wealth, whilst it must immensely strengthen the power of the Government, whose action is often rendered inefficient by the enormous distances which separate the greatest part of the Russian towns and provinces from its central seat. It will also facilitate the movement of the troops beyond every comparison with the manner in which it is at present effected.\*

The civil administration of Russia, which is now truly wretched, may be greatly improved, if the Government will pay to it that attention, which is now almost entirely absorbed by military affairs, and particularly by raising the civil functionaries in the public estimation, so as to induce men of rank and property to enter this branch of public service, which many of them consider now almost a degradation. The serfage, which is now a great obstacle to the moral as well as material progress of Russia, may be abolished, I think, without much difficulty, if the Government once earnestly sets its heart to it, as is proved by the Baltic provinces, where the peasantry were emancipated under the reign of the Emperor Alexander. And, indeed, the general excitement which the continual appeals of the Emperor to his nation must produce, on a people so little accustomed to this kind of treatment as the Russians, cannot but powerfully promote the development of the national energies, and greatly contribute to an increase of real strength to Russia.†

\* It has been calculated by the military authorities of Russia, that a corps of fifty thousand men may be transported on a railway in waggons purposely constructed for this object, *in one week*, over the same distance which now requires *three months'* march. The advantages of this new mode of transport, consist not only in the saving of time, but also in that of expense, fatigue to men and horses, whilst much trouble and oppression will be spared to the inhabitants of the country through which the troops march.

† I am greatly confirmed in the opinions expressed in the text by the

It may therefore be concluded, that Russia, in pursuing the line of policy alluded to above, during a quarter of a century, which, though a considerable period in the life of an individual, is but a moment in that of a nation, may not only repair the losses sustained by her during the present war, but increase her resources, and consequently her real power, far beyond what they are at present.

“Well, so much the better,” many of my readers will probably say. “Let Russia advance in the career of improvement as rapidly as she may, and good speed to her! The richer she grows, the better customer she will be for our produce as well as for our unemployed capital: the cause of humanity cannot but gain by the advance which a nation is making from barbarity to civilization.”

Yes, indeed, it would do so, if this progress were employed for the promotion of human happiness, founded upon peace and rational liberty, and not for that of dominion and conquest. The reforms of Peter the Great, by which that half-savage genius forced the Western civilization upon his reluctant Muscovites, were the theme of the most exaggerated praises, and often the object of a sincere admiration, to some of the most accomplished writers of Western Europe, who extolled his reign as having inaugurated a new era of civilization to a large portion of mankind. But what were the consequences of this civilization to Europe, and which it began to experience from the time of that reformer himself and continues to our own days? Has that uninterrupted progress of Russian conquest and influence in

following fact, the importance of which will be appreciated only by those who are well acquainted with Russia. It is well known that all the promotion in the military as well as civil service, is reserved in that country to the privileged class, or the *nobles*, whilst the other classes, as merchants and burghers, cannot obtain promotion in either of these services, except by submitting to some very onerous conditions. This barrier has now been virtually broken down by an imperial *ukase*, published about a couple of months ago, and ordering that the pupils of the commercial schools should be received into the public service on equal terms with the nobles.

the East, West, and South, been productive of happiness or misery, of moral elevation or degradation, to those by whom it has been felt, though Russia has been, during all this time, not a bad customer to the produce of Western Europe, and a not unprofitable field for the employment of its capital, as well as for the talents of many of its adventurous children? The results of an internal progress of Russia, such as I have pointed out above, will be nothing else than a farther development of those effects which the civilization of Russia by Peter the Great has brought upon her neighbours; because Russia may suspend, but never abandon, her projects of aggrandizement, which have become, in some respects, a national instinct, replacing all other political feelings and aspirations, with the great mass of the Russian people; and this sentiment is so strong, that even the most civilised and liberal Russians are not free from its influence.\* Justice must be rendered to the Russian, that however he may be corrupted by the influence of the degrading absolutism under which his country has groaned, for so many centuries, he has a strong national feeling, and the poorest and most oppressed boor exults in the idea that his Tzar is dreaded by the whole world, and identifies himself with this glory of his Autocrat. And, indeed, long before Peter the Great, when Muscovy was considered, in many parts of Europe, not much better than is now Bokhara, or any other petty state of the East, the ambassadors of that country, who were literally prostrating themselves before their own monarch, behaved often abroad with a most in-

\* Thus, for instance, Mr S. Tourgheneff, a man of great information and talent, author of the "Theory of Taxation," (the most liberal work that has ever been published in Russia), and who, after having occupied a high office in his country, is now an exile for his liberal opinions, strongly advocates the union of the Slavonic provinces of Turkey with Russia, in a work written with evident sincerity and full of noble and liberal sentiments. *Vid.* his "La Russie et les Russes," 1847, chaps. ii. and iii.



solent and overbearing pride. Even now, many a Russian who is civilised enough to feel the galling yoke of his despotic government, seeks compensation for his slavery at home, by playing the *civis Romanus sum* in several parts of Europe. The humiliation to which Russia must be subjected by a peace concluded on such terms as those which I have mentioned on p. 7, will therefore be felt, not only by her Government, but also by all classes of her inhabitants; because, whilst other nations may be consoled for their want of political significance, by their eminence in art or science, the advanced state of their civilization, the beauty of their climate, or at least the past glories of their ancestors, the national pride of the Russians will lose its only source of gratification,—the political predominance of their country over others,—and which they had hitherto believed to be immense. The following sketch of the political character of the Russians was drawn by the Marquis de Custine, and though it may appear to be painted with too glowing colours, its truth will not be denied by those who are well acquainted with this subject:—

“An immense, boundless ambition, one of those ambitions that can only animate the soul of the oppressed, and derive its aliment from the misfortunes of a whole nation, ferments in the hearts of the Russian people. This nation, essentially a conquering one, greedy through its privations, expiates beforehand, by a degrading submission at home, the hope which it entertains to tyrannise one day over other nations. The glory and riches which the Russians expect make them forget their present state of ignominy; and in order to cleanse himself of the effects of an impious sacrifice of every kind of public and personal liberty, the kneeling slave dreams about the dominion of the world.

“It is not the man who is worshipped in the person of

the Emperor Nicholas, it is the ambitious master of a nation still more ambitious than himself. The passions of the Russians are moulded on the pattern of those of the ancient nations; every thing amongst them reminds us of the Old Testament; their hopes and their sufferings are as great as their empire.

“There is no limit to any thing in Russia,—neither to sufferings nor rewards,—neither to sacrifices nor hopes. The power of the Russians may become enormous, but they will have purchased it at the price which the nations of Asia pay for the fixity of their governments—at the price of happiness.

“Russia looks upon Europe as upon a prey which, sooner or later, will be delivered to her grasp by our dissensions. She foments anarchy amongst us with the hope of profiting by our corruption, which she promotes because it is favourable to her views. It is the history of Poland recommenced on a great scale. Paris has read, for many years, revolutionary journals paid by Russia. ‘Europe,’ say people at St Petersburg, ‘is now entering the same road which Poland had followed; she weakens herself by a vain liberalism, whilst we remain powerful precisely because we are not free. Let us have patience under our yoke; we shall one day make the other nations pay for our degradation.’” \*

Now, what is to become of the Russians if all these hopes of their future national greatness are to be extinguished, and the present state of their internal, political, and social degradation press upon their minds in all its naked reality? Can it but produce a deep and universal irritation, which must result either in an internal revolution, or find its vent in a settled and violent hostility against those nations who will have put a check, by the present war,

\* *La Russie en 1839*, par le Marquis de Custine. Book xxxvi.

to the bold aspirations of these ambitious slaves? \* This feeling will not only be kept up, but continually increased, by a skilful action of the government, in order to prevent

\* As a specimen of the Russian feeling to which I allude in the text, I may quote the following passage from a pamphlet recently published at Edinburgh, by a Russian of rank, who has received an entire Western education, had studied at the University of Edinburgh, and had enjoyed a friendly intercourse with the most eminent characters of that learned body, leaving, with all those who had known him, a most favourable impression of his personal character and talents. His opinion, therefore, must be considered as an expression of that entertained by the most enlightened portion of Russian society. He says—(in a pamphlet recently published by him in this country, and entitled, “An Appeal on the Eastern Question to the Senatus Academicus of the Royal College of Edinburgh, by a Russian, Quondam Civis Bibliothecæ Edinensis. Edinburgh: T. C. Jack; London: Hamilton, Adams, & Co.”)—in speaking of the war between Russia and the Western Powers, which, though impending, was then not yet declared:—“One of the two must yield, but it must be the side of two to one, else chivalry is extinct as well as justice. We are one to two, and yield we will not, no more than we did when the first Napoleon came upon us, dragging all Europe, excepting you, at his tail. He crossed the Niemen, and deluged our fields with our blood and that of his own soldiers, the one not much more precious in his eyes than the other. Our old capital was destroyed, and still we were not tamed. He paid old scores at last at Paris. But here, you may say, the parallel between 1812 and 1854 ends, for there is no chance of the Muscovite ever pitching his tent in Hyde Park. But, let me ask, is it only because you are, or fancy yourselves to be, safe from reprisals, that you refrain from unprovoked offence? Between Portsmouth and St Petersburg there is nothing to hinder you on your forward and backward course; no Smolensk, no Borodino, no Mali Yaroslawetz, no Berezhina. Denmark and Sweden have stipulated in good time that they were to receive no blows from either side. Other neutral powers will probably come to the winning side; and they withhold as yet for a moment the assistance you may receive at their hands a little later. You will therefore have nothing but what you style our rotten bottoms on your way. Supposing, for argument’s sake, that even they will have vanished from the Baltic, that the batteries of Cronstadt will have been deserted, and their cannon silent; with a fair wind and your steam up, you will then show the Royal Jack to the Neva, and moor your ships in the midst of St Petersburg. Beware, however, lest your broadsides be fired until you will have passed the second bridge, for till then you have in sight the English Quay,—that quay on which the Thompsons and Bonnars, the Cattleys, the Andersons, and Maberleys, have had their counting-houses almost from the day when, in a good or evil hour, Peter the First founded his new capital. With these men we have dealt and shaken hands, transacted business, and

its degenerating into a revolutionary spirit dangerous to the internal security of the state, as well as for facilitating its foreign schemes, which Russia will resume with ampler means than she has now, when a proper time for reconquering her lost position arrives. Russia has, indeed, given sufficient proofs that she knows how to bide her time, but never abandons her projects.

It has been observed in an article in the "Quarterly Review," March 1842, evidently written by one thoroughly acquainted with his subject, that the principal object of the Russian Government is to furnish its army with as many recruits as possible. The same line of policy will be continued, with only this difference, that, taught by experience, this Government will do it in a more rational, and consequently more efficient, manner than before.

There is one very important circumstance peculiar to our age, which must produce a very great influence on the respective position which is now occupied in Europe by the Slavonic and Germanic populations, but which I do not think has as yet attracted the attention of any political writer,—I mean, the emigration which is now going on from various parts of Western Europe, at an yearly increasing rate. This popular movement, which, considering the rapid increase of the facilities of transport, will, in all human probability, continue in a progressive ratio for many years to come, must produce, at no distant date, consequences of a more momentous nature than those which have ever been brought about by a political revolution. The influence of this circumstance will be particularly felt by Germany, whose inhabitants are perhaps

been friends. No matter that to you ; yet must property of your countrymen remain unharmed ; and farther up the stream your cannon will have walls enough to demolish. Supposing that work prosperously achieved, you will then probably turn your ships westwards lest they be locked in by the ice. What will you have gained ? A city destroyed, and the energies of a whole nation bent on waiting patiently but sturdily for the hour of vengeance."

generally less attached to their native soil than those of any other country. No nation in the world leaves, perhaps, with less reluctance than the Germans do their own homes, in order to better their fortunes in a more or less distant foreign clime; and the industry and thriftiness which are the characteristic qualities of this nation causes them generally to prosper in their new settlements. Now, it is well known that the emigration to America and Australia from various parts of Germany is annually increasing; and as there is little doubt that it will continue going on in the same manner, it must finally, if not diminish the population of that country, render it stationary, or, at all events, greatly limit its increase. The social advantages of this emigration are undoubtedly very great; but it is attended, I think, with a considerable, though distant, political danger,—and which it is now my object to point out to the statesmen of Europe. The migratory movement to which I have alluded, and which already begins to produce such a material influence upon Western Europe, but particularly on the Germanic nation, has no effect on the Slavonians, who constitute the great bulk of the population of Eastern Europe. A Slavonian leaves not voluntarily his home, however homely it may be, in order to better his fortunes, like a German, under another sky. He is fixed in his native soil, like the trees that grow upon it, and is only removed by the violent hand of an external agency which he is unable to resist, and the operation of which frequently proves fatal to him.\* The countries inhabited by the Slavonic race are generally still so little cultivated, that long years must elapse before the inconve-

\* It is an admitted fact, that amongst the diseases which decimate the Russian army, *nostalgia* occupies a prominent place, and produces great havoc, particularly amongst recruits. The Russian peasants travel often great distances as carriers, and in search of profitable employment, but they continually revisit their homes.

niences of an over-population will be felt in them. The manners of the Slavonian are patriarchal; his family ties are much stronger and more extended than those of the Western nations. The accents of his native language have an almost magic power over him, and he is never happy except when he can hear them. His attachment to his language is perhaps even stronger than that to his soil; and this has induced an eminent German writer of our day, who is well acquainted with the Slavonians, to say,—“The patriotism of the Slavonians is not attached to the soil: they are kept together by one powerful bond,—by the bond of their language, which is as supple and as pliant as the nations who speak it.”\* It is so indeed, because the language represents to the Slavonian his race, which is to him a living country, of which he is himself an integral part, and has, consequently, stronger claims upon his affection than the dead soil upon which he was accidentally born. The bond which, as Bodenstedt has justly observed, “keeps the Slavonians together,” is, though “supple and pliant,” powerful indeed, and may bear, without breaking, a great amount of tension; because, whilst a German becomes a Russian in Russia, a Frenchman in France, &c., adopting the nationality of the country where he settles, a Slavonian, however distantly removed from his own country, instinctively remains faithful to his nationality; and what the late lamented Sir Robert Peel has so truly said of the Poles, “*Cælum non animum mutant*,” is applicable to all the Slavonians. †

\* Bodenstedt, now Professor of Eastern Languages at the University of Gottingen, who has remained a considerable time in Russia, and published some valuable works on that country. The passage in the text is extracted from an article inserted by him in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 11th May 1848, and entitled, “Slaven und Germanen.”

† There are, undoubtedly, some few Slavonians who feel themselves quite at home in Western Europe. These are, however, exceptions from the general rule, and mere drops in the ocean.

In describing the difference between the Slavonian and German national character, I have no intention to judge about their respective merits or demerits: my object is simply to state a fact, and to point out its consequences. The truth of my statement may be easily ascertained by comparing the list of various nations who immigrate every year into the territory of the United States of America, and amongst whom the Slavonians form an almost imperceptible item; and even this small portion of Slavonic nationality is chiefly represented by the Poles, who had been driven from their country by political commotions.\*

Now, I would most earnestly request all statesmen of Europe, who look somewhat farther than the next day or year, and whose policy is not founded on the selfish maxim, *Après moi le deluge*, seriously to consider what must be the necessary, nay, the inevitable, consequences of this state of things;—what must be the result, say in half a century, of the constant increase of the Slavonic population, whilst the Germanic one will remain in Europe either stationary, or advance at a much slower rate than its Eastern neighbours. Must not this give the Slavonians an immense numerical preponderance over the Germans? and will not such a preponderance naturally lead to one of a political nature? And who will be the representative of this numerical as well as political preponderance, if not Russia, who has already under her dominion more than three-fourths of the whole Slavonic race? †

I have endeavoured to trace the internal and external relations of the Slavonians in other writings, to which I must refer those who wish more ample information on this

\* Whilst these sheets were passing through the press, I read a strong confirmation of what I have said in the text, in a letter from Posen, inserted in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 7th June, which states that a considerable emigration to America is going on from that province, and that it is entirely composed of Germans, whilst not a single Pole has joined it.

† According to the Slavonic Ethnography of Szaffarik, who is considered

subject.\* I shall here only state, that it is a fact, acknowledged by the most competent authorities, that the numerous sections of the Slavonic race, though greatly modified by the differences of religion, form of government, climate, and various local circumstances, form, in all their essential characteristics, one and the same nation, speaking dialects of a common mother-tongue so nearly connected amongst themselves, that the inhabitants of the shores of the Adriatic can freely converse with those of the icy regions of the White Sea. The national aspirations, sympathies, and antipathies of this race, have recently developed themselves with great vigour; and the intensity of those feelings, which are not the produce of any fortuitous and momentary circumstances, but have their cause in the very nature of things, have been strengthened rather than

to be the greatest living Slavonic authority, the number of Slavonians in 1842 was as follows:—

Under Russia,	53,502,000
„ Austria,	16,791,000
„ Turkey,	6,100,000
„ Prussia,	2,108,000
„ Republic of Cracow, since united with Austria,	130,000
„ Saxony,	60,000
Total,	78,691,000

With regard to their religious persuasion, there were, according to the same authority, belonging

To the Eastern or Greek Church,	54,011,000
„ Roman Catholic,	19,359,000
„ Greek united with Rome,	2,990,000
„ Protestants,	1,531,000
„ Mahometans,	800,000

\* 1. "Panslavism and Germanism," Newby, London, 1848;—translated into German by W. Lindau, entitled, "Slaventhum und Deutschthum," Arnold, Dresden, 1848;—and in Danish, published in a series of *feuilletons* in the "Faedrelandet" for May 1849. 2. "Sketch of the Religious History of the Slavonic Nations;" Edinburgh, Johnstone and Hunter; London, Theobald: 1851. Two French translations of this work simultaneously appeared in 1853: one revised by the author, and illustrated with many etchings, published by Cherbuillez, Geneva and Paris, and the other published by Freres Granier, Paris. 3. "Montenegro and the Turkish Slavonians," published in the "Railway Library," by Chapman and Hall, London, 1853.

weakened by the events of these last years, which have damped so many hopes and aspirations of a purely political nature.

Russia is fully aware of the advantages which she may derive from these circumstances; but her policy in this respect has hitherto been very undecided, and she evidently avoided to give, in this respect, umbrage to Austria. She cajoled, by marks of distinction, the most celebrated Slavonic writers of other countries; she established chairs of Slavonic literature in her universities, which bestow the same academical honours in that special branch of learning, as is done in divinity, law, and medicine: but she jealously watched and severely repressed all tendencies towards the same object independent of the Government, probably fearing, and not without some reason, that they might assume a revolutionary character. The Slavonic or Panslavonic party, whose object is to unite into one whole all the branches of the Slavonic race, and give it thereby a preponderance over all other races, is, however, continually growing in Russia, particularly amongst the younger generation; and the Grand Duke Constantine, the second and favourite son of the Emperor Nicholas, generally considered a talented and ambitious youth, is said to be the head of that party. The idea of Panslavism\* is entertained by many Slavonians out of the

\* The origin of Panslavism is of a purely literary character. It was started by Kollar, a Protestant clergyman of the Slavonic congregation at Pesth, in Hungary, recently deceased, and who enjoys considerable reputation as a poet in the Bohemian language. He proposed, in some writings published with this object, to establish a literary reciprocity amongst all the Slavonians; that is to say, that every educated Slavonian should be conversant with the languages and literature of the principal branches of their common stock, and that the Slavonic literati should possess a thorough knowledge of all the dialects and subdialects of their race. He proved, at the same time, that the various Slavonic dialects did not differ amongst themselves more than was the case with the four principal dialects of Ancient Greece (the Attic, Ionic, Eolian, and Dorian), and that the authors who wrote in those four dialects were, notwithstanding this difference,

Russian empire, who, having despaired of ever obtaining from their Governments the recognition of the full rights of their nationality, are becoming every day more and more inclined to merge their national individuality in the

equally considered as Greek, and their productions as the common property and glory of all Greece, and not as exclusively belonging to the population in whose dialect they were composed. If such a division of their language into several dialects did not prevent the Greeks from creating the most splendid literature of the world, why should the same cause act as an impediment to the Slavonians in obtaining a similar result? The advantages which all the Slavonic nations might derive from the establishment of such a reciprocity are certainly very great, because it could not but give a considerable extension to the literature of all the Slavonic nations, and at the same time greatly raise the intrinsic worth of their productions, as it would afford the authors a wider field for the spread of their fame, and a better chance for the remuneration of their labours.

About the time when Kollar began to advocate the establishment of a literary connection between all the Slavonians, another Bohemian writer, who has now acquired, by his researches on the ancient Slavonic history, a European reputation,—Szaffarik,—published a sketch of all the Slavonic languages and their literature. This work, published also in German, powerfully assisted the object promoted by Kollar, as the Slavonians perceived, by means of this publication, with joy and amazement, their own importance as a whole race; and this fact could no longer be questioned by other nations, who became acquainted with it through the medium of the same work.

Kollar's proposition, supported by Szaffarik's work, found a ready echo amongst all the scholars of the Slavonic nations. The study of cognate languages and their literature becomes daily more and more general amongst all those nations; and already, at this moment, few, if any, Slavonic writers of any merit are unacquainted with the languages and literature of the sister branches of their common race.

This is the origin of what is called Panslavism, and which was originally intended only as a literary connection between all the Slavonic nations. But, was it possible that this originally purely intellectual movement should not assume a political tendency? And was it not a natural consequence, that the different nations of the same race, striving to raise their literary significance by uniting their separate efforts, should not arrive, by a common process of reasoning, at the idea and desire of acquiring a political importance, by uniting their whole race into one powerful empire or confederation, which would insure to the Slavonians a decided preponderance over the affairs of Europe? This idea is gaining ground every day more and more, particularly amongst those Slavonic nations who, having no political existence of their own, have every thing to gain and nothing to lose by its realization.

unity of their race, and to seek compensation for such a sacrifice in the dazzling, though perhaps delusive, prospects of a Panslavonic empire.

The system of the Russian government, particularly since the accession of the present Emperor, has been to carry out, through the employment of mere force, its schemes of consolidation, by amalgamating into one whole the more or less heterogeneous nationalities of its empire. Its defeat and humiliation, by a treaty similar to that which I have described on p. 7, will undoubtedly induce it to adopt a wiser policy also in this respect; and, instead of *Russianism*, which is the form into which it has hitherto tried to mould all those nationalities, it will employ *Slavonism*, by means of which it may easily accomplish what could not be obtained by great and persevering efforts, accompanied with many atrocious acts of violence. It will be something very like what was done in this country in amalgamating Scotland with England, by substituting for their separate names that of Great Britain, which could be accepted by both of these countries without any offence to their national feeling. Russia may employ this policy with great effect towards the Poles, who have strenuously resisted all the efforts which have been made to convert them into Russians, but who cannot deny that they are Slavonians. I repeat, however, now, what I said six years ago, namely, that "the Poles will not enter into such a combination (a cordial union with the Russians under the common name of Slavonians) as long as they retain a reasonable hope of attaining the complete restoration of their country as an independent state. A nation which has a history of nine centuries, and one which contains many bright and glorious pages, cannot so easily divest itself of its individuality in order to become only the part of a whole, although that whole be its own race, and although it does thereby nothing but change the name of the species into that of

the genus. Besides these feelings of national self-love or pride, there are powerful interests of a more material nature, which must make the Poles, as well as every other nation, prefer a separate political existence to the union with another more powerful state, because the first-named position presents a much better chance of success for the talents and ambition of individuals than the last-mentioned combination." \*

These hopes are now more than ever excited, and all the hearts and minds of Poland are turned towards the West, awaiting in an agony of suspense the signal of their deliverance from the Allied Powers. It would have been, perhaps, unreasonable on the part of the Poles to expect that war should be undertaken for the restoration of their country, however necessary such a measure may be for the establishment of the peace of Europe on a solid and permanent foundation, because it would have been almost impossible to persuade the public of Western Europe to submit to an immediate sacrifice for the sake of a distant advantage. But the sword being once drawn against Russia, the Poles cannot understand that it could be returned to the scabbard without accomplishing an act of justice, as well as of sound policy, and the necessity of which for the whole of Europe has become a truism; for it would be indeed nothing less than the betrayal of that very cause for the sake of which the present war has been undertaken.

Should, however, these legitimate hopes be disappointed, and the Poles assigned by the verdict of Europe to share the destinies of Russia, I ask every unprejudiced person, to whatever nation he may belong, can it be then required from the Poles, with a shadow of justice, that they should continue a hopeless resistance for the advantage of that very Europe by whom they will be thus abandoned in

\* Panslavism and Germanism, p. 218.

such a nameless manner? And can they consider, should such a contingency take place, every expression of sympathy coming from that quarter otherwise than a most insulting mockery? And what will then remain to them, except to resign those delusive hopes, which have caused them a deluge of blood and tears, and, cordially uniting with Russia, become, instead of a barrier between Russia and Europe, the vanguard of the Slavonic empire against the latter, but particularly Germany? Russia will thus acquire a strength which will more than compensate for all her losses, because that which had hitherto been to her gigantic body the heel of Achilles will become his spear in her hands; and, indeed, if the Russians wish to avenge themselves by external conquest for their domestic oppression, will not the Poles have even much stronger reasons to be animated by feelings of a similar nature? This certainly will not be conducive to the welfare of humanity, and the progress of civilization. But I ask every manly heart, in whatever country it may beat, what would be its choice if its nation had no alternative between being either an object of terror or of pity? and whether it is not preferable to incur the hostility of the whole world than its contempt?

Such will be the cruel position into which the Poles must be inevitably thrown if Russia is to obtain peace without giving up the provinces which she has acquired by the partition of Poland,—a contingency of which I cannot even think without a feeling of mental distress, but which I believe it is my duty to expose to the public of Western Europe in all its terrible truth, and the consequences of which may be delayed, but not avoided. I therefore implore the statesmen of Europe, and all those who have any regard to the interests of humanity, to give their serious consideration to this subject. I do not wish them implicitly to believe my statements, but only attentively to examine them; because it may be said, without any

exaggeration, that the question whether Europe is to advance or to retrograde in the scale of civilization must depend upon this circumstance.

Austria will be the first to feel the consequences of this combination. The majority of her population is composed of Slavonians; and this circumstance induced the Emperor Joseph the Second, when he was beginning his reforms, to hesitate whether he was to establish as the official language of the whole empire the Bohemian or the German. He decided for the latter, and tried hard to force the language of the minority upon the majority of his subjects. His efforts to Germanise the Slavonians, as well as the Magyars, failed entirely, and even produced an effect diametrically opposed to that which he had sought to obtain; because, instead of destroying he reanimated the nationalities against which his measures were directed. The attempt at introducing the German language for public purposes was abandoned in Hungary, and the use of Latin restored. It was not so in the Slavonic provinces, which did not belong to Hungary, and the use of the German language for official purposes was continued there, though with some local modifications. It produced, however, an intellectual reaction, and gave a powerful impulse to the development of their national language and literature, particularly in Bohemia, and which continuing with increasing success, attained a very flourishing condition.\*

The Hungarian Diet adopted in 1830 the ill-judged resolution of replacing the use of the Latin language with the Magyar. The use of the Latin for all official transactions was established in Hungary soon after the introduction of the Christian religion. This was a very wise measure, as it established a common medium of communication between the heterogeneous elements of the population of that country (Magyars, Slavonians, and Walla-

\* *Vide* p. 26, *note*.

chians). It removed the most active cause of dissension between nations of an entirely different origin and language, and established, in some measure, an equality between the conquerors and the conquered, by placing them both on neutral ground. History shows us that when a nation is conquered by another, a long struggle ensues between the two races, represented by their languages, until the nationality of the conquered is exterminated by that of the conquerors, as was the case with the Slavonians of the Baltic; or that the nationality of the conquerors becomes absorbed by that of the conquered, who were superior to them in numbers, as was the case with the Franks in Gallia, the Danes in Normandy, and in some measure with the French-Normans in England. The annals of Hungary present no struggle of this kind, and although that country was exposed to foreign conquest and internal commotions, the parties by which it was torn were either political or religious, but we never see any contest between the different races which compose its population. This policy, the wisdom of which has been confirmed by the experience of ages, was abandoned by the above-mentioned resolution of the Diet of 1830, which, gradually advancing through several successive Diets, was fully established by that of 1844, which enacted that the Magyar language should be employed in all official transactions of the country; that it should become the medium of instruction in all the public schools; and that the Diets should deliberate in Magyar. The deputies of the annexed kingdoms (Croatia and Slavonia) were, however, permitted, in case they should not understand the Magyar, to give their votes in Latin; but this privilege was to be in force only at the Diets which were to take place within the next six years. The Magyar language was to be taught in all the schools of the above-mentioned provinces.

These enactments, which, imposing the language of the minority upon that of the majority, were calculated to destroy the nationality of the non-Magyar populations, roused a violent opposition, particularly amongst the Croats, which, gradually increasing, degenerated into an open breach, and was the beginning of that terrible commotion which ended in the destruction of Hungary as a separate state, extinguishing her constitutional liberties, and converting her into a mere province of the Austrian empire.\*

The Croats and other Austrian-Slavonians took part against the Hungarians and the Viennese democracy during that memorable struggle, not from any particular feeling of loyalty towards the house of Hapsburg, but for the sake of their nationality, wishing not only to secure it against the encroachments of Magyarism, but even entertaining a not unreasonable hope that Austria would adopt a Slavonic policy, *i. e.*, assume a Slavonic instead of a German character, giving to the last-named element a subordinate position, proportionate to the number of the population belonging to that race.† This line of policy,

\* The consequences of this ill-judged policy were so evident that the author of the present essay was able to predict them in his "Panslavism and Germanism," in May 1848, when the Magyars were on the best terms with the Austrian Cabinet, by the following passage, where, after having described the circumstances mentioned in the text, he says, "This, we fear, must lead to the entire dissolution of Hungary as a state, and it will be a melancholy event indeed; for no friend of liberty can withhold the due meed of praise from the Hungarians, for the unceasing efforts which they have of late been making in order to develop their constitutional liberties, and to extend them to all classes of the inhabitants. We in particular, as Poles, cannot but feel the strongest interest in the welfare of a nation, which always evinced the most sincere sympathy for our country. Let us, therefore, hope that the catastrophe which seems now menacing Hungary will be averted from that noble country, notwithstanding the lowering aspect of its political horizon, which forebodes storms of the most terrific description."—(Pp. 187, 188.) I leave it to the public to judge how far this prediction has been fulfilled.

† Austria contained, in 1842, 16,791,000 Slavonians and 6,425,000 Ger-

which, as is said, had been advocated by some very high personages, was not, however, adopted; and, notwithstanding the equalization of rights (*Gleichberechtigung*) of all the nationalities of Austria, which was proclaimed by her Government, it adopted a decidedly German character, and is sedulously labouring to force it upon the other nationalities of the empire. This produced great discontent amongst the Slavonians; and the Croats, who had virtually saved the crown of the Hapsburg dynasty, by arresting the revolutionary movement at Vienna in 1848, gave an unmistakable proof of their feeling on this subject, by proposing that the Russian language should be adopted for all public transactions in their province. This naturally produced a great and painful sensation over all Germany; but the Austrian Government, instead of profiting by the warning given it through this manifestation of the real feelings entertained by its Slavonic subjects, hushed up this ebullition of their discontent, and continues its system of Germanization. This not only increased the discontent amongst the Slavonians of Austria, but it excited a strong feeling of hostility amongst her neighbours belonging to the same race, and which has been recently manifested in the most undisguised manner by the Servians. It is also well known that there is not much love for Austria amongst the Russians, whose sentiments in this respect were frequently shown during the campaign of 1849. Even in 1828, Pozzo di Borgo, who was consulted by his Government on the political situation of Europe, in his secret despatch, addressed to Count Nesselrode from Paris on the 28th November 1828,\* expressed a strong feeling against Austria on account of her endeavours to arrest mans, of whom only between four and five millions formed a compact population, whilst the remainder was scattered amongst Slavonians and Magyars.

\* *Vid.* "Portfolio," vol. i.

the progress of the Russian arms in Turkey, charging her with ingratitude for the benefits which she had received from Russia. According to the opinion of that celebrated diplomate, it was the success of the Russian arms under the Emperor Alexander which had in some measure re-seated the Emperor Francis on his throne, and delivered over to him Italy, either by real acquisitions or by an unlimited influence which he was allowed to exercise over those parts which were not directly subject to him. The Austrian supremacy in Italy, which was threatened by the revolutionary movement in that country, was saved by the intervention of the Emperor Alexander, which gave the Court of Vienna an opportunity of extracting from the kingdom of Naples 200,000,000 francs (£8,000,000 sterling), as the price of having delivered it from the Carbonari. He goes on in this despatch enumerating various griefs against Austria and Prince Metternich, and concluding with the advice that it was absolutely necessary to show Austria that she would find Russia, in case of a war, *formidable, inexorable, and determined to pour out upon Austria all the calamities of war, without sparing to her any one of them.* If such were the feelings of the Russian Cabinet at that time, what must they be now, when Russia may say, with much more truth than then, that she has re-seated the Emperor of Austria on his throne by her intervention in Hungary? The Russian Cabinet will not think that this intervention was made as much in its own interest as in that of the crown of Austria, and that if the Hungarian insurrection had succeeded, it is more than probable that it would have extended to Poland. It will only consider Austria as guilty of an act of base ingratitude to her Imperial benefactor. It would certainly never pardon her even for not taking the part of Russia in the present war; how much less will it forgive her joining the Western Powers on the present occasion? Austria is

therefore more interested than any other power in reducing the strength of a neighbour whom she has mortally offended, and who will have much stronger motives and much better means to take revenge upon her than upon the Western Powers.

Prussia is exposed to no less great dangers than Austria from her Russian neighbours. Even Frederick II. observed, in his political writings, that Prussia must avoid as much as possible a collision with Russia, because the latter can inflict upon the former injuries which cannot be retaliated. The late diplomatic revelations have shown, indeed, by the cavalier manner in which the Emperor Nicholas has treated the part which Prussia was to play in the present political complications of Europe, that he is perfectly aware of the truth of Frederick's observation, which has become much greater since the partition of Poland, but particularly the acquisition of the kingdom of Poland by Russia in 1815, and which brought the Russian frontier to a distance of about two hundred and forty English miles from Berlin; so that, in case of a war, one victory of the Russian army may deliver the capital of Prussia into its power. Prussia has, besides, many other vulnerable points on the side of Russia; and these dangers did not escape the observation of some Prussian statesmen during the time of the Congress of Vienna. The most striking remarks on this subject are, I think, those which are contained in a memoir addressed by the Prussian General Knesebeck to the celebrated Baron Stein, dated Vienna, 28th September 1814. Strongly prejudiced as he was against the Poles, he wished a return to the state of things which had been established by the final partition of Poland, but changed by the Treaty of Tilsit. He foresaw, however, the impossibility of such an arrangement, as Russia was determined to retain at least a great part of the duchy of Warsaw, then occupied by her troops; and

he prefers to it the restoration of an independent Poland, though her territory, projecting between Austria and Prussia, was, according to his opinion, giving her an advantageous strategical position against Germany.

“One hundred thousand Polish troops,” says he, “posted about Lenczyca (about fifty English miles to the west of Warsaw), may be balanced by an army of one hundred and twenty thousand Prussians stationed near Posen, Czenstochow, or Bromberg; but five hundred thousand Russians occupying the above-mentioned position will break the Prussian kingdom into pieces.

“In the first case, the projecting of the Polish territory into the Prussian is disagreeable, uncomfortable; in the second, a similar protruding of the Russian territory threatens the very existence of Prussia, and destroys her independence.

“The first may be suffered; the second renders life itself worthless.

“There is no security for Prussia when a large portion of the Russian territory will protrude into her own; none for Austria as soon as Russia crosses the Vistula.”

He therefore concludes, that the security of Austria, as well as that of Prussia, requires that the frontiers of Russia should not extend to the left bank of the Vistula and the right one of the Bug; and when this could not be obtained, that nothing should be neglected in order to restore Poland, with the exception of those parts which Austria and Prussia require for a good military frontier; that is to say, to act honestly, and with every possible energy, for the re-establishment of that country as a self-existent (*selbstänidg*) independent state, governed by its own monarch, and who will not occupy any other throne besides.

“Should, however, Russia oppose an entire restoration of Poland, and extend her territory to the Warta, her plans of a universal monarchy will then become apparent; the freedom of Europe will be endangered on that side, and a war for saving the independence of other states must be shortly expected.

“In such a case, nothing remains to us than to begin at once to prepare the necessary means for meeting this contingency.

“These means are,—

“1. An intimate alliance between Austria and Prussia.

" 2. A military organization of all the German States; their confederation and intimate alliance with the two above-mentioned Powers.

" 3. An efficient organization of the military force of those two Powers; the construction of a fortress between Jablunka and Teschen by Austria, and of one near Posen by Prussia.

" 4. An intimate alliance of Austria, Prussia, and the rest of Germany, with England.

" 5. The prevention of an alliance between Russia and France by the united efforts of the Allied Powers.

" 6. In case of a war with Russia, the above-mentioned Powers must ally themselves with the Turks, and endeavour to put them into motion, as well as the Persians.

" 7. This war ought, however, to be as much as possible avoided, until the Turks and, if possible, the Persians will be inclined to take a part in it.

" 8. In case of this war, *the Poles must not be neglected, but the above-mentioned Powers must solemnly guarantee to them their emancipation from the Russian yoke, and the restoration of their country to an independent state, with the limitations mentioned before*" (i.e., the cession of some parts required for securing a good frontier to Austria and Prussia in a stratagetical point of view.)\*

Such was the view taken, just forty years ago, by an accomplished Prussian soldier and statesman,—who had no personal sympathies for the Poles,—of the position of Russia towards Austria, Prussia, and Germany, and of the necessity of restoring Poland, in order to fortify the position of the latter against the former. His fears about the extension of the Russian territory to the Warta were more than realised, because since 1815 a part of this river flows within that territory. But his salutary advice about what should have been done in a similar case has not been by any means followed. Prussia, instead of concluding an intimate alliance with Austria, the German States, and England, in order to counterbalance the preponderance of Russia, became a satellite of the last-named Power, whom Austria was also obliged to court on account of the precarious tenure by which she holds her Italian

\* "Das Leben des Ministers Freiherrn von Stein. Von G. H. Pertz." Berlin, 1851. Vol. iv. pp. 651-654.

provinces. And when Metternich sought to arrest the progress of the Russian arms in Turkey in 1828, he met with great coldness from England, and a virtual alliance between France and Russia, because Charles X. positively declared that an attack on Russia by Austria would be immediately followed by one made by France upon the last-named country. It was precisely the contingency which that far-sighted politician endeavoured to meet, by recommending the intimate alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Germany with England, and preventing a union of Russia with France. The Poles were more than neglected by Austria and Prussia, because the manner in which their nationality has been treated since 1815 in those states is much worse than what it had experienced under the Russian Government till the insurrection of 1830. The French Revolution of 1830 did no injury to Russia. Louis Philippe, who was placed by this commotion on the throne of Charles X., instead of opposing the influence of that Power, courted its favour in the most undignified manner,—an alliance with which was openly recommended by many devoted partisans of the Orleans dynasty; whilst the sincerity with which the Citizen King maintained the *entente cordiale* with England was sufficiently proved by his inactive policy during the Carlist insurrection in the Basque provinces, but particularly by the Spanish marriages.

The French Revolution of 1848, which overturned the throne of the Orleans dynasty, shook to their very foundations those of Austria and Prussia,—raised amongst the Germans hopes as extravagant as delusive,—destroyed the constitution of Hungary,—and produced in general much more harm than good to the cause of liberty, proved very advantageous to the power of Russia. And, indeed, her successful campaign in Hungary gave her an immense influence not only over Austria, but over Prussia and the

whole of Germany, who seemed to have no prospect of emancipating themselves from this moral vassalage. Now, when Providence, by one of those fortunate events which but too rarely occur in the history of mankind, has united the two most powerful states of the West with Turkey, against Russia, a most splendid opportunity is offered to Germany in order to emerge from that desperate position which, as General Knesebeck had nobly said, "*renders life itself worthless* to her patriots." I do not understand how the Government of these two states, but particularly of Prussia, can neglect taking advantage of it, without betraying the most vital interests of their respective countries. And, indeed, there can be no doubt that such a wilful dereliction of a most clear and incontestable duty of the head of a state, whether produced by a sentimental incapacity or guilty motives, ought to subject a responsible ruler to the penalty of high treason, and will brand an irresponsible sovereign with the historical stigma of a traitor to the dignity of his crown, as well as the honours and interests of his own dynasty, which are perfectly worthless, if not inseparably connected with those of his nation and country.

It would be, therefore, I consider, offering a gratuitous insult to those Governments if I were to suppose them capable of such conduct as that to which I have alluded above, without having positive proofs of it. Let us now examine what is precisely to be done in order to accomplish the object in question? The idea of transferring to Prussia that part of the ancient Polish territory which was given to Russia by the Treaty of Vienna, in 1815, under the name of the kingdom of Poland, was started in a French pamphlet, published not long ago at Paris, but suppressed by order of the Government, and has been hinted at by some German papers. This territory, comprehending an extent of 2320 geographical square miles,

with a population of 4,810,735,\* would be then united with Prussia, either by simply becoming a Prussian province, governed by the ministry of Berlin, as is now the case with the province of Posen, or in the manner in which it was united with Russia in 1815,—*i. e.*, having a representative constitution with an entirely separate administration and army, and connected with Prussia only by the mutual bond of one and the same sovereign,—exactly in the same manner as Hanover was united with this country from the accession of George I. to the demise of William IV., or Scotland, before her union with England, under Queen Anne. Now, admitting the first of these suppositions, what will be the consequences of this acquisition to the Prussian state? Will not the increase of its Slavonic population from two to more than six millions destroy its present German character, more than the third of its population thereby belonging to another race, and whose interests it will be continually to oppose the consolidation of the above-mentioned character? Will it not create a most powerful opposition in the legislative body of Prussia,—an opposition far more formidable than that which the section of the British House of Commons, known under the appellation of the Irish Brigade, creates often to the Government of this country? Such a party in the Prussian Parliament, having interests separate from those of the whole state, and directed by a skilful leader, will be always able, by joining the opposition, to defeat the Ministry on every question it may choose, and render a constitutional *regime* in Prussia *impossible*, because a popular form of government can never exist in a country, consistently with its safety, when the interests, at least of the great majority, of its population are not identical. And is it a contingency which any Prussian patriot may wish to bring about? The strong hand

\* According to the census of 1850.

of an absolute government, which must in such a case replace the constitutional one, which is now beginning to develop itself in Prussia, will not be, however, able to amalgamate this great mass of a heterogeneous element with the remainder of the population of Prussia, and all its efforts to Germanise the Poles will only tend to convert them into Slavonians. Consequently this combination, which will effect a geographical without accomplishing a moral union of the kingdom of Poland with Prussia, will be a much greater source of weakness than of strength to that state. What regard to the second of these suppositions,—namely, a union of the kingdom of Poland with Prussia by the common bond of one and the same monarch,—I think that such an arrangement, the conditions of which will undoubtedly be better observed by the Prussian monarchs as kings of Poland than they had been by the Russian sovereigns, who hold it by this title, and that, consequently, it would be very favourable to the prosperity of that portion of ancient Poland to which at least a part of Posen would be probably then united. The material and intellectual welfare of its inhabitants would, undoubtedly, assume a rapid development, and Prussia would be on that side strongly fortified, not only against Russia, but also against Austria. Yet, notwithstanding all these positive advantages, it would have, as is the case with every half-measure, many and serious drawbacks, which would almost inevitably, sooner or later, lead to very dangerous complications. The free development of the Polish nationality which will then take place in the part of ancient Poland connected with Prussia must exercise a powerful influence on those parts which will remain under the dominion of Austria and Russia, producing a continual excitement amongst their inhabitants, whose desire to be united with their more fortunate brethren will become so strong that it cannot but excite the jealousy of

the two above-mentioned Powers—*i. e.*, Russia and Austria—against Prussia, and lead to an alliance between the two first-named states against the latter. Such a contingency may easily disturb the peace of Europe and involve it in a general war under circumstances much more advantageous to Russia and much less favourable to the Western Powers than the present ones.

The transfer of the kingdom of Poland to Austria instead of Prussia would give to the former such an immense preponderance over the latter, particularly in a strategical point of view, as virtually to destroy its independence,—a combination most injurious to the interests of Germany in particular, and those of Europe in general; for it would leave Prussia no other alternative than to become a satellite either of Austria or Prussia,—two contingencies equally dangerous to the interests of the Western Powers, and which none of them, but particularly France, can ever allow to take place. A division of the above-mentioned part of ancient Poland between Austria and Prussia will only increase the number of malcontents in both of these states, and greatly favour the objects of the Panslavonic propaganda, which will be the most powerful means by which Russia may regain her lost position, and which I have more amply described on pages 26, 27.

It must be moreover observed, that the loss of that part of Poland which has been the subject of the foregoing observations will not form by any means an obstacle to the aggressions of Russia upon Turkey, if those parts of Poland which border on the Ottoman territory be left in her possession. Before the first dismemberment of Poland, these provinces entirely covered the Turkish frontiers from Transylvania to the river Kodyma, leaving only a space extending about one hundred English miles from that river to the Black Sea open to a Russian inva-

sion. The frontier between Russia and Turkey was then formed by the river Boh, flowing into the Black Sea through the above-mentioned tract of land, which being composed of steppes, rendered the march of an army exceedingly difficult, on account of the scarcity of water and provisions. Russia could therefore make no effective attack on Turkey except through the Polish territory, as she did in 1739, when sixty thousand Russians, commanded by Field-Marshal Munnich, crossed the territory of Poland, violating her neutrality, and invaded Moldavia, obtaining great advantages over the Turks by this movement. The Ottoman Porte was so convinced of the dangers with which it was menaced from the occupation of the Polish territory by the Russian troops, that it declared, in 1769, on that account, war against the Court of St Petersburg, after having represented in vain to the Courts of Europe the dangerous consequences which such an occupation would produce for all of them. The Polish territory was violated by Russia during the above-mentioned war (which ended in the treaty of Kainardgy), as well as in that which took place in 1788-1792; and the dismemberment of Poland having given to Russia the provinces bordering on the Turkish territory, opened it to Muscovite aggression from the Austrian frontier to the Black Sea. Ten years had scarcely elapsed from that time, when Russia, taking advantage of her position, invaded the Danubian principalities, under a frivolous pretence, in 1806, evidently considering the political complications in which Europe was then involved as very opportune for the accomplishment of her projects in that quarter. The tenacity with which she pursued her projects upon the Danubian principalities on that occasion is very remarkable indeed; for the French campaign of 1806-7, which ended in the Treaty of Tilsit, and the subsequent war with Sweden, produced only a temporary suspension of hos-

tilities, which were resumed with the greatest vigour as soon as the conquest of Finland was accomplished, and carried on without any disguise of their object, because the Emperor Alexander declared, by an ukase dated the 21st January 1810, the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the Danube, from the Austrian frontier to the Black Sea, the boundary of the Russian empire.\* The impending war with France compelled Russia to abandon the prey which she was holding in her grasp; but she succeeded, however, in securing a part of it through the peace of Bucharest, concluded in May 1812, by which she obtained Bessarabia, and extended her territory to the mouths of the Danube, whose free navigation she was continually impeding from that time. Russian territory was thus advanced from the Dniester to the Pruth and the Danube, and brought into contact with Bulgaria,—a circumstance which gave her great facilities to foment, during the time of peace, a spirit of hostility to the Ottoman Porte amongst its Slavonic subjects, and to invade its territory in case of a war.

The result of the circumstances discussed above has been too strikingly exemplified by the present war to require any further comments; and it is almost superfluous to observe, that the only means of preventing the recurrence of a similar contingency to the war in question, is to remove its cause, by wresting from Russia the territory which borders on the Turkish dominions, extending between Austria and the Black Sea, and thus to interpose a bar which will prevent every contact between Russia and Turkey, and become an effective obstacle to the material as well as moral action of the former on the latter.

A single glance at the map will clearly show the indispensability of such an arrangement for the preservation of the integrity of the Turkish territory, continually menaced

\* Alison's "History of Europe," vol. xv. chap. 69.

by Russia; but a most natural question may occur, namely, how is the territory destined to form a barrier between the Russian and Turkish dominions to be disposed, in order to obtain this object in the most effectual manner? There are only two possible modes of settling this subject. The territory in question may be either given to Austria, whose possessions will be thus extended from the eastern frontier of Galicia to the Black Sea, or to form it into a new independent state, or part of such a state.

As regards the first of these arrangements, which might be done in connection with those of Poland, which I have discussed on p. 40, *et seq.*, I believe that such a new partition of Poland would be any thing but advantageous to the real interests of Austria, because it would only swell her body, without giving her any increase of vitality. It would considerably augment the Slavonic element in her dominions, particularly the Russniak population, which, on account of the similarity of its language, is more accessible to the Russian influence than any other Slavonians.\* In short, this arrangement can have no other result than powerfully to advance the development of Panslavism, because I can most emphatically declare, that there is no other alternative for us between either becoming Poles, such as we have been for nine centuries, or becoming Slavonians. I appeal, in this respect, to my countrymen; and I feel certain that, however they may differ on other points, they will be unanimous in this respect.

An effective barrier between Russia and Turkey cannot be established by forming the territory mentioned above

\* The Russniaks, Russines, or Little Russians, so called in order to distinguish them from the Great Russians, or Muscovites, form, according to Szaffarin, a population of 13,144,000, of whom 2,774,000 are under the Austrian dominion, living in Eastern Galicia, with the exception of about 600,000 in the north-east of Hungary, whilst the rest belong to Russia.

into a separate principality, because it would only make a small and consequently weak state, which, instead of opposing Russia, would be even unable to maintain its own independence against its powerful neighbours. It results, therefore, from all that has been said, that the only effective means of establishing the peace of Europe on a really solid foundation, by securing it against the material and moral action of Russia,—against her conquest as well as influence, is to interpose between her and the east of Europe a state whose material force would be capable to oppose her arms, and whose Slavonic nationality would entirely destroy the possibility of ever accomplishing her ambitious project of a Panslavonic empire; because the existence of such a state would completely remove the cause which is now so powerfully promoting the desire of this combination amongst the western Slavonians, by granting to the great majority of them the thing itself for which they are striving—to obtain a compensation by the above-mentioned scheme. In short, the material and moral progress of Russia cannot be effectually arrested, and the peace and security of Europe established in a solid and permanent manner, otherwise than by the restoration of Poland, with the territory possessed by her previously to the year 1772, or the first partition of that country, with the addition of the shores of the Black Sea, between the mouths of the Dnieper und the Dniester.\* Some particles of the territory which cannot be given up without injuring some important interests of Austria and Prussia, as, for instance, Dantzic, must be excepted from the restoration, because these powers cannot co-operate in the accomplishment of a scheme injurious to themselves, and for which the future state of Poland may be compensated by the acquisition of

\* The Polish territory, which extended in the sixteenth century to the shores of the Black Sea, was separated from them at the time of its last partition in 1795, by a distance of about 100 English miles.

the shores of the Black Sea, which will not only be required by its commercial interests, but will be absolutely indispensable in a strategical point of view, for the establishment of an effective barrier to the aggressions of Russia in that important quarter, and which a single glance on the map may better prove than any arguments. A free commercial intercourse of Poland with the Baltic may be secured by a treaty with Prussia, guaranteed by the Western Powers, but particularly Great Britain, which will be as much interested in the maintenance of it as Poland. I moreover think that Austria may get a sufficient compensation for her cession of Galicia by obtaining the Danubian Principalities and Bessarabia, and thus securing the free navigation of the Danube, which is a vital question to her prosperity, and of the greatest importance to the commerce of Germany in particular, and to that of Europe in general. The commercial advantages of such a territorial arrangement have been discussed over and over, and have become quite a truism.

The Ottoman Porte cannot lose any real advantage by such an arrangement. Its dominion over the Danubian Principalities is almost nominal, whilst the revenue which it derives from those provinces is quite insignificant;\* and the only object which Turkey can have in retaining her sovereignty over the Principalities is, that it prevents their becoming a possession of Russia. Turkey may be more than compensated for the cession of the Principalities to Austria by the Mahometan provinces of Russia, situated beyond the Caucasus, which will give her more real strength than all her Christian population. The Ottoman dominions, extending to the Caspian, will become a much more effective barrier against the progress of Russia in that quarter

\* The annual tribute paid to the Porte by Wallachia is 460,000 francs; by Moldavia, 230,000 francs; making a total of 690,000 francs, or £26,800 English money.

than Persia, whose power, as experience has proved, could not be propped up by all the efforts of introducing European improvements, which seem to have considerably reinvigorated that of Turkey. The Circassian tribes have in general a great attachment to Turkey, and some of them belong to the same race, and speak the same language as the Turks. The same race and language predominates in the countries to the east of the Caspian Sea, Khiva, Bokhara, &c. This circumstance, and the community of their creed, for they belong, as well as the Afghans and other Mahometans of that region, to the same branch of Islamism as the Turks, must assure to the Sultan a great influence in that quarter, and which may be employed with considerable advantage for impeding the progress of Russian conquest and influence in Central Asia.\*

Prussia may obtain a compensation for the Polish territory now under her dominion, in the Baltic provinces of Russia, which, being essentially German, may be much easier brought into harmony with her national interests

\* Although the subject of the Caucasian nations does not enter into the immediate range of this essay, I cannot omit mentioning the most interesting population of them,—the race Karthli, generally known by the appellation of Georgians. Converted to Christianity in the fourth century, they remained faithful to their religion during centuries of the most cruel persecution; and their national dynasty, whose reign began even before their conversion, maintained its throne in Georgia and Imerettia during centuries of Persian and Turkish oppression, but the protection of Christian Russia proved more fatal to its existence in the space of a quarter of a century than ages of Mahometan dominion. The details of this event may be read in the well-known admirable little book, "The Progress of Russia in the East." I shall only add, that the Imerettians made in 1822, at the instigation of their clergy, an unsuccessful attempt to get rid of their Christian masters, and that as late as 1832 an extensive conspiracy of the Georgian nobles against the dominion of Russia, and in which numbers of the first families of the land shared, was discovered and punished with the utmost severity.\* The legitimate heirs of the crowns of Georgia and Imerettia live now in Russia, reduced to private condition. Why should not they be restored under the protection of the Western Powers?

\* Bodenstedt die Völker des Kaukasus, pp. 63, 280.

than the above-mentioned Polish territory. These particulars, however, will be amply discussed, and means to arrange every difficulty of this kind easily found, by the Council of the European Powers which will be occupied with the settlement of this question, vital to the peace and security of Europe. The restoration of Poland is a *European necessity*; it must, therefore, be treated as such, and not on any sentimental grounds,—not as a matter of feeling, but as one of reason,—as a *raison d'état, ratio status*, in diplomatic language, but which can never be sound if it violates the principles of right and justice.\*

Poland, in order to answer the requirements of Europe, expressed above, must be constituted in a solid manner. It must therefore be a hereditary kingdom, with a free

\* When correcting these sheets I found, to my great pleasure, the views which I have expressed in the text, supported by no less an authority than that of the *Times*, which says, in a leading article of the 14th June:—"For the first time since the partition of Poland, a rupture appears to be imminent between the three Northern Courts which shared in that transaction. Let Austria and Prussia ask themselves what they have gained by it. Let them review the diplomatic transactions of the Congress of Vienna, at the moment when Alexander announced his intention to avail himself of the position in which he stood, and to annex the Duchy of Warsaw to his empire. If the enormous acquisitions of Russia from the spoils of Poland are contrasted with the paltry extension and questionable advantage of such provinces as Galicia to Austria, or Posen to Prussia, it is evident that the practical result of the partition has been to advance the Russian dominions by several degrees of longitude to the west, and to place her armies in the position they now occupy, threatening Moravia and threatening Berlin. The full political and military effect of the annihilation of Poland was never felt before, because the contingency now before us had not previously occurred; and we speak here not of the wrongs of the Poles themselves, or of the spirit in which they endure them, but of the public interest of Germany and of Europe. For if an independent state be ever restored in Poland, it will be only by the policy of neighbouring states, who have learnt by experience the fatal consequences to themselves of their act of injustice. . . . . The Ottoman empire cannot be defended by the Ottoman strength alone; the balance of power between Russia and the Porte is too unequal, and must be rectified. At the present moment the armies and fleets of England and France are thrown into the scale, but upon the restoration of peace that object must be accomplished and secured by the wisdom of Europe."

constitution, such as will insure complete religious and civil liberty to every inhabitant, and perfect equality in the eyes of the law, as well as promotion by merit alone in all the branches of civil and military service, without any regard to class or religion. The executive power must be strong, particularly as the first task of the administration of the new state will be to restore unity to a body which had been torn to pieces for so long a time by the neighbouring governments. With regard to the dynasty to be placed on the Polish throne, if the author of this essay had to consult only his feelings of national pride, he would prefer above all to have a native monarch, one of his own brethren; but unfortunately this is perfectly impossible. There is no native individual whose merits, however great they may be, have obtained such a general recognition in the national opinion as to constitute a predominant majority in his favour. Moreover, every native will be shackled by ties of relationship, personal friendship, &c., to rise above which requires a more than human virtue, but which must greatly impede his action, produce many inconveniences, and render the new monarch unpopular, and his reign less efficient than it ought to be for the arduous task of reconstructing a state. The throne of Poland must therefore be occupied by a foreign prince, who will be free from all the above-mentioned ties, and similar considerations, having no other personal interests than those of his dynasty, identified with the prosperity and honour of his people.

It would be premature to discuss at present who may be the prince to whom the glorious part of recommencing the history of a great country will be assigned. The rumours which have reached me from Poland agree in stating that the general opinion of the country designates His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge as the most desirable person to fill the future throne of Poland; and there is no

doubt that the military exploits which he may have an opportunity of performing during the present war will considerably strengthen that opinion. There is also in Poland a hereditary sympathy for the Royal House of Saxony, to which the last free Diet of Poland, which abolished the elective monarchy by the constitution of 3d May 1791, offered the crown of their country. The transfer of the Saxon dynasty to the Polish throne might facilitate the indemnification of Prussia for the loss of the Polish territory by a union of Saxony; or a secular injustice might be repaired on that occasion, by placing on the throne of Saxony the eldest or Ernestine line of her ancient dynasty, which was deprived of its birthright for its adherence to the Protestant cause in the sixteenth century. The wisdom of European statesmen will, however, know best how to arrange this matter, as well as all those which will be required for the accomplishment of the great object, the necessity of which I have endeavoured to prove.

There are many of my countrymen, who, having despaired of ever obtaining justice for their country from the monarchs of Europe, sincerely believe that the only chance for Poland is to be reconstructed as a republic. Amongst those who entertain this opinion there are individuals for whose personal character I have the highest regard, and therefore I would be very sorry if they could suppose me capable of any slight or want of consideration for opinions so respectable, because sincere, as theirs. I would, however, ask them to show me in history the example of a permanently established republic, which was formed otherwise than by the development of local self-governments into a state by means of a confederation, more or less directed by a central government. This was the case with Switzerland, Holland, and the United States of America. The example of the latter is generally quoted by the pro-

moters of the republican form of government in Europe; but I think that this example may be, on the contrary, employed as the strongest argument against their views. The United States of America did not gain their form of government in consequence of their revolt from the mother country, because they were colonies previously settled and developed under the most popular forms of self-government, established by charters granted to the first settlers by England; the constitution of which was so democratic that it was hardly necessary to make any modification of it at the establishment of the Union; whilst one of the States (I believe Rhode Island) retained, without any change, its original constitution granted by Charles II. It is well known, indeed, that the war of independence was undertaken by the Americans on an entirely conservative principle; because they took up arms against the mother country, not to gain any thing which they had not before, but simply to defend the rights which they had inherited from their ancestors, and which were violated by England, who had thus brought about that memorable revolution, and not America. The United States, in fact, had nothing more to do, in order to accomplish their emancipation from the mother country, than to transfer the seat of their supreme government from London to Washington, without any necessity of changing their internal organization. This is the reason why the emancipation of those British colonies produced such splendid results; whilst that of Spanish America, not prepared by self-government for a republic, proved such a miserable failure. France has certainly had better opportunities than ourselves of making practical experiments on various forms of government; and she rejected, by an unmistakable expression of the national will, the republican form, by electing in 1848 Louis Napoleon as President. There could not be, indeed, a nobler representative of the

republican principle than General Cavaignac; whilst Louis Napoleon had not then had any opportunity of displaying those great qualifications of a ruler which have since characterised his reign. The French nation declared, however, by an overwhelming majority, in favour of a Buonaparte, not on account of any personal qualities of the candidate, but because he represented the monarchical principle; and, indeed, his election was a virtual declaration of the restoration of the Empire, the final establishment of which became then only a matter of time. Now, if the French nation did not feel itself able to establish with advantage to the country a republican form of government, how could we adopt it without the greatest danger to our newly restored country? Moreover, the European powers, whose interest it is to restore Poland, can never agree to give her a form of government which would be so little in harmony with the political organization of their own states.

Several writers, into whose motives I shall not examine, have tried to prove that Poland possesses neither moral nor material elements for political reconstruction; that the whole of her history is but a continual record of anarchy and misrule; that she fell entirely by her own fault, and that the natural character of her inhabitants, and the material resources of her territory, are by no means calculated to give a reasonable hope for the durability of the political existence of that country; and should its restoration take place, Europe cannot expect to derive from that event the advantages which are generally considered as being attached to it. The limits of this essay allow me not to enter into a detailed examination of these accusations. I would, however, ask the writers who have proffered them, how it was that a country, deprived of the elements necessary for self-existence, could, in spite of a most defective political organization, the most violent assaults from without, and internal commotions, pre-

serve its independence for centuries, and, even after its dissolution, effectively resist all the efforts which have been made to destroy its nationality? And, indeed, all those who are acquainted with the history of Poland will admit, that it is difficult to show the example of any other nation who could have resisted so as the Poles did, the dissolving influence of such a defective constitution as that of their country,—a circumstance which evidently proves the uncommon vitality of our nation. The defects of our political organization, however, did no injury to Europe, which mainly owes to the Poles that it had not been devastated by the Turks, when their power was in its zenith, and the whole brunt of which was borne by ourselves. We never interfered in the affairs of Western Europe except twice. We obtained in 1573 religious liberty for the French Protestants, by stipulating this condition at the election of Henry II. to our throne.\* And we rescued Germany under the walls of Vienna in 1683. The defective state of our constitution, which almost entirely destroyed the power of the executive, did not, however, produce any internal commotion whenever we were left to ourselves and not interfered with by our neighbours. This is a fact, attested by the well-known French writer, Rulhieres,† who,

\* It was on that occasion that the town of Sancerre, which had been reduced by a siege of ten months to all the horrors of famine, was liberated, and the Protestants, who defended themselves in it, were delivered by such a distant nation as the Poles.—*Popeliniere*, vol. ii. fol. 170. *Felice Histoire des Protestans de France*, p. 222.

† And yet I grieve to say, that there was found an English writer, who, in his ungenerous task of defending the oppressor, and calumniating his victim, could forget himself so far as to quote that very authority which I have given in the text in order to make the following misstatement:—"The annals of republican Poland previously to its dismemberment, are nothing but a history of anarchy, and such is the title actually given to a work which is only a horrible catalogue of tragedies, in which the nobles are the actors, who crowd the scenes with murders, fires, torturings, and famine, until the heart sickens with horror at the frightful spectacle."—*Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer*, p. 17. It was very natural that an author, who could make such statements, should disapprove of lectures on Polish history and

after having described the perfect absence of authority which prevailed in Poland at the time preceding her first dismemberment, says,—

“What is scarcely possible to understand is, that in the midst of such an anarchy, she (Poland) appeared to be happy and tranquil. Security prevailed in the towns, travellers might without danger traverse the most solitary forests, and pass over the least frequented roads. No crime was ever heard of; and nothing, perhaps, reflects more honour on human nature, and may confirm the philosophical opinion, that man is naturally good. No fanatical zeal appeared anywhere; there were no longer any injuries or resentments.”\*

A most salutary, though peaceful revolution was effected in 1764 by the influence of the Prince Czartoyski, which suspended the *liberum veto* (by means of which a single deputy could destroy the resolutions of the whole Diet), and introduced several other important reforms. This revolution, which changed at once the anarchical government of Poland into a well-regulated monarchy, was effected with a remarkable facility, and would have been easily developed and consolidated, had it not been destroyed by a direct interference of the foreign powers. Catherine Empress of Russia, and Frederic the Second of Prussia, not only fomented and supported a violent internal opposition to this salutary reform, but made a joint declaration (16th October 1766) that the suspension of *liberum veto* would be considered by them as a *casus belli*.

literature, given by refugees in various parts of the country, (p. 20.) His love of free discussion has been, however, fully established since that time, by his attacks on the periodical press of Britain,—an inconvenience from which he would certainly be free in the country of his predilection—Russia. And, indeed, he has strongly advocated the surrender of Constantinople to that power, because it would introduce there the elegancies of St Petersburg, (p. 7.) The cogency of this argument seems, however, not to have been fully appreciated by the Government as well as the public of this country, whose common sense and good feeling have now disposed of all the manœuvres by which the direct or indirect advocates of the Russian interests have tried to mislead public opinion.

\* “Histoire de l’Anarchie de la Pologne, vol. i. p. 173.

After the first dismemberment in 1772, the Poles endeavoured, in spite of their defective constitution, to repair their losses by every kind of internal improvement, but particularly by a better system of education. The result of this was the establishment of the constitution of the 3d May 1791, which has obtained such splendid eulogies from the most eminent statesmen of Great Britain,—Burke, Pitt, Fox, &c.; but which was overturned by the arms of Russia, assisted by the treachery of an ally perhaps unparalleled in history. The King of Prussia, who had strongly encouraged the Poles to establish the above-mentioned constitution, and concluded with them a defensive alliance on the 27th March 1790, instead of resisting Russia, as he was solemnly bound to do, by the provisions of that treaty, joined her in invading the territory of his ally. I shall, however, refer this subject to the testimony of a living author, who stands above every suspicion of partiality.

Frederick von Raumer, professor of history at the University of Berlin, and whose works have earned a well-merited fame in all Europe, wrote, in 1831, by order of his Government, an account of the fall of Poland.\* He cannot therefore be suspected of any undue bias towards the Poles; and, indeed, he gives extracts from several writers, containing most disadvantageous evidence against our nation. The most bitter of these accusations are those of the celebrated Abbe Raynal, and Frederick II. of Prussia, who, after having spoliated Poland, abused his victim, declaring, amongst other things, that women conducted every thing by their intrigues whilst the men were drunk. Having quoted those extracts, Raumer concludes with the following observations:—

“Judgments expressed at such different periods, and by various per-

\* “Polens Untergang,” published in the “Historischer Almanac” of Leipsic, for 1832, and reprinted in a separate form.

sons, cannot be entirely without foundation, and are of importance even in their exaggerations, as far as settled opinions about a nation never remain without effect. But these dark shades are on the other side relieved by bursts of light, which are likewise confirmed by history. Without accusing Russia, or posing the question whether other European states have remained blameless during the course of their development, and whether Germany in particular has not likewise rendered herself guilty of great neglect of her duties towards herself, it may be said that the love of liberty acts in such an inspiring and animating manner, and is such a laudable sign of internal worth, that one becomes tolerant even to its aberrations and exaggerations, particularly when contemplating those nations who are by nature deficient in that quality, in whom it has been destroyed by tyranny, and who became loath to it by anarchy. The Poles united always with their love of independence, valour, that fundamental condition of a manly character, and an unconquerable patriotism. It is true they did not constitute a well-organised state, in the present acceptation of this word; but their patriotism made them a nation, in which individuals appeared as real and living personages, and not merely as lifeless shadows and dead ciphers, only fit to figure in statistical tables. Finally, as to the Polish women,—though, from another point of view, there may be much in them to blame,—it is unreasonable to find fault with them because there was room in their hearts and in their heads for the concerns of their country; and, indeed, this fact in itself refutes many other accusations.”—(Page 9.)

The constitution which these much-abused Poles proclaimed on the 3d May 1791 is described by the same author as follows:—

“ Among all the constitutions which have been framed within the last forty years,\* the Polish constitution of the 3d May 1791 is, with the exception of the North American, the most ancient. Any defects in it would be therefore much more excusable than if it had taken birth at a period of more mature experience, or if it had been planned under more favourable circumstances, or by nations having attained a higher degree of civilization. How praiseworthy is it, therefore, that the Poles succeeded, under the most difficult and the most deplorable circumstances (such, indeed, as would have rendered desperate resolves excusable), to give themselves a constitution, which, superior to almost all the subsequent attempts of the kind, conciliates in a most satisfactory manner the general claims of reason and sound theory with the order of things established by history and with the requirements of the age,

\* This was written in 1831.

and kept all within the limits of the practicable! Had the theoretical point of view, and the consequent means, been obstinately insisted on, it would have led to wild dreams alone, while too great concessions to tradition would have led to the idolatry of the past; but Kollontay, Ignatius Potocki, and the other admirable originators of this constitution, happily steered their way between the dangers of these Scylla and Charybdis.

“ For if any one would find fault with certain provisions concerning religion and the relative positions of the two chambers, let him remember that Great Britain settled the first point only forty years later, and that France is still in doubt on the subject of the latter. All the other provisions were decidedly improvements on the existing order of things. Take, for instance, the extension of religious toleration, the enfranchisement of the towns, the regulation of all the dues of the peasantry, the new organization of the diet; the increased power of the senators, the form of elections, the abolition of the confederations and of the *liberum veto*, the establishment of an hereditary monarchy, &c.; and this constitution the Poles had given to themselves, without plunder, assassination, bloodshed, or injury to the rights of property. They combined the most tender respect for all vested rights, which could possibly be maintained, with the extermination of all radical evils, with wisdom, moderation, and perseverance. Such an admirable work was indeed deserving of the greatest possible success; doubly responsible, therefore, are those ruthless hands which polluted the pure, spotless deed, the calumniators who reviled it, and the miscreants who have destroyed it.”—(Page 89.)

We shall conclude our extracts from Raumer's work with the following passage, which may serve as the best answer to all those political sages who pretend that Poland fell entirely by the fault of her own children, who, they say, are incapable of political self-existence:—

“ The first dismemberment had, no doubt, at least partly, been brought about by the fault of the Poles,—by the neglect of their duties to themselves, and the anarchy which prevailed in their country. Since that time, however, they had advanced in a laudable manner towards a better state of things, and had even, in respect to the legal forms of public life, outsped their accusing neighbours: what right, therefore, had these latter to disturb, instead of assisting,—to destroy, instead of upholding? The tenth part of the forces which they set in motion for their unhallowed ends would have sufficed to extirpate all that was

wrong in Poland, and insure victory to all that was good. In 1772, Catherine declared that she was supporting the cause of Polish liberty, while, from motives of covetousness, she was promoting anarchy. In 1791 she received the congratulations of the confederates of Targovitza for having checked the *ultra-monarchical* innovations in Poland, and in 1792 she designated those very innovations as *jacobinical and democratic!* In the same manner, Frederick William, following the triumphal car of Russia, shifted about in word and deed.

“ War was made upon France because the royal power had there been diminished, and upon Poland because it had there been increased; and this increase was ascribed to the Jacobins (the enemies of all kings.) Whilst in France licentiousness, assuming the mask of a false philosophy and philanthropy, led ambitious innovators to the overthrow of all governments, in Poland the infatuated kings seems to have entered into a conspiracy with their adversaries to surpass the latter in jacobinical practices, and to destroy amongst nations all respect for right, property, the sanctity of oaths, and the duty of subjects!

“ Indeed, the Poles were more unfortunate than those nations who were conquered in an open, simple war. Their friendship was sought with a view of betraying it; it was considered a pleasure to break treaties solemnly concluded with them; they were driven into courses which were afterwards condemned, and sentiments were ascribed to them which they never had harboured. At the present day, it is only blind prejudice, wilful ignorance, or base calumny, which can accuse the originators of the constitution of the 3d May 1791 of having been blameworthy revolutionists.”—(Page 112.)

All this, we think, sufficiently proves, that Poland has enough of moral elements for her political regeneration, and requires only favourable circumstances in order to give them the development which will be necessary for the attainment of this object.

What regard to the material resources of Poland, a single glance on the territorial extent and present population of the provinces which belonged to that country, previously to its first dismemberment in 1772,\* may convince every unprejudiced person of the importance of those resources :—

\* Extracted from “ Almanac de Gotha ” for 1848. The miles are German, —15 to a degree.

	Sq. miles.	Population.
Austrian Poland or Galicia contains, . . . . .	1594	4,910,629
Kingdom of Poland, . . . . .	2319	4,857,250
Provinces taken by Russia at the three dismemberments—		
Government of Vilna, . . . . .	767	863,700
"    Witepsk, . . . . .	810	789,500
"    Wolhynia, . . . . .	1296	1,445,500
"    Mohilef, . . . . .	884	931,300
"    Minsk, . . . . .	1662	1,046,400
"    Grodno, . . . . .	692	907,100
"    Kowno, . . . . .	758	915,500
"    Kioff, . . . . .	913	1,605,800
Total of the Polish provinces incorporated with Russia, . . . . .	5782	8,504,800
PRUSSIAN POLAND.		
Grand Duchy of Posen, . . . . .	536	1,364,399
Western Prussia, formerly Royal or Polish Prussia, taken 1772, . . . . .	471	1,019,105
Total . . . . .	1007	2,383,504
RECAPITULATION.		
Under the Russian dominion—		
A Kingdom of Poland, . . . . .	2319	4,857,250
Provinces incorporated with Russia, . . . . .	5782	8,504,800
Under the Austrian dominion, . . . . .	1594	4,910,629
Under the Prussian, " . . . . .	1007	2,383,504
Total extent and population of the lands which constituted ancient Poland, . . . . .	10,702	20,656,183

It is superfluous to add, that the population inhabiting those lands may be doubled without creating any inconvenience; and that their industry being almost entirely limited to the production of raw materials, they would present, with a free trade, a most important market for British manufactures.

Princes and Nations of Europe! do you know what is the cause of the present war? the real, though not proximate cause, which, unless removed, will continue to

distract the peace of the world? It is the shade of murdered Poland, who, appearing from the grave in which you had fancied her for ever laid, shakes her bloody shroud in your face, calling, with a loud voice,

“Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere divos!”

Yes! justice, justice, or an avenging Nemesis, who is already brandishing her scourge over your heads, will inflict upon Europe countless evils, the effects of which may be felt by distant generations. Avert, therefore, these calamities, ere it be too late, by a great act of justice, which will obliterate the foulest political crime that blots the pages of modern history,—the partition of Poland. What do we Poles ask from Europe? Are we desiring to disturb the lawful possessions of any one,—to upset the social order and the peace of Europe by some dangerous innovations? No; we desire nothing but our birthright; we desire not to be aliens upon our native soil,—a soil inherited from our ancestors, impregnated with the blood of our men, the tears of our women, and which we desire of being allowed to till in peace, and free from foreign dominion. We therefore implore Europe not to refuse us an act of unquestionable justice, and not to force, by its denial, those who might be a blessing to become a curse, to the world as well as to themselves; because the despair of a nation may produce effects such as it is impossible even to contemplate without a shudder, but which I consider it my duty to point out (p. 23) to the attention of Europe. I therefore entreat every right-minded person, to whatever nation he may belong, to give this subject his serious consideration ere it be too late.

Ah! if such a feeble voice as mine could ever reach the throne of the monarchs in whose hands Providence has now placed the destinies of Europe, I would say to the Elect of the French nation, “Sire, two hundred thou-

sand Polish lives have been cheerfully sacrificed, under the banners of republican and imperial France, as a price for the future restoration of their country. An envious fate did not allow Napoleon I. to accomplish this great act of justice and wisdom. It has been reserved to you, Sire,—you, who have achieved a nobler triumph than all the conquests of your great predecessor, for you have gained the friendship and esteem of his most formidable rival.” No less glory is it to Queen Victoria in having inaugurated a new era in modern history, by the establishment of a cordial union between the two most powerful and civilised nations of Europe (whose divisions had been the source of so much misfortune to humanity), and a mutual confidence between their Governments such as had not existed since the days of Elizabeth and Henry IV. Why should not, therefore, the present Anglo-French alliance accomplish that splendid scheme, devised by the genius of those two great sovereigns, for the establishment of the peace of Europe on a solid and permanent foundation, but the execution of which, suspended by the death of Elizabeth, was prevented by that of Henry IV. at the very moment when he was about to begin it? \* The restora-

\* It is scarcely necessary to observe, that I am alluding here to that celebrated project, conceived by Henry IV., to reduce the then dangerous power of the Austrian dynasty, and to establish the community of the European states upon a secure and permanent foundation,—an arrangement which, by satisfying the wants and feelings of its nations, might secure to Europe a perpetual peace. According to that scheme, this peace was to be maintained by a permanent congress, composed of the delegates of all the states forming the European confederation, and possessed of sufficient means to prevent its breach, not by simple words, but by real deeds. It seems, however, that it is not generally known that the same scheme had been conceived by Queen Elizabeth even before it had been communicated to her by Henry; nay, it is not improbable that she suggested to him this idea. Sully says, in speaking of this project, “If the first idea of this was not given him (Henry IV.) by Elizabeth, it is at least certain that this great Queen had long before imagined it herself as a means of avenging Europe on Austria” (read now, Russia), “its common enemy.”—*Mémoire de Sully*, p. 430.

tion of Poland must form an indispensable part of such a scheme, as being the only means of effectively counterbalancing the power of Russia (which, even after its reduction, will be considerable),\* by covering Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and allowing the development of the Christian populations, from the Danube to the Mediterranean, free from Russian influence, and in a manner accordant with the interests of true civilization as well as the peace and security of Europe.

\* Russia, even reduced to the geographical position which she occupied at the accession of Peter the Great, would contain a population of about forty millions, and capable of being trebled without inconvenience.

THE END.





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